Da 25-1075

Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice_DA-25-1075_as released 12-18-25.pdf

Application to Participate in a FCC Auction, FCC Form 175

DA 25-1075

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DA 25-1075
Released: December 18, 2025
AUCTION OF ADVANCED WIRELESS SERVICES (AWS-3) LICENSES
NOTICE AND FILING REQUIREMENTS, MINIMUM OPENING BIDS, UPFRONT
PAYMENTS, AND OTHER PROCEDURES FOR AUCTION 113
BIDDING SCHEDULED TO BEGIN JUNE 2, 2026
AU Docket No. 25-117
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Heading
I.

Paragraph #

GENERAL INFORMATION .................................................................................................................1
A. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................1
B. Background and Relevant Authority ................................................................................................3
C. Description of Licenses to Be Offered in Auction 113.....................................................................8
D. Incumbency Issues ..........................................................................................................................12
E. Auction Specifics ............................................................................................................................14
1. Auction Title and Start Date.....................................................................................................14
2. Auction Dates and Deadlines ...................................................................................................15
3. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation............................................................................16
4. Requirements for Participation.................................................................................................17
F. Educational Materials .....................................................................................................................18
II. PRE-BIDDING ACTIVITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS .................................................................21
A. Due Diligence .................................................................................................................................21
B. Licensing Considerations................................................................................................................26
1. International Coordination........................................................................................................27
2. Environmental Review Requirements......................................................................................29
3. Mobile Spectrum Holdings ......................................................................................................30
4. Quiet Zones ..............................................................................................................................31
C. Short-Form Applications: Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026 .................................32
D. Application Processing and Minor Modifications ..........................................................................35
1. Public Notice of Applicants’ Initial Application Status and Opportunity for Minor
Modifications............................................................................................................................35
2. Public Notice of Applicants’ Final Application Status After Upfront Payment
Deadline....................................................................................................................................38
E. Upfront Payments ...........................................................................................................................39
1. Making Upfront Payments by Wire Transfer for Auction 113 ................................................40
2. Completing and Submitting FCC Form 159 ............................................................................45
3. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility ...............................................................................47
F. Auction Registration .......................................................................................................................53
G. Remote Electronic Bidding via the Bidding System ......................................................................56

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H. Mock Auction .................................................................................................................................60
I. Fraud Alert ......................................................................................................................................61
III. SHORT-FORM APPLICATION CONTENTS AND CERTIFICATIONS .........................................64
A. General Information Regarding Short-Form Applications .............................................................64
B. Certification of Notice of Auction 113 Requirements and Procedures ..........................................76
C. Acknowledgement Statement for Auction 113 Applicants.............................................................81
D. License Selection ............................................................................................................................82
E. Disclosure of Agreements and Bidding Arrangements...................................................................84
F. Ownership Disclosure Requirements..............................................................................................93
G. Foreign Ownership Disclosure Requirements ................................................................................95
H. Additional Disclosures for Small Businesses and Rural Service Providers Seeking
Bidding Credits ...............................................................................................................................96
1. Small Business Bidding Credit...............................................................................................101
2. Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit...................................................................................104
3. Attributable Interests ..............................................................................................................106
I. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters..................................................................117
J. Modifications to FCC Form 175...................................................................................................122
1. Duty to Maintain Accuracy and Completeness of FCC Form 175 ........................................122
2. Modifying an FCC Form 175 .................................................................................................123
IV. INFORMATION PROCEDURES AND PROHIBITED COMMUNICATIONS..............................130
A. Information Procedures During the Auction Process ...................................................................130
B. Prohibited Communications and Compliance with Antitrust Laws .............................................136
1. Entities Subject to Section 1.2105(c) .....................................................................................137
2. Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline ..............................................................138
3. Scope of Prohibition on Certain Communications; Prohibition on Joint Bidding
Agreements.............................................................................................................................139
4. Communicating with Third Parties ........................................................................................148
5. Section 1.2105(c) Certifications.............................................................................................152
6. Duty to Report Prohibited Communications ..........................................................................153
7. Procedures for Reporting Prohibited Communications..........................................................154
8. Additional Information Concerning Prohibition on Certain Communications in
Commission Auctions ............................................................................................................157
9. Antitrust Laws ........................................................................................................................158
V. BIDDING PROCEDURES .................................................................................................................160
A. Clock-1 Auction Structure ............................................................................................................162
B. Individual Licenses in Two Geographic Area Types....................................................................164
C. Bidding Rounds ............................................................................................................................165
D. Stopping Rule................................................................................................................................171
E. Activity Rule .................................................................................................................................172
F. Acceptable Bids ............................................................................................................................179
1. Reserve Prices ........................................................................................................................179
2. Minimum Opening Bids .........................................................................................................185
3. Clock Price Increments...........................................................................................................192
4. Bid Types ...............................................................................................................................194
5. Intra-Round Bids ....................................................................................................................196
6. Proxy Bids ..............................................................................................................................199
7. Missing Bids...........................................................................................................................206
G. Bid Processing ..............................................................................................................................207
1. No Excess Supply Rule for Bids to Reduce Demand.............................................................208
2. Eligibility Rule for Bids to Increase Demand ........................................................................210
3. Processed Demand .................................................................................................................211
4. Price Determination................................................................................................................215
5. Caps on Bidding Credits.........................................................................................................219
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6. Winning Bids..........................................................................................................................228
VI. POST-AUCTION PROCEDURES .....................................................................................................229
A. Down Payments ............................................................................................................................230
B. Final Payments..............................................................................................................................231
C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601) ....................................................................................232
D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602) .......................................................236
E. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit .........................................................................................................239
F. Default and Disqualification .........................................................................................................241
G. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance .........................................................................245
VII. PROCEDURAL MATTERS..............................................................................................................247
A. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis ..............................................................................................247
B. Congressional Review Act............................................................................................................248
C. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis ...........................................................................................249
D. Contact Information ......................................................................................................................276
ATTACHMENT A: Auction 113 Licenses; Bidding Units, Upfront Payments, and Minimum Opening
Bid Amounts
ATTACHMENT B: Acknowledgement Statement for Auction 113 Applicants
I.

GENERAL INFORMATION
A.

Introduction

1.
By this Public Notice, the Office of Economics and Analytics (OEA), jointly with the
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB), establishes the procedures to be used for Auction 113, the
auction of 200 Advanced Wireless Services licenses for spectrum in the Commission’s inventory in the
1695–1710 MHz, 1755–1780 MHz, and 2155–2180 MHz bands (collectively, the “AWS-3” bands).
Auction 113, which marks the Federal Communications Commission’s (Commission) first auction since
its authority to use competitive bidding lapsed in 2023, will bring unused, valuable 5G-ready spectrum to
market, and proceeds will fund the Commission’s ongoing efforts to protect American networks from
untrustworthy and insecure foreign equipment.
2.
Bidding in Auction 113 is scheduled to commence on June 2, 2026. Auction 113 will be
conducted using an ascending clock auction with a supply of one in each category of frequency-specific
channel blocks, referred to as the “clock-1” auction format. This Public Notice provides details regarding
the procedures, terms, conditions, dates, and deadlines governing participation in Auction 113 bidding, as
well as an overview of the post-auction application and payment processes.
B.

Background and Relevant Authority

3.
The Commission is offering licenses in Auction 113 pursuant to the Spectrum and Secure
Technology and Innovation Act of 2024 (Spectrum and Secure Technology and Innovation Act).1 The
Spectrum and Secure Technology and Innovation Act directs the Commission to initiate a system of
competitive bidding under section 309(j) of the Communications Act to grant licenses for spectrum in its
inventory in the AWS-3 bands as of December 23, 2024.2 Auction proceeds will support the
Commission’s Supply Chain Reimbursement Program, which implements the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act of 2019 by reimbursing eligible advanced communications service

Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, Pub.
L. No. 118–159, Div. E, Title LIV, §§ 5401–5405 (Spectrum and Secure Technology and Innovation Act), § 5403
(2024) (mandating that the Commission initiate a system of competitive bidding for licenses for unassigned AWS-3
spectrum within 18 months of December 23, 2024), https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ159/PLAW118publ159.pdf.
1

Id.

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providers for their costs to remove, replace, and dispose of Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE
Corporation equipment and services obtained on or before June 30, 2020.3
4.
On March 11, 2025, in accordance with section 309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended (Communications Act),4 OEA and WTB released a public notice seeking comment on
certain competitive bidding and other various procedures to be used in Auction 113.5 Ten parties filed
comments in response to the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, and six parties filed reply comments.6
5.
The Commission’s rules and decisions provide the underlying authority for the
procedures we adopt today for Auction 113.7 As specified in section 27.1105 of the Commission’s rules,
any auction of licenses for spectrum in the AWS-3 band is to be governed by the bidding procedures set
forth in part 1, subpart Q.8 The Commission has also adopted rules regarding the AWS-3 bands, as well
as the licensing and operating rules that are applicable to all part 27 services.9 On July 24, 2025, the
Commission adopted an order updating the designated entity provisions of the part 27 rules that had
applied to the Commission’s first auction of AWS-3 spectrum in 2014.10
Id. § 5404(b)(2)(A), (c)(1). In its comments, Hoopa Valley Public Utilities District (Hoopa Valley) recommends
that funds from spectrum auctions and licenses should be strategically and primarily directed towards expanding
rural Tribal cellular services and communications infrastructure support on Tribal lands rather than for incumbent
reimbursement. See Hoopa Valley Comments at 2–3. No parties commented on Hoopa Valley’s recommendation.
Even if Hoopa Valley’s recommendation did not conflict with Congress’s express direction for the Auction 113
proceeds, the use of auction proceeds is outside the scope of this proceeding on auction procedures as well as
outside the scope of OEA’s and WTB’s delegated authority. See 47 CFR §§ 0.271, 0.131. Under section
309(j)(8)(A) of the Communications Act, the Commission is required to deposit all proceeds from the use of a
competitive bidding system in the Treasury in accordance with chapter 33 of title 31, except as provided in express
circumstances. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(A).
3

47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(E)(i) (requiring Commission to seek comment on proposed auction procedures); see also id.
§ 309(j)(4)(F) (authorizing Commission to prescribe reserve price or minimum bid); 47 CFR § 1.2104(c)–(d).
4

Auction of Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-3) Licenses; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures
for Auction 113, AU Docket No. 25-117, Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd 1479 (OEA/WTB 2025) (Auction 113
Comment Public Notice).
5

The comments and reply comments filed in response to the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice are available in
AU Docket No. 25–117 in the Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). The ECFS home page is
publicly accessible at www.fcc.gov/ecfs. We generally note in the context of discussing particular issues whether
any commenter addressed those issues.
6

See generally 47 CFR pt. 1, subpt. Q.

47 CFR § 27.1105.

See generally 47 CFR part 27, subpart M; id. § 2.106.

See Enhancing National Security Through the Auction of AWS-3 Spectrum Licenses; Applying New Average
Annual Gross Revenue Benchmarks for Small Business Bidding Credits; Amendment of the Commission’s Rules
with Regard to Commercial Operations in the 1695–1710 MHz, 1755–1780 MHz, and 2155–2180 MHz Bands,
GN Docket No. 25-70, GN Docket No. 25-71, GN Docket No. 13-185, Report and Order and Second Report and
Order, FCC 25-39 (rel. July 25, 2025) (2025 AWS-3 Report and Order). Although the Auction 113 Comment Public
Notice did not make any proposals or seek comment on the existing buildout rules for the AWS-3 bands, T-Mobile
requests that we adopt an accelerated two-year buildout deadline for Auction 113 winning bidders because it claims
that doing so will favor bidders with the financial capacity, operational readiness, and technical sophistication to
promptly deploy service as well as discourage “speculative bidding.” See T-Mobile Comments at 2–5. AT&T,
CCA, Council Tree, and WISPA each oppose T-Mobile’s request. See AT&T Reply at 3–4 (opposing T-Mobile’s
request because it would require amendment to the Commission’s part 27 rules that must be made in a rulemaking
proceeding, which would delay the auction); CCA Reply at 5–6 (winning bidders should be afforded additional time
and flexibility without negative consequences); Council Tree Reply at 5–6 (a short buildout window would benefit
large incumbents like T-Mobile and serve as a barrier to entry to other bidders); WISPA Reply at 3–4 (an
(continued….)

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6.
Prospective applicants should familiarize themselves with those rules,11 including
amendments and clarifications thereto, as well as Commission decisions regarding competitive bidding
procedures, application requirements, and obligations of Commission licensees.12 In addition, applicants
must be thoroughly familiar with the procedures, terms, and conditions contained in this Public Notice
and any future public notices that may be released in this proceeding.13
7.
The terms contained in the Commission’s rules, relevant orders, and public notices are
not negotiable. OEA and WTB may amend or supplement the information contained in their public
notices at any time, and may issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental information that
may generally apply to applicants. Pursuant to the Commission’s rules, OEA and WTB also retain the
authority to implement further procedures during the course of this auction.14 It is the responsibility of all
applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with all public notices pertaining to
Auction 113.15
C.

Description of Licenses to Be Offered in Auction 113

8.
The AWS-3 spectrum available in Auction 113 will be licensed on a geographic area
basis. Of the 200 licenses offered in Auction 113, the 48 licenses located in the A1 block (1695–1700
MHz), B1 block (1700–1710 MHz), H block (1760–1765/2160–2165), I block (1765–1770/2165–2170),
and J block (1770–1780 MHz/2170–2180 MHz) are based on Economic Areas (EAs) and the 152 located

accelerated timeline would substantially discourage, if not entirely foreclose, small and rural providers from
participating in Auction 113 and effectively make AWS-3 spectrum accessible only to large providers). The
Commission adopted buildout rules for the AWS-3 bands in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order. See Amendment of
the Commission’s Rules with Regard to Commercial Operations in the 1695–1710 MHz, 1755–1780 MHz, and
2155–2180 MHz Bands, GN Docket No. 13-185, Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 4610, 4659, para. 135 (2014) (2014
AWS-3 Report and Order); 47 CFR § 27.14(s). Amendments to those rules require a rulemaking proceeding and
cannot be made in the context of establishing the procedures for Auction 113 because such action is outside the
scope of OEA’s and WTB’s delegated authority. See 47 CFR §§ 0.271, 0.131.
11

See generally 47 CFR pt. 1, subpt. Q.

See, e.g., Updating Part 1 Competitive Bidding Rules et al., WT Docket Nos. 14-170 et al., Report and Order, Order
on Reconsideration of the First Report and Order, Third Order on Reconsideration of the Second Report and Order,
Third Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 7493 (2015) (Updating Part 1 Report and Order) (modified by Erratum,
30 FCC Rcd 8518 (2015)); Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules—Competitive Bidding Proceeding,
WT Docket No. 97-82, Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd
5686 (1997) (Part 1 Order); Order on Reconsideration of the Third Report and Order, Fifth Report and Order, and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 15 FCC Rcd 15293 (2000) (Part 1 Fifth Report and Order)
(modified by Erratum, 15 FCC Rcd 21520 (2000)); Seventh Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 17546 (2001) (Part 1
Seventh Report and Order); Eighth Report and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 2962 (2002); Second Order on Reconsideration
of the Third Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration of the Fifth Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 10180
(2003) (Part 1 Third R&O Second Recon/Part 1 Fifth R&O Recon); Second Order on Reconsideration of the Fifth
Report and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 1942 (2005) (Part 1 Fifth R&O Second Recon).
12

See Section III.B. (Certification of Notice of Auction 113 Requirements and Procedures), below.

See 47 CFR §§ 0.21(m), 0.131(a), (c), 0.271(a) (“The Chief, [OEA], shall not have authority to act on notices of
proposed rulemaking and of inquiry, final orders in rulemaking proceedings and inquiry proceedings, and reports
arising from any of the foregoing except . . . notices and orders addressing the detailed procedures for
implementation of auctions of spectrum and broadcast services . . . .” (emphasis added)).
14

Copies of most auctions-related Commission documents, including public notices, can be retrieved from the
Commission’s Auctions Internet site at www.fcc.gov/auctions. Additionally, documents are available at the
Commission’s headquarters during normal business hours when the building is open to the public. See
Section VII.D. (Contact Information), below, for additional guidance.
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in the G block (1755–1760/2155–2160) are based on Cellular Market Areas (CMAs).16 The AWS-3
frequencies will be licensed in five and ten megahertz blocks, with each license having a total bandwidth
of five, ten, or twenty megahertz.17 The list of licenses to be offered in Auction 113 is available in the
Attachment A file on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.18
9.
The 1695–1710 MHz band will be licensed in an unpaired configuration for low-power
mobile transmit (i.e., uplink) operations.19 The 1755–1780 MHz band will be licensed paired with the
2155–2180 MHz band, with the 1755–1780 MHz band authorized for low-power mobile transmit (i.e.,
uplink) operations and the 2155–2180 MHz band authorized for base station and fixed (i.e., downlink)
operations.20
10.
Figure 1 shows the band plan for the 1695–1710 MHz band. Figure 2 shows the band
plans for the 1755–1780 MHz and 2155–2180 MHz bands. Table 1 contains summary information
regarding the AWS-3 licenses available in Auction 113.

47 CFR § 27.6(k). WISPA requests that Block G be redefined using county level geographic areas for Auction
113, rather than on a CMA basis, as specified in the part 27 rules. See WISPA Comments at 2–5; CCA Reply at 7
(supporting WISPA’s request to the extent such a change is feasible). However, AT&T, CTIA, and Verizon are
correct that implementing such a change would require an amendment to the Commission’s part 27 rules that must
be adopted in a rulemaking proceeding. See AT&T Reply at 4; CTIA Reply at 3–4; Verizon Reply at 7. A
Commission rule cannot be amended in the context of this proceeding establishing the procedures for Auction 113
because such action is outside the scope of OEA’s and WTB’s delegated authority. See 47 CFR §§ 0.271, 0.131.
16

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4634, paras. 51–52.

Although we did not seek comment on establishing a Tribal licensing window for AWS-3 spectrum inventory in
the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, five parties commented on this topic. See John Vetter Comments at 1;
Hoopa Valley Comments at 1–2; Michael Ravnitzky (Ravnitzky) Comments at 3–4; CTIA Reply at 2; Verizon
Reply at 7. The Commission declined in the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order to implement a Tribal licensing
window for Auction 113. See 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 23–25, paras. 58–63. Accordingly, the Commission
has already resolved this issue. Id. at 24–25, para. 62.
18

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4612, 4620–21, 4625, paras. 2, 19, 29.

See id. at 4612, 4630, 4631–32, paras. 2, 41, 43–44. Higher-power fixed and base station operations are also
prohibited in the 1755–1780 MHz band. See id. at 4631, para. 43.
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Figure 1: 1695–1710 MHz Band Plan
1695
Federal
MetSAT

1700

1710

AWS-3
A1

AWS-3
B1

AWS-1

Mobile Transmit/Base Receive

Figure 2: 1755–1780 MHz and 2155–2180 MHz Band Plans
1755

AWS-1

1765

1760

1770

AWS-3 AWS-3 AWS-3
G
H
I
CMA

1780

AWS-3
J

Federal

Mobile Transmit/Base Receive
2155

AWS-1

2160

2170

2165

AWS-3 AWS-3 AWS-3
G
H
I
CMA

2180

AWS-3
J

AWS-4/MSS

Base Transmit/Mobile Receive

Table 1: AWS-3 License Summary (Auction 113)
Block

Frequencies (MHz)

Total
Bandwidth

Pairing

Geographic
Area Type

A1
B1
G
H
I
J

1695–1700 MHz
1700–1710 MHz
1755–1760/2155–2160 MHz
1760–1765/2160–2165 MHz
1765–1770/2165–2170 MHz
1770–1780/2170–2180 MHz

5 MHz
10 MHz
10 MHz
10 MHz
10 MHz
20 MHz

unpaired
unpaired
2 x 5 MHz
2 x 5 MHz
2 x 5 MHz
2 x 10 MHz

EA
EA
CMA
EA
EA
EA

Number of
Licenses
1
1
152
14
29
3

11.
Each potential bidder is solely responsible for investigating and evaluating all technical
and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the potential uses of a license that it may seek in
Auction 113. In addition to the typical due diligence considerations that we encourage of bidders in all
auctions,21 we call particular attention in Auction 113 to the incumbency issues in the 1695–1710 MHz,
In advance of each auction, the Commission has urged potential bidders to undertake research, conduct market
analyses and consider a broad range of marketplace and regulatory factors and associated risks before making any
decisions on participation. See Section II.A. (Due Diligence), below. See also, e.g., Auction of Flexible-Use Service
Licenses in the 3.45–3.55 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements,
Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 110, AU Docket No. 21-62, Public
Notice, 36 FCC Rcd 9272, 9308–10, paras. 108–13 (2021) (Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice); Auction of
Flexible-Use Licenses in the 2.5 GHz Band For Next Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing
Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 108; Bidding
(continued….)
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1755–1780 MHz, and 2155–2180 MHz bands and protection of Federal and non-Federal incumbent
operations, described below.22 Each applicant should closely follow releases from the Commission
concerning these issues and consider carefully the technical and economic implications for commercial
use of the AWS-3 band. The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of this
spectrum for particular services, or about the information in Commission databases that is furnished by
outside parties.
D.

Incumbency Issues

12.
The AWS-3 bands are currently being used for a variety of government and nongovernment services. In the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, the Commission allocated the 1695–1710
MHz and 1755–1780 MHz bands for commercial use.23 Licenses in the 1695–1710 MHz band are being
made available on a shared basis with incumbent Federal meteorological-satellite (MetSat) data users.24
Licenses in the 1755–1780 MHz band are being made available on a shared basis with a limited number
of Federal incumbents indefinitely, and some Federal systems that have or will over time relocate out of
the band.25 Licenses to operate in the 1695–1710 MHz and 1755–1780 MHz bands are subject to the
condition that the licensee must not cause harmful interference to an incumbent Federal entity relocating
from these bands under an approved Transition Plan.26 This condition remains in effect until the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) terminates the applicable authorization of
the incumbent Federal entity.27 In addition, AWS-3 licensees in the 1755–1780 MHz band must agree to

Scheduled to Begin July 29, 2022, AU Docket No. 20-429, Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd 4370, 4413–14, paras. 123–
28 (OEA/WTB 2022) (Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice).
22

See Section I.D. (Incumbency Issues), below.

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4612, 4620, 4627, 4629, 4684–85, 4688, paras. 2, 16, 33, 37,
198–200, 207. The Commission allocated the 1695–1710 MHz band for non-Federal fixed and mobile (except
aeronautical mobile) use and the 1755–1780 MHz band for non-Federal fixed and mobile use. See id., App. A; 47
CFR § 2.106.
23

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4612, para. 2. The Commission adopted twenty-seven
Protection Zones for the 1695–1710 MHz band in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, and the forty-seven Federal
earth stations located in these Protection Zones will operate on a co-equal, primary basis with commercial AWS-3
licensees. See 47 CFR § 2.106, US note 88. All other Federal earth stations operate on a secondary basis. See 47
CFR § 2.106, US note 88(b). In order to facilitate coordination, uplink/mobile transmit devices in the 1695–1710
MHz band must be under the control of, or associated with, a base station as a means to facilitate shared use of the
band and prevent interference to Federal operations. See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4620–21,
4648, paras. 19, 100–02.
24

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4612, para. 2. The Federal systems located in the Protection
Zones adopted by the Commission for the 1755–1780 MHz band in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order will operate
on a co-equal, primary basis with commercial AWS licensees. See 47 CFR § 2.106, US note 91. The Federal
systems that will relocate from the band pursuant to an approved transition plan will operate on a primary basis until
they are reaccommodated. Id. In order to facilitate coordination, uplink/mobile transmit devices in the 1755–1780
MHz band must be under the control of, or associated with, a base station as a means to facilitate shared use of the
band and prevent interference to Federal operations. See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4631,
4648, paras. 43, 100–102. NTIA issues annual reports on the status of the transitions of spectrum in the 1695–1710
MHz and 1755–1780 MHz bands. See, e.g., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2024/2023-commercial-spectrumenhancement-act-csea-report. See also https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/aws-3-transition.
25

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4691–92, para. 219 and App. A; 47 CFR § 27.5(h) (Note).
See also 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(16)(C).
26

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4691–92, para. 219 and App. A; 47 CFR § 27.5(h) (Note).
Although this license condition does not apply to the permanent sharing scenario, the Commission’s rules require
successful coordination to avoid causing harmful interference to these Federal incumbents. See 47 CFR
§ 27.1134(c), (f).
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accept interference from incumbent Federal users while they remain authorized to operate in the band.28
The 2155–2180 MHz band is already allocated for exclusive non-Federal, commercial use. Although no
Federal users are currently licensed or operating in the 2155–2180 MHz band, AWS-3 licensees may have
to protect or relocate and/or share in the cost of relocating non-Federal incumbent Fixed Microwave and
Broadband Radio Service licensees in the band.29
13.
AWS-3 licensees in the 1695–1710 MHz and 1755–1780 MHz bands are required to
successfully coordinate with Federal incumbent users in these bands prior to operating in designated
protection zones.30 The 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order established that 1695–1710 MHz licensees
operating at certain power levels are required to coordinate with Federal incumbents in those protection
zones, and higher-powered operations would generally require nationwide coordination.31 Similarly,
operations in the 1755–1780 MHz band are subject to successful coordination with Federal incumbents in
the protection zones adopted for that band, with the default coordination zone being nationwide.32 Prior
to commencing operations in the 1755–1780 MHz band, an AWS-3 licensee must reach a coordination
arrangement on an operator-to-operator basis with each Federal agency that has an assignment with
United States and Possessions authority.33 The FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures Public Notice
contains various refinements to the previously-defined protection zones for each of these bands.34 That
Public Notice also provides information and guidance on the overall coordination process for these bands,
as contemplated by the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, including informal pre-coordination discussion
and the formal process of submitting coordination requests to, and receiving responses from, relevant
Federal agencies.35 We encourage each potential applicant to carefully review these coordination
requirements and the policies and procedures adopted by the Commission to implement them, and to
consider the impact of those requirements and policies on the potential applicant’s business plans.36

See 47 CFR § 27.1134(f). See also 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4693, para. 222.

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4682–83, paras. 194–196 and App. A; 47 CFR §§ 27.1111,
27.1131, 27.1132.
29

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4692–93, paras. 220–22 and App. A; 47 CFR § 2.106(c)(88),
(91); 47 CFR § 27.1134(c), (f).
30

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4620–21, 4645, 4692–93, paras. 19, 90, 220–22 and App. A;
47 CFR § 2.106(c)(88); 47 CFR § 27.1134(c).
31

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4645, 4692–93, paras. 91, 220–22 and App. A; 47 CFR
§ 2.106(c)(91); 47 CFR § 27.1134(f).
32

47 CFR § 27.1134(f)(1)(i).

See The Federal Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration: Coordination Procedures in the 1695-1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz Bands, GN Docket
No. 13-185, Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 8527, 8530–35, 8540–42, 8542–69 (Section III., “Refined Protection Zones
Establishing Areas Where AWS-3 Licensees Must Successfully Coordinate with Federal Incumbents Operating
Under Non-USP Assignments;” Section V., “Refined Protection Zones for 25 Satellite Earth Stations and
Streamlined Coordination Option;” Appendices A, B, C) (WTB 2014) (FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures Public
Notice).
34

See id. at 8535–40, Section IV., “Coordination Process Guidance.”

Although we did not seek comment on the existing spectrum sharing and coordination requirements for the
AWS-3 bands in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, Ravnitzky expresses opposition to Federal spectrum
sharing and coordination requirements for the AWS-3 bands because he contends that they create challenges for
bidders and could deter participation or lead to underutilized spectrum. Ravnitzky Comments at 1–2. Ravnitzky’s
arguments are outside the scope of this proceeding, and as such, we do not address them. The Commission adopted
rules for the spectrum sharing and coordination requirements for the AWS-3 bands in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and
Order. See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 4610, 4612, 4620–21, 4631, 4648, 4682–83, 4690–94,
paras. 2, 19, 43, 100–02, 194–96, 216–24; 47 CFR § 2.106, US notes 88, 88(b), 91; § 27.5(h) (Note); §§ 27.1111,
(continued….)

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Auction Specifics
1.

Auction Title and Start Date

14.
The auction of licenses for spectrum in the Commission’s inventory in the AWS-3 bands
will be referred to as “Auction 113.” Bidding in Auction 113 will begin on June 2, 2026. Pre-bidding
dates and deadlines are listed below. The initial schedule for bidding rounds in Auction 113 will be
announced by public notice at least one week before bidding begins. Unless otherwise announced,
bidding on all licenses will be conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all licenses.
2.
15.

Auction Dates and Deadlines

The following dates and deadlines apply to Auction 113:

Auction Application System (AAS) Publicly Available ...Expected January 7, 202637
Auction Application Tutorial Available (via Internet) ......No later than January 12, 2026
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
Filing Window Opens........................................................January 26, 2026, 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET)
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
Filing Window Deadline ...................................................February 11, 2026, 6:00 p.m. ET
Upfront Payments (via wire transfer) ................................April 8, 2026, 6:00 p.m. ET
Bidding Tutorial Available (via Internet) .........................No later than May 1, 2026
Mock Auction ....................................................................May 29, 2026
Bidding Begins in Auction 113 .........................................June 2, 2026
3.

Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

16.
We adopt our proposal that at any time before or during the bidding process, OEA, in
conjunction with WTB, may delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 113 in the event of a natural
disaster, technical obstacle, network interruption, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an
auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and
efficient conduct of competitive bidding.38 This approach has proven effective in resolving exigent
circumstances in previous auctions, and we find no reason to depart from it here. OEA will notify
participants of any such delay, suspension, or cancellation by public notice and/or through the FCC
Auction Bidding System’s (bidding system) announcement function. If the bidding is delayed or
suspended, then OEA may, in its sole discretion, elect to resume the auction starting from the beginning
of the current round or from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its entirety.39 We emphasize
that OEA and WTB will exercise the authority to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 113 solely
at their discretion.
4.
17.

Requirements for Participation

Those wishing to participate in Auction 113 must:

27.1131, 27.1132, 27.1134(c), (f). Amendments to those rules require a rulemaking proceeding and cannot be
adopted in the context of establishing the procedures for Auction 113 because such action is outside the scope of
OEA’s and WTB’s delegated authority. See 47 CFR §§ 0.271, 0.131.
37

The Commission will release a public notice announcing the date on which the public may access the
Commission’s new AAS and will provide additional instructions, as detailed herein. See para. 65, below.
See 47 CFR § 1.2104(i); Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1492, para. 31. The only party that
commented on this proposal supports adopting it. See CCA Comments at 7.
38

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1492, para. 31; see also 47 CFR §§ 0.271, 0.21(m).

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•

Submit a short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on
February 11, 2026, following the electronic filing procedures and other instructions set forth in
this Public Notice and in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.40

•

Submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159) by
6:00 p.m. ET on April 8, 2026, following the procedures and instructions set forth in this Public
Notice.41

•

Comply with all provisions outlined in this Public Notice and applicable Commission rules.
F.

Educational Materials

18.
Before the opening of the short-form filing window for Auction 113, detailed educational
information will be provided in various formats to potential participants on the Auction 113 web page.42
Specifically, OEA will provide various materials on the pre-bidding processes in advance of the opening
of the short-form application window, beginning with the release of step-by-step instructions for
completing the FCC Form 175 in the Commission’s Auction Application System (AAS), which is the
Commission’s newly developed system that will be used for the first time in this auction. These materials
will be available in the Education section on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113. In
addition, OEA will provide an online application procedures tutorial for the auction, covering information
on pre-bidding preparation, completing short-form applications, and the application review process.
Applicants should carefully review both the Auction 113 application tutorial and the FCC Form 175 filing
instructions, paying close attention to any departures from previous application processes as a result of the
use of the new AAS for Auction 113.43
19.
In advance of the start of the mock auction, OEA will provide educational materials on
the bidding procedures for Auction 113, including a user guide for the bidding system, bidding system
file formats, and an online bidding procedures tutorial. These materials will provide detailed information
on bidding features specific to the ascending clock auction format, including intra-round bidding and
proxy bids. We recognize the importance of these materials to applicants’ and bidders’ comprehension of
the bidding procedures we adopt herein. Accordingly, the educational materials will be released as soon
as reasonably possible to provide potential applicants and bidders with time to understand them and ask
questions of Commission staff before bidding begins.44
20.
We believe that parties interested in participating in Auction 113 will find the interactive,
online tutorials an efficient and effective way to further their understanding of the application and bidding
Prior to the opening of the short-form application window, OEA will make publicly available detailed instructions
for submitting an FCC Form 175 for Auction 113 (FCC Form 175 Instructions) in the Education section on the
Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.
40

See Section II.E.2. (Completing and Submitting FCC Form 159), below.

Ravnitzky advocates for additional educational support in the form of personalized and interactive tools for less
experienced participants, claiming that the educational resources the Commission makes available to participants are
often too generalized for bidders to apply to their particular circumstances. Ravnitzky Comments at 5–6. The
Commission currently offers a wide variety of educational materials, demonstrations, educational opportunities, and
other information and resources to assist prospective applicants and bidders with understanding the AAS and the
bidding system. Moreover, individual prospective applicants and bidders can address specific questions to
Commission staff well in advance of all auction deadlines. As a result, we conclude that the added benefit, if any, of
developing personalized and interactive educational tools in time for Auction 113 is outweighed by the time and
expense that Commission would incur to customize such resources.
43

As explained below, in order to access the Auction Application Portal (AAP) within the new AAS, an individual
must have a unique email address associated with an FCC Username account that is associated with the applicant’s
FCC Registration Number (FRN) in the Commission Registration System (CORES). See Section III.A. (General
Information Regarding Short-Form Applications), below.
44

See Section VII.D. (Application Processing and Minor Modifications), below.

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DA 25-1075

processes. The online tutorials will allow viewers to navigate the presentation outline, review written
notes, and listen to audio of the notes. Additional features of these web-based tools include links to
auction-specific Commission releases, email links for contacting Commission staff, and screen shots of
the online auction application and bidding systems. The online tutorials will be accessible in the
Education section on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113. Once posted, the tutorials
will remain continuously accessible.
II.

PRE-BIDDING ACTIVITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS
A.

Due Diligence

21.
We remind each potential bidder that it is solely responsible for investigating and
evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the licenses that it
is seeking in Auction 113 and that it is required to certify, under penalty of perjury, that it has read this
Public Notice and has familiarized itself with the auction procedures and the service rules for the AWS-3
bands.45 The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of this spectrum or
these licenses for particular services. Each applicant should be aware that a Commission auction
represents an opportunity to become a Commission licensee, subject to certain conditions and
regulations.46 This includes the established authority of the Commission to alter the terms of
existing licenses by rulemaking, which is equally applicable to licenses awarded by auction.47 A
Commission auction does not constitute an endorsement by the Commission of any particular
service, technology, or product, nor does a Commission license constitute a guarantee of business
success.
22.
An applicant should perform its due diligence research and analysis before proceeding, as
it would with any new business venture. In particular, we encourage each potential bidder to perform
technical analyses and/or refresh its previous analyses to assure itself that, should it become a winning
bidder for any Auction 113 license, it will be able to build and operate facilities that will fully comply
with all applicable technical and legal requirements. We urge each applicant to inspect any prospective
sites for communications facilities located in, or near, the geographic area for which it plans to bid,
confirm the availability of such sites, and to familiarize itself with the Commission’s rules regarding the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and any
other environmental statutes that may apply.48
23.
We also encourage each applicant in Auction 113 to continue to conduct its own research
throughout the auction in order to determine the existence of pending or future administrative or judicial
proceedings that might affect its decision on continued participation in the auction. Each applicant is
responsible for assessing the likelihood of the various possible outcomes and for considering the potential
45

See Section III.B. (Certification of Notice of Auction 113 Requirements and Procedures), below.

Section 301 of the Communications Act authorizes the Federal Government to maintain control “over all the
channels of radio transmission,” requires a license for wireless transmissions, and provides that “no such license
shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.” 47 U.S.C. § 301.
See also 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(D) (“Nothing … in the use of competitive bidding, shall be construed to convey any
rights, including any expectation of renewal of a license, that differ from the rights that apply to other licenses
within the same service that were not issued pursuant to this subsection.”).
See, e.g., Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Celtronix Telemetry, Inc. v. FCC, 272 F.3d
585, 589 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(D)).
47

42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; 54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq.; 47 CFR pt. 1, subpt. I. We note that in August 2025, the
Commission released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to consider updates to its rules implementing NEPA. See
Modernizing the Commission’s National Environmental Policy Act Rules; CTIA Petition for Rulemaking on the
Commission’s National Environmental Policy Act Rules, WT Docket No. 25-217, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC 25-47 (rel. Aug. 14, 2025). Potential bidders in Auction 113 should be mindful that if the Commission amends
its NEPA rules, AWS-3 licensees will be subject to the amended rules.
48

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DA 25-1075

impact on licenses available in an auction. The due diligence considerations mentioned in this Public
Notice do not constitute an exhaustive list of steps that should be undertaken prior to participating in
Auction 113. As always, the burden is on the potential bidder to determine how much research to
undertake, depending upon the specific facts and circumstances related to its interests. For example,
applicants should pay particular attention to the requirements presented by the temporary and indefinite
sharing of portions of the AWS-3 bands by incumbent Federal users and AWS-3 licensees, which may
vary by geography and frequency.49 As discussed above, the FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures Public
Notice contains additional information regarding the extent of sharing in the AWS-3 bands, refinements
to the protection zones adopted in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, and information and guidance on
the overall coordination process between commercial and Federal users. We expect that the information
in both the FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures Public Notice and federal agencies’ approved transition
plans will be material to an applicant’s potential participation in Auction 113. Therefore, we strongly
encourage each applicant to closely review these materials, as well as future releases from the
Commission and NTIA concerning these issues, and to carefully consider the technical and economic
implications for commercial use of the AWS-3 bands.
24.
Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated risks and for
investigating and evaluating the degree to which such matters may affect their ability to bid on,
otherwise acquire, or make use of the licenses available in Auction 113. Each potential bidder is
responsible for undertaking research to ensure that any licenses won in the auction will be suitable for its
business plans and needs. Each potential bidder must undertake its own assessment of the relevance and
importance of information gathered as part of its due diligence efforts.
25.
The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding the accuracy or
completeness of information in its databases or any third-party databases, including, for example, court
docketing systems. To the extent the Commission’s databases may not include all information deemed
necessary or desirable by an applicant, it must obtain or verify such information from independent sources
or assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases. Furthermore, the Commission
makes no representations or guarantees regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has
been provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.
B.

Licensing Considerations

26.
In addition to the incumbency issues discussed above,50 potential bidders should be aware
of the following licensing considerations concerning the use of the AWS-3 frequencies they acquire in
Auction 113.
1.

International Coordination

27.
Potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas adjacent to the Canadian and
Mexican borders should be aware that the use of the AWS-3 frequencies they acquire in Auction 113 are
subject to current and future agreements with the governments of Canada and Mexico.
28.
The Commission routinely works with the United States Department of State and
Canadian and Mexican government officials to ensure the efficient use of the spectrum as well as
interference-free operations in the border areas near Canada and Mexico. Until such time as any adjusted
agreements, as needed, between the United States, Mexico, and/or Canada can be agreed to, operations in
the AWS-3 bands must not cause harmful interference across the border, consistent with the terms of the
agreements currently in force.

See Section I.D. (Incumbency Issues), above.

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Environmental Review Requirements

29.
Licensees must comply with the Commission’s rules for environmental review under the
NEPA, the NHPA, and any other environmental statutes that may apply.51 Licensees and other applicants
that propose to build certain types of communications facilities for licensed service must follow
Commission procedures implementing obligations under NEPA and NHPA prior to constructing the
facilities.52 Under NEPA, a licensee or applicant must assess if certain environmentally sensitive
conditions specified in the Commission’s rules are relevant to the proposed facilities, and prepare an
environmental assessment when applicable.53 If an environmental assessment is required, then facilities
may not be constructed until environmental processing is completed. Under NHPA, a licensee or
applicant must follow the procedures in section 1.1320 of the Commission’s rules,54 the Nationwide
Programmatic Agreement for Collocation of Wireless Antennas, and the Nationwide Programmatic
Agreement Regarding the Section 106 National Historic Preservation Act Review Process.55 Compliance
with section 106 of the NHPA requires Tribal consultation, and if construction of the communications
facilities would have adverse effects on historic or Tribally significant properties, an environmental
assessment must be prepared.56
3.

Mobile Spectrum Holdings

30.
We remind bidders of the Commission’s mobile spectrum holdings policies applicable to
the AWS-3 band. Specifically, the Commission did not impose a pre-auction bright-line limit on
acquisitions of the AWS-3 band.57 The Commission also determined that it would perform case-by-case
review of proposed secondary market transactions once AWS-3 was found suitable and available for the
provision of mobile telephony/broadband services.58 All 65 megahertz of AWS-3 spectrum have been
found suitable and available and are currently included in the spectrum screen.59

42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; 54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq.; 47 CFR Chapter 1, pt. 1, subpt. I.

See Accelerating Wireless Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment,
WT Docket No. 17-79, Second Report and Order, 33 FCC Rcd 3102 (2018) (amending the Commission’s rules
concerning the types of deployments that are subject to review pursuant to NHPA and NEPA).
52

47 CFR § 1.1307. This assessment may require consultation with expert agencies having environmental
responsibilities, such as U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, among others.
53

Id. § 1.1320.

Id. pt. 1, Appendices B and C.

Id. § 1.1307; see also Implementation of State and Local Governments’ Obligation to Approve Certain Wireless
Facility Modification Requests Under Section 6409(a) of the Spectrum Act of 2012, WT Docket No. 19-250, RM11849, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 5977, 6000–03, paras. 45–50 (2020)
(clarifying that no environmental assessment has to be filed if the parties enter into a memorandum of agreement to
resolve all adverse effects).
56

See In the Matter of Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings; Expanding the Economic and Innovation
Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, WT Docket No. 12-269, GN Docket No. 12-268, Report and
Order, 29 FCC Rcd 6133, 6219–21, paras. 218, 222–24 (2014).
57

Id. at 6135, 6177–79, 6219, 6221, paras. 4, 100–02, 218, 224.

See Communications Marketplace Report, GN Docket No. 18-231 et al., Report, 33 FCC Rcd 12558, 12586, para.
32 Fig. A-23 (2018).
59

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Quiet Zones

31.
AWS-3 licensees must individually apply for and receive a separate license for each
transmitter if the proposed operation will affect the radio quiet zones set forth in the Commission’s
rules.60
C.

Short-Form Applications: Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026

32.
In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 113, an applicant must first follow the procedures
to submit a short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically via the Auction Application Portal
(AAP) in the AAS, following the instructions set forth in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. The short-form
application will become available with the opening of the initial filing window and must be submitted
prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026. Late applications will not be accepted. No application
fee is required for short-form applications.61
33.
Applications may be filed at any time beginning at 12:00 p.m. ET on January 26, 2026,
until the filing window closes at 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026. Applicants are strongly encouraged
to file early and are responsible for allowing adequate time for filing their applications. There are no
limits or restrictions on the number of times an application can be updated or amended until the initial
filing deadline.
34.
An applicant must always click on the CERTIFY & SUBMIT button on the Certify &
Submit screen to successfully submit its FCC Form 175 and any modifications; otherwise, the application
or changes to the application will not be received or reviewed by Commission staff. Additional
information about accessing, completing, and viewing the FCC Form 175 is provided in the FCC
Form 175 Instructions. Applicants requiring technical assistance should contact FCC Auctions Technical
Support using the contact information provided in Section VII.D. (Contact Information), below.62 In
order to provide better service to the public, all calls to Technical Support are recorded.
D.

Application Processing and Minor Modifications
1.

Public Notice of Applicants’ Initial Application Status and Opportunity for
Minor Modifications

35.
After the deadline for filing auction applications, the Commission will process all timely
submitted applications to determine whether each applicant has complied with the application
requirements and provided all information concerning its qualifications for bidding. OEA will issue a
public notice with applicants’ initial application status, identifying: (1) those that are complete; and
(2) those that are incomplete or deficient because of defects that may be corrected. The public notice will
include the deadline for resubmitting corrected applications and an electronic copy will be sent by email
to the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 for each applicant. In addition, each applicant with an
incomplete application will be sent information on the nature of the deficiencies in its application, along
with the name and contact information of a Commission staff member who can answer questions specific
to the application.
60

47 CFR § 1.924.

Each Auction 113 winning bidder must, however, submit a filing fee with each separate long-form application.
47 CFR § 1.1102. The Commission adopted a long-form application filing fee that includes an amount to recover
costs for processing the short-form application. Amendment of the Schedule of Application Fees Set Forth in
Sections 1.1102 through 1.1109 of the Commission’s Rules, MD Docket No. 20-270, Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd
15089, 15104–06, paras. 45–51 (2020) (adopting a filing fee for geographic-based wireless license long-form
applications).
61

We caution applicants that the Commission periodically performs scheduled maintenance of its IT systems.
During scheduled maintenance activities, which typically occur over weekends, every effort is made to minimize
any downtime to auction-related systems, including the AAP. However, there are occasions when auction-related
systems may be temporarily unavailable.
62

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36.
After the initial application filing deadline on February 11, 2026, applicants can make
only minor modifications to their applications.63 Major modifications (e.g., change of license selection,
change in ownership that would constitute an assignment or transfer of control of the applicant, change in
the required certifications, change in applicant’s legal classification that results in a change in control, or
change in claimed eligibility for a higher percentage of bidding credit) will not be permitted.64 If an
amendment reporting changes is a “major amendment,” as described in section 1.2105(b)(2) of the
Commission’s rules, the major amendment will not be accepted and may result in the dismissal of the
application.65 After the deadline for resubmitting corrected applications, an applicant will have no further
opportunity to cure any deficiencies in its application or provide any additional information that may
affect Commission staff’s ultimate determination of whether and to what extent the applicant is qualified
to participate in Auction 113 and whether the applicant may be eligible to pursue any bidding credit
claim.
37.
Commission staff will communicate only with an applicant’s contact person or certifying
official, as designated on the applicant’s FCC Form 175, unless the applicant’s certifying official or
contact person notifies Commission staff in writing that another representative is authorized to speak on
the applicant’s behalf.66 Authorizations may be sent by email to auction113@fcc.gov.
2.

Public Notice of Applicants’ Final Application Status After Upfront
Payment Deadline

38.
After Commission staff reviews resubmitted applications and upfront payments, OEA
will release a public notice identifying applicants that have become qualified bidders for the auction. A
Qualified Bidders Public Notice will be issued before bidding in the auction begins. Qualified bidders are
those applicants with submitted FCC Form 175 applications that are deemed timely filed and complete
and that have made a timely and sufficient upfront payment.
E.

Upfront Payments

39.
In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 113, a sufficient upfront payment and a complete
and accurate FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised 2/03) must be submitted before
6:00 p.m. ET on April 8, 2026. After completing its short-form application, an applicant will have access
to an electronic blank version of the FCC Form 159.67 An accurate and complete FCC Form 159 must
See 47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(2). Minor amendments include any changes that are not major, such as: the deletion or
addition of authorized bidders (to a maximum of three); revision of addresses and telephone numbers of the
applicant, its responsible party, and its contact person; correcting typographical errors; and supplying or correcting
information as requested to support the certifications made in the application. Id.
63

47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(2); see also Two Way Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 12035, 12039,
para. 8 (1999) (denying an auction applicant’s request to change its designated entity status after application filing
deadline).
64

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(2) (“An application will be considered to be newly filed if it is amended by a major
amendment and may not be resubmitted after applicable filing deadlines.”). Any change in control of an applicant—
resulting from a merger, for example—will be considered a major amendment, and the application will consequently
be dismissed. We reiterate that, even if an applicant’s FCC Form 175 is dismissed, the applicant would remain
subject to the communication prohibitions of 47 CFR § 1.2105(c) until the down payment deadline for Auction 113.
See id. § 1.2105(b)(2) for more examples of major amendments.
65

In no event, however, will the Commission send auction registration materials to anyone other than the contact
person listed on the applicant’s FCC Form 175 or respond to a request for replacement registration materials from
anyone other than the authorized bidder, contact person, or certifying official listed on the applicant’s FCC Form
175. See Section II.F. (Auction Registration), below.
66

Unlike in other FCC spectrum auctions—where the application system made both an electronic pre-filled version
and an electronic blank version of the FCC Form 159 available to an applicant after it had completed its short-form
application—for Auction 113, the AAS will make only an electronic blank version of the FCC Form 159 available
to applicants.

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accompany each payment. Proper completion of this form is critical to ensuring correct crediting of
upfront payments. Payers are responsible for ensuring that all information entered on the FCC Form 159,
including payment amounts, is accurate. Instructions for completing FCC Form 159 for Auction 113 are
provided below.
1.

Making Upfront Payments by Wire Transfer for Auction 113

40.
All upfront payments for Auction 113 must be transmitted by electronic wire transfer
directly from a bank or other financial institution to the proper account at the U.S. Treasury.68 Wire
transfer payments for Auction 113 must be received before 6:00 p.m. ET on April 8, 2026. No other
payment method is acceptable.69 To avoid untimely payments, applicants should discuss arrangements
(including bank closing schedules and other specific bank wire transfer requirements, such as an inperson written request before a specified time of day) with their bankers several days before they plan to
make the wire transfer, and must allow sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed before
the deadline. The following information will be needed:
ABA Routing Number: 021030004
Receiving Bank:
TREAS NYC
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
BENEFICIARY:

FCC
45 L Street, NE, 3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20554

ACCOUNT NUMBER: 827000001001
Originating Bank Information (OBI Field): (Skip one space between each information item)
“AUCTIONPAY”
APPLICANT FCC REGISTRATION NUMBER (FRN): (use the same FRN as used on the
applicant’s FCC Form 159, block 21)
PAYMENT TYPE CODE: (same as FCC Form 159, block 24A: “U113”)
NOTE: The beneficiary account number (BNF Account Number) is specific to the upfront payments for
Auction 113. Do not use a BNF Account Number from a previous auction.
41.
At least one hour before placing the order for the wire transfer (but on the same business
day), applicants must print and fax a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to the FCC at (202) 4182843. Alternatively, the completed form can be scanned and sent as an attachment to an email to
RROGWireFaxes@fcc.gov. On the fax cover sheet or in the email subject header, write “Wire Transfer
— Auction Payment for Auction 113.” To meet the upfront payment deadline, an applicant’s payment
must be credited to the Commission’s account for Auction 113 before the deadline.70
42.
Each applicant is responsible for ensuring the timely submission of its upfront payment
and for timely filing an accurate and complete FCC Form 159. An applicant should coordinate with its
financial institution well ahead of the due date regarding its wire transfer and allow sufficient time for the
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Division P, Title I, 132 Stat. 348, 1080 (2018).
For more information on calculating upfront payments and the impact of upfront payments on bidding eligibility, see
Section II.E.3. (Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility), below.
68

The Commission will not accept checks, credit cards, or automated clearing house (ACH) payments.

70 See,

e.g., Four Corners Broadcasting, LLC—Request for Waiver of Section 1.2106(a), Closed Broadcast
Auction 88, Letter Order, 25 FCC Rcd 9046, 9050 (WTB 2010) (denying request of waiver for upfront payment
deadline where applicant claimed its late upfront payment was due to a “bank error completely out of the
[applicant’s] control”).

Federal Communications Commission

DA 25-1075

transfer to be initiated and completed prior to the deadline.71 The Commission repeatedly has cautioned
auction participants about the importance of planning ahead to prepare for unforeseen last-minute
difficulties in making payments by wire transfer.72 Each applicant also is responsible for obtaining
confirmation from its financial institution that its wire transfer to the U.S. Treasury was successful
and from Commission staff that its upfront payment was timely received and that it was deposited
into the proper account. As a regulatory requirement, the U.S. Treasury screens all payments from all
financial institutions before deposits are made available to specified accounts. If wires are suspended, the
U.S. Treasury may direct questions regarding any transfer to the financial institution initiating the wire.
Each applicant must take care to assure that any questions directed to its financial institution(s) are
addressed promptly. To receive confirmation from Commission staff, contact Scott Radcliffe of the
Office of Managing Director’s Revenue & Receivables Operations Group/Auctions at (202) 418-7518 or
Theresa Meeks at (202) 418-2945.
43.

Please note the following information regarding upfront payments:

•

All payments must be made in U.S. dollars.

•

All payments must be made by wire transfer.

•

Upfront payments for Auction 113 go to an account number different from the accounts used in
previous FCC auctions.

44.
Failure to deliver a sufficient upfront payment as instructed herein by the upfront
payment deadline will result in dismissal of the short-form application and disqualification from
participation in the auction.
2.

Completing and Submitting FCC Form 159

45.
The following information supplements the standard instructions for FCC Form 159
(Revised 2/03) and is provided to help ensure the correct completion of FCC Form 159 for upfront
payments for Auction 113. Applicants need to complete FCC Form 159 carefully because:
•

Mistakes may affect bidding eligibility; and

•

Lack of consistency between information provided in FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03), FCC Form
175, long-form application (FCC Form 601), and correspondence about an application may cause
processing delays.

46.
Therefore, appropriate cross-references between the FCC Form 159 Remittance Advice
and the short-form application (FCC Form 175) are described below.
Block
Number

Required Information

LOCKBOX # — Leave Blank

Payer Name — Enter the name of the person or company making the payment. If the
applicant itself is the payer, this entry would be the same name as in FCC Form 175.

Total Amount Paid — Enter the amount of the upfront payment associated with the FCC
Form 159 (Revised 2/03).

Among other things, the Commission cautions each applicant to plan ahead regarding any potential delays in its or
its financial institution’s ability to complete wire transfers.
71

See, e.g., Spectrum Acquisitions, Inc. Application to Participate in Auction 73—Request for Waiver of Upfront
Payment Deadline, Letter Order, 23 FCC Rcd 4765 (WTB 2008) (denying request for waiver of upfront payment
deadline where applicant claimed that bank’s practices prevented timely payment).
72

Federal Communications Commission

Block
Number

DA 25-1075

Required Information

4–8

Street Address, City, State, ZIP Code — Enter the street mailing address (not post office
box number) where mail should be sent to the payer. If the applicant is the payer, these
entries would be the same as FCC Form 175 from the Applicant Information section.

Daytime Telephone Number — Enter the telephone number of a person knowledgeable
about this upfront payment.

Country Code — For addresses outside the United States, enter the appropriate postal
country code (available from the Mailing Requirements Department of the U.S. Postal
Service).
Payer FRN — Enter the payer’s 10-digit FCC Registration Number (FRN) registered in the
Commission Registration System (CORES).

11
21

Applicant FRN (Complete only if applicant is different than payer) — Enter the applicant’s
10-digit FRN registered in CORES.

24A

Payment Type Code — Enter “U113”.

25A

Quantity — Enter the number “1”.

26A

Fee Due — Amount of Upfront Payment

27A

Total Fee — Will be the same amount as 26A.

28A

FCC Code 1 — Enter the number “113” (indicating Auction 113).

NOTES:
•

Do not use Remittance Advice (Continuation Sheet), FCC Form 159-C, for upfront payments.

•

If the applicant is different from the payer, complete blocks 13 through 21 for the applicant, using the
same information shown on FCC Form 175. Otherwise leave them blank.

•

No signature is required on FCC Form 159 for auction payments

•

Since credit card payments will not be accepted for upfront payments for an auction, leave Section E
blank.
3.

Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility

47.
An upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each applicant seeking to participate
in bidding to establish its eligibility to bid on licenses.73 Upfront payments that are related to the
inventory of licenses being auctioned protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the
Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of bidding.74
48.
Applicants that are former defaulters must pay upfront payments 50% greater than nonformer defaulters.75 For purposes of classification as a former defaulter or a former delinquent, defaults
and delinquencies of the applicant itself and its controlling interests are included.76
73

47 CFR § 1.2106; see also Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1491, para. 28.

See Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2378–79, paras. 171–76.

47 CFR § 1.2106(a); see also Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 15317, para. 42; Section III.I.
(Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters), below.
75

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(xii); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7568, para. 175. For this purpose,
the term “controlling interest” is defined in 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(4)(i).
76

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DA 25-1075

49.
An applicant must make an upfront payment sufficient to obtain bidding eligibility on the
licenses on which it will bid.77 We adopt the proposals in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice to set
upfront payments based on the MHz-pops of each license offered in the auction and to determine an
applicant’s initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may place
bids in any single round, based on the amount of the upfront payment.78 In order to bid for a license,
qualified bidders must have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number of bidding units
assigned to that license. At a minimum, therefore, an applicant’s total upfront payment must be
enough to establish eligibility to bid on at least one license in a market selected on its FCC Form
175 for Auction 113, or else the applicant will not become qualified to participate in the auction.
The total upfront payment does not affect the total dollar amount the bidder may bid.
50.
The Commission has authority to determine appropriate upfront payments for each
license being auctioned, taking into account such factors as the efficiency of the auction process and the
potential value of similar licenses.79 In the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, we proposed to base
upfront payments for the paired licenses on dollars per MHz-pop in three population tiers: $0.005 per
MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of less than 300,000, $0.01 per MHz-pop for
the paired licenses in areas with a population of at least 300,000 and less than 1,000,000, $0.025 per
MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of at least 1,000,000, and $0.005 per MHz-pop
for the unpaired licenses and sought comment on this proposal.80 We received no comment on this
proposal. We believe that this methodology is appropriate here and therefore adopt it. For all licenses,
upfront payments will be subject to a minimum of $500 per license.81 The upfront payment amount per
license is set forth in the Attachment A file on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.
51.
Additionally, for the reasons set forth in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, we
adopt the proposal to assign each license a specific number of bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per
$100 of the upfront payment, which is necessary for implementing the activity requirement described in
Section V.E. (Activity Rule) below, and facilitates the efficient conduct of the auction.82 The number of
bidding units for a given license is fixed and does not change during the auction as prices change. Thus,
in calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should determine the maximum number of
bidding units on which it may wish to bid in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount
covering that number of bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an applicant should add together
the bidding units for the licenses on which it seeks to be active in any given round. Applicants should
check their calculations carefully, as there is no provision for increasing a bidder’s eligibility after
the upfront payment deadline.
Example: Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
License

Description

Bidding Units

Upfront Payment

47 CFR § 1.2106; Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1491, para. 28.

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1491–92, paras. 28–30.

See Part 1 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 5697–98, para. 16; see also Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules—
Competitive Bidding Procedures et al., Third Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 13 FCC Rcd 374, 425, para. 86 (1997) (Part 1 Third Report and Order); Competitive Bidding Second
Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2377–79, paras. 169–75; 47 CFR §§ 0.131(c), 0.21(m), 0.271(a).
79

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1491, para. 28.

The results of these calculations will be rounded using the Commission’s standard rounding procedures for
auctions: results above $10,000 are rounded to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000 are
rounded to the nearest $100; and results below $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $10.
82

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1492, para. 30.

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CMA117-G

Colorado Springs, CO

760

$76,000

CMA118-G

Reading, PA

430

$43,000

Under the clock-1 format, if a bidder wishes to bid on both of the above licenses in a
round, it must have selected both of the markets in which these licenses are located on
its FCC Form 175 and have purchased at least 1,190 bidding units (760 + 430) of
bidding eligibility. If a bidder only wishes to bid on one, but not both licenses,
purchasing 760 bidding units would allow the bidder to bid on either license, but not
both at the same time. If the bidder purchased only 430 bidding units, the bidder would
have enough eligibility to bid for the license in Reading but not for the one in Colorado
Springs.
52.
If an applicant is a former defaulter, it must calculate its upfront payment for the
maximum number of licenses on which it plans to bid by multiplying the number of bidding units on
which it wishes to be active by 1.5.83 In order to calculate the number of bidding units to assign to former
defaulters, the Commission will calculate the number of bidding units a non-former defaulter would get
for the upfront payment received, divide that number by 1.5, and round the result up to the nearest
bidding unit.84
F.

Auction Registration

53.
All qualified bidders for Auction 113 are automatically registered for the auction.
Registration materials will be distributed prior to the auction by overnight delivery. The mailing will be
sent only to the contact person at the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 and will include the
SecurID® tokens that will be required to place bids.
54.
Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration mailing will not be able to submit
bids. Therefore, any qualified bidder for Auction 113 that has not received this mailing by noon on May
15, 2026, should call the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868. Receipt of this registration mailing is
critical to participating in the auction, and each applicant is responsible for ensuring it has received all the
registration materials.
55.
In the event that a SecurID® token is lost or damaged, only a person who has been
designated as an authorized bidder, the contact person, or the certifying official on the applicant’s shortform application may request a replacement. To request a replacement, call the Auction Bidder Line at
the telephone number provided in the registration materials or the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868.
G.

Remote Electronic Bidding via the Bidding System

56.
Bidders will be able to participate in Auction 113 over the Internet using the bidding
system. In addition, bidders will have the option of placing bids by telephone through a dedicated auction
bidder line. Please note that telephonic bid assistants are required to use a script when entering bids
placed by telephone. Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow sufficient time to bid by placing
83

See 47 CFR § 1.2106(a).

If a former defaulter fails to submit a sufficient upfront payment to establish eligibility to bid on at least one
license, the applicant will not be eligible to bid in Auction 113. Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act—Competitive Bidding for Commercial Broadcast and Instructional Television Fixed Service
Licenses et al., MM Docket No. 97-234, First Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 15920, 15980, para. 153 (1998). The
applicant, however, will retain its status as an applicant in Auction 113 and will remain subject to 47 CFR
§ 1.2105(c). See Applications of Star Wireless, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 19 FCC Rcd 18626, 18628, para. 4 & n.19
(EB 2004), granted in part sub nom. Star Wireless, LLC and Northeast Communications of Wisconsin, Inc., Order
on Review, 22 FCC Rcd 8943 (2007), petition for review denied, Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d 469 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
84

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DA 25-1075

their calls well in advance of the close of a round. The length of a call to place a telephonic bid may vary;
please allow a minimum of 10 minutes. The toll-free telephone number for the auction bidder line will be
provided to qualified bidders prior to the start of bidding in the auction.
57.
Only qualified bidders are permitted to bid. Each authorized bidder must have his or her
own SecurID® token, which the Commission will provide at no charge. Each applicant will be issued
three SecurID® tokens. A bidder cannot bid without his or her SecurID® token. In order to access the
bidding function of the bidding system, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round using the
passcode generated by the SecurID® token and a personal identification number (PIN) created by the
bidder. For security purposes, the SecurID® tokens and a telephone number for bidding questions
are only mailed to the contact person at the contact address listed on the FCC Form 175. Each
SecurID® token is tailored to a specific auction. SecurID® tokens issued for other auctions or obtained
from a source other than the FCC will not work for Auction 113. Please note that the SecurID® tokens
can be recycled, and the Commission requests that bidders return the tokens to the FCC. Pre-addressed
envelopes will be provided to return the tokens once the auction has ended.
58.
The Commission makes no warranties whatsoever and shall not be deemed to have made
any warranties, with respect to the bidding system, including any implied warranties of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall the Commission, or any of its officers, employees, or
agents, be liable for any damages whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of business profits,
business interruption, loss of use, revenue, or business information, or any other direct, indirect, or
consequential damages) arising out of or relating to the existence, furnishing, functioning, or use of the
bidding system. Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of the Commission’s technical,
programming, or other advice or service provided in connection with the bidding system.
59.
To the extent an issue arises with the bidding system itself, the Commission will take all
appropriate measures to resolve such issues quickly and equitably. Should an issue arise that is outside
the bidding system or attributable to a bidder, including, but not limited to, a bidder’s hardware, software,
or Internet access problem that prevents the bidder from submitting a bid prior to the end of a round, the
Commission shall have no obligation to resolve or remediate such an issue on behalf of the bidder.
Similarly, if an issue arises due to bidder error using the bidding system, the Commission shall have no
obligation to resolve or remediate such an issue on behalf of the bidder. Accordingly, after the close of a
bidding round, the results of bid processing will not be altered absent evidence of any failure in the
bidding system.
H.

Mock Auction

60.
All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a mock auction.85 The mock
auction, which will begin on May 29, 2026, will enable qualified bidders to become familiar with the
bidding system and to practice submitting bids prior to the auction. We recommend that all qualified
bidders, including all their authorized bidders, participate to assure that they can log in to the bidding
system and gain experience with the bidding procedures. Participating in the mock auction may reduce
the likelihood of a bidder making a mistake during the auction. Details regarding the mock auction will
be announced in the Qualified Bidders Public Notice for Auction 113.
I.

Fraud Alert

61.
As is the case with many business investment opportunities, some unscrupulous parties
may attempt to use Auction 113 to deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Common warning signals
of fraud include the following:
•

The first contact is a “cold call” from a telemarketer or is made in response to an inquiry prompted by
a radio or television infomercial.

Only those bidders that are qualified to bid in Auction 113 will be eligible to participate in the mock auction.

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DA 25-1075

•

The offering materials used to invest in the venture appear to be targeted at IRA funds, for example,
by including all documents and papers needed for the transfer of funds maintained in IRA accounts.

•

The amount of investment is less than $25,000.

•

The sales representative makes verbal representations that: (a) the Internal Revenue Service, Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), FCC, or other government
agency has approved the investment; (b) the investment is not subject to state or federal securities
laws; or (c) the investment will yield unrealistically high short-term profits. In addition, the offering
materials often include copies of actual FCC releases, or quotes from FCC personnel, giving the
appearance of FCC knowledge or approval of the solicitation.

62.
Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes is available from the
FCC, as well as the FTC and SEC. Additional sources of information for potential bidders and investors
may be obtained from the following sources:
•

the FCC’s Consumer Call Center at (888) 225-5322 or by visiting www.fcc.gov/general/fraudsscams-and-alerts-guides

•

the FTC at (877) FTC-HELP ((877) 382-4357) or by visiting https://consumer.ftc.gov/

•

the SEC at (800) 732-0330 or by visiting https://www.investor.gov/

63.
Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment schemes should be
directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Consumer League’s Fraud Center at https://fraud.org/ or
(202) 835-3323, Ext. 815.
III.

SHORT-FORM APPLICATION CONTENTS AND CERTIFICATIONS
A.

General Information Regarding Short-Form Applications

64.
An application to participate in Auction 113, referred to as a short-form application or
FCC Form 175, provides information concerning the applicant’s legal, technical, and/or financial
qualifications to participate in a Commission auction for spectrum licenses or permits.86 The short-form
application is the first part of the Commission’s two-phased auction application process. In the first
phase, a party seeking to participate in Auction 113 must file a short-form application in which it certifies,
under penalty of perjury, that it is qualified to participate.87 Eligibility to participate in Auction 113 is
determined based on an applicant’s short-form application and certifications88 and on the applicant’s
upfront payment.89 After bidding closes, in the second phase of the process, each winning bidder in
See id. § 1.2105; see also Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding,
PP Docket No. 93-253, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2376–77, para. 166 (1994) (Competitive
Bidding Second Report and Order).
86

See 47 CFR § 1.2105; Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2376, para. 165. As
discussed in Section IV.B, each Auction 113 applicant will be subject to the Commission’s rule prohibiting certain
communications. 47 CFR § 1.2105(c).
87

Pursuant to the Commission’s competitive bidding rules, each applicant must make a series of certifications under
penalty of perjury on its FCC Form 175 related to the information provided in its application and its participation in
the auction, and it must confirm that it is legally, technically, financially, and otherwise qualified to hold a
Commission license. See 47 CFR § 1.2105. An auction applicant’s failure to make the required certifications in its
short-form application by the applicable filing deadline would render its application unacceptable for filing, its
application would be dismissed with prejudice, and it would be ineligible to participate further in the auction. Id. §
1.2105(b)(1). We note that Hoopa Valley requests that the Commission “develop and mandate a Certification of
Tribal Spectrum Access for all licensees.” See Hoopa Valley Comments at 3. No parties commented on Hoopa
Valley’s request. Hoopa Valley’s request is outside the scope of OEA’s and WTB’s delegated authority. See 47
CFR §§ 0.271, 0.131.
88

See Section II.E. (Upfront Payments), above.

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Auction 113 must file a more comprehensive post-auction long-form application (FCC Form 601) for the
licenses it wins in the auction, and it must have a complete and accurate ownership disclosure information
report (FCC Form 602) on file with the Commission.90
65.
A party seeking to participate in Auction 113 must file an FCC Form 175 electronically
via the AAP in the AAS prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026, following the procedures prescribed
in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.91 In order to access the AAP within the new AAS to create a new
auction application for an applicant, or save, edit, view, and/or withdraw an existing application for
the applicant, an individual must: (1) have a unique email address associated with an FCC
Username account that is associated with the applicant’s FCC Registration Number (FRN) in the
Commission Registration System (CORES),92 (2) be granted the appropriate permissions in
CORES by an Administrator of that FRN, 93 and (3) be assigned the appropriate Auctions
Permissions in the AAP by the Administrator of that FRN. The AAS includes security features that
are being implemented for the first time in Auction 113, including the use of multifactor
authentication.94 The Commission expects to make the AAS available to the public for the
Administrator(s) for an FRN to assign the appropriate Auctions Permissions in the AAP to each unique
FCC Username associated with that FRN on January 7, 2026, or as otherwise announced by public notice.
At that time, the Commission will publish detailed instructions describing the process for designating
Administrators for an FRN in CORES, setting up multifactor authentication for logging into the AAP, and
granting Auctions Permissions to other users associated with a given FRN in the AAP.
66.
Below we describe more fully the information disclosures and certifications required in
the short-form application.
67.
An Auction 113 applicant bears full responsibility for submitting an accurate, complete,
and timely short-form application. Pursuant to the Commission’s competitive bidding rules, an applicant
must make a series of certifications under penalty of perjury on its FCC Form 175 related to the
information provided in its application and its participation in the auction, and an applicant must confirm
that it is legally, technically, financially, and otherwise qualified to hold a license.95 If an applicant claims
eligibility for a bidding credit, then the information provided in its FCC Form 175 will be used to
determine whether the applicant appears to be eligible for the claimed bidding credit, with the final
determination of bidding credit eligibility to occur based on a winning bidder’s post-auction long-form
47 CFR § 1.2107. We remind applicants that being deemed qualified to bid in Auction 113 does not constitute a
determination that a party is qualified to hold a Commission license or is eligible for a designated entity bidding
credit.
90

FCC Form 175 Instructions are available in the Education section on the Auction 113 website at
www.fcc.gov/auction/113. FCC Form 175 previously included an optional “Applicant Status” field in which
applicants owned by members of minority groups and/or women and rural telephone companies could voluntarily
identify themselves. That field no longer appears on the application form. This information, which had been
collected only for post-auction informational purposes, will not be collected for Auction 113.
91

Instructions for setting up an FCC Username account and associating it with an FRN are available on the CORES
website: apps.fcc.gov/cores. There are also tip sheets and instructions for setting up an FCC Username account and
associating the FCC Username for that account to an FRN available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/cores/publicHome.do?help=true&csfrToken=.
93

An Administrator for an FRN is an individual designated in CORES by the individual or entity associated with a
particular FRN. The FRN Administrator is responsible for managing that FRN, approving an FCC Username
account’s access to that FRN, and granting one or more permission levels to the FCC Username account as
necessary to conduct business with the Commission. Each entity with an FRN has at least one designated
Administrator in CORES with the authority to grant permissions to other users associated with the same FRN.
94

Users of the AAS will be required to undergo a login authentication process each time they log in to AAP for an
additional layer of security. Users have the option to enroll in either Okta Verify® or Google Authenticator®.
95

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(v)–(xiii).

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application. As discussed below, each participant in Auction 113 must also certify that it has read this
Public Notice and familiarized itself both with the auction procedures and with the requirements for
obtaining a license and operating facilities in the AWS-3 bands.96 If an Auction 113 applicant fails to
make the required certifications in its FCC Form 175 by the filing deadline, then its application will be
deemed unacceptable for filing and cannot be corrected after the filing deadline.97
68.
An applicant should note that submitting an FCC Form 175 (and any amendments
thereto) constitutes a representation by the certifying official that he or she is an authorized representative
of the applicant with authority to bind the applicant, that he or she has read the form’s instructions and
certifications, and that the contents of the application, its certifications, and any attachments are true and
correct.98 Submitting a false certification to the Commission may result in penalties, including monetary
forfeitures, license forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.99
69.
Applicants are cautioned that, because the required information submitted in FCC
Form 175 bears on each applicant’s qualifications, requests for confidential treatment will not be
routinely granted. The Commission generally has held that it may publicly release confidential business
information where the party has put that information at issue in a Commission proceeding or where the
Commission has identified a compelling public interest in disclosing the information.100 In this regard,
we have previously concluded that information submitted in support of receiving bidding credits in
auction proceedings should be made available to the public.101
70.
An applicant must designate between one and three individuals as authorized bidders in
its FCC Form 175. The Commission’s rules prohibit an individual from serving as an authorized bidder
for more than one auction applicant.102
71.
To access the bidding system, each authorized bidder will be required to have a unique
email address associated with an FCC Username account that is associated with the applicant’s FRN in
CORES.103 If an authorized bidder does not provide an FCC Username that is associated with the

See Section III.B. (Certification of Notice of Auction 113 Requirements and Procedures), below.

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(1)(i).

As more fully explained in Section III.J. (Modifications to FCC Form 175), below, an applicant is not permitted to
make major modifications to its FCC Form 175 after the initial filing deadline. 47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(2). A change in
the required certifications is considered a major change and would therefore not be permitted.
98

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2).

See Examination of Current Policy Concerning Treatment of Confidential Information Submitted to the
Commission, GC Docket No. 96-55, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 24816, 24822–23, para. 8 (1998).
100

See, e.g., SAL Spectrum, LLC—Request for Confidential Treatment of Subscriber Information Provided in FCC
Form 175, Letter Order, 31 FCC Rcd 3726, 3727–38 (WTB 2016) (denying a request for confidentiality of the
number of wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable subscribers submitted by an applicant for only those affiliates
operating in the United States).
101

102

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(iii).

The email address associated with an FCC Username account is also the FCC Username for that account. An
applicant should provide that FCC Username as the unique email address for the authorized bidder in the applicant’s
FCC Form 175. Each authorized bidder must have its own unique FCC Username; authorized bidders cannot share
FCC Usernames or FCC Username accounts. An applicant may designate up to three individuals to serve as an
authorized bidder for the applicant. Thus, an applicant may list up to three authorized bidders in its FCC Form 175,
with each having its own unique email address (FCC Username). Instructions for setting up an FCC Username
account and associating the FCC Username for that account to an FRN are available on the CORES website:
apps.fcc.gov/cores. The Commission will withhold these email addresses—the authorized bidders’ FCC
Usernames—from public disclosure.
103

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applicant’s FRN in the applicant’s FCC Form 175, that bidder will be unable to place or submit bids. For
further details, applicants should refer to the FCC Form 175 Instructions for Auction 113.
72.
No individual or entity may file more than one short-form application or have a
controlling interest in more than one short-form application.104 If a party submits multiple short-form
applications for an auction, then only one application may form the basis for that party to become
qualified to bid in that auction.105
73.
Similarly, and consistent with the Commission’s general prohibition on joint bidding
agreements, a party generally is permitted to participate in a Commission auction only through a single
bidding entity.106 Accordingly, the filing of applications in Auction 113 by multiple entities controlled by
the same individual or set of individuals generally will not be permitted.107 As noted by the Commission
in adopting the prohibition on applications by commonly controlled entities, this rule, in conjunction with
the prohibition against joint bidding agreements, protects the competitiveness of the Commission’s
auctions.108
74.
As discussed above,109 after the initial short-form application filing deadline,
Commission staff will review each timely submitted application to determine whether it complies with
the application requirements. Following this review, a public notice will be released announcing the
status of the submitted applications and establishing an application resubmission filing window, during
which an applicant may make minor modifications to its application to address identified deficiencies.110
To become a qualified bidder, an applicant must have a complete application (i.e., have timely filed an
application that is deemed complete after the deadline for correcting any identified deficiencies) and make
a timely and sufficient upfront payment. Qualified bidders will be identified by public notice at least 10
days prior to the mock auction.
75.
We discuss below additional details regarding certain information required to be
submitted in the FCC Form 175. An applicant should consult the Commission’s rules to ensure that, in
addition to the materials described below, all required information is included in its short-form
application. To the extent the information in this Public Notice does not address an applicant’s specific
operating structure, or if the applicant needs additional information or guidance concerning the described
disclosure requirements, the applicant should review the educational materials for Auction 113 (see the
Education section on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113) and use the contact
information provided in this Public Notice to consult with Commission staff to better understand the
information that it must submit in its short-form application.

104

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(3); see Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7579, para. 205.

105

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(3), (b)(1)(ii).

106

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7580–81, paras. 206–08.

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(3), (a)(4)(i), (b)(1)(ii); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7580–81,
paras. 206–08. This restriction applies across all applications, without regard to the geographic areas selected. See
Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7580, para. 206. The Commission adopted a limited exception
to the general prohibition on the filing of multiple applications by commonly controlled entities for qualified rural
wireless partnerships and individual members of such partnerships. See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(3). Under this limited
exception, each qualifying rural wireless partnership and its individual members will be permitted to participate
separately in an auction. See id.; see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7582, para. 210.
107

108

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7580, para. 206.

109

See Section II.D. (Application Processing and Minor Modifications), above.

110

47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(2).

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Certification of Notice of Auction 113 Requirements and Procedures

76.
For the reasons set forth in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, we adopt the
proposal to require any applicant seeking to participate in Auction 113 to certify in its short-form
application, under penalty of perjury, that it has read this Public Notice adopting procedures for
Auction 113 and that it has familiarized itself with these procedures and with the requirements for
obtaining a license and operating facilities in the AWS-3 bands.111
77.
This certification is designed to bolster applicants’ efforts to educate themselves about
the procedures for auction participation and to ensure that, prior to submitting their short-form
applications, applicants understand their obligation to stay abreast of relevant information. Familiarity
with the Commission’s rules and procedures governing Auction 113 may also help bidders avoid the
consequences to them associated with defaults, which also cause harm to other applicants and the public
by reducing the efficiency of the auction process and reducing the likelihood that the license will be
assigned to the bidder that values it the most. This certification, along with the other certifications
required pursuant to section 1.2105(a), will promote the submission of applications that meet the
Commission’s requirements, thereby leading to a more efficient application process.
78.
A substantively similar requirement was instituted for Auctions 110, 108, and 112.112
This requirement furthers a long-standing policy under which the Commission expressly places a burden
upon each applicant to be thoroughly familiar with the procedures, terms, and conditions contained in the
relevant Procedures Public Notice and any future public notices that may be released in the auction
proceeding.113 While the certification we add refers to information regarding auction procedures and
licensing that is available at the time of certification, potential auction applicants are on notice from this
Public Notice that their educational efforts must continue even after their short-form applications are
filed. Commission staff routinely makes available detailed educational materials, such as interactive,
online tutorials and technical guides, to enhance interested parties’ comprehension of the pre-bidding and
bidding processes and to help applicants minimize their need to engage outside engineers, legal counsel,
or other auction experts.
79.
For these reasons, we will require each Auction 113 applicant to certify as follows in its
short-form application:
that the applicant has read the public notice adopting procedures for the auction and that it has
familiarized itself both with the auction procedures and with the requirements for obtaining a
license and operating facilities in the AWS-3 bands.
80.
An applicant must provide this certification under penalty of perjury, consistent with
section 1.2105(a) of the Commission’s rules.114 This certification must be provided in addition to the

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1485, para. 12. We received no comment on this
proposal.
111

Certification Adopted for Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the in the 3.45–3.55 GHz Band For Next
Generation Wireless Services (Auction 110), AU Docket No. 21-62, Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd 8444, 8444–46,
paras. 1–7 (OEA/WTB 2021); Auction of Construction Permits for Full Power Television Stations; Notice and
Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 112; Bidding
Scheduled to Begin June 7, 2022, AU Docket No. 21-449, Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd 1155, 1162–63, paras. 19–23
(OEA/MB 2022) (Auction 112 Procedures Public Notice); Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at
4381–83, paras. 24–28.
112

See, e.g., Auction of Flexible Use Licenses in the 3.7–3.98 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services;
Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for
Auction 107; Bidding in Auction 107 Scheduled to Begin December 8, 2020, AU Docket No. 20-25, Public Notice,
35 FCC Rcd 8404, 8407, para. 5 (2020) (Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice).
113

114

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2).

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certifications already required under section 1.2105.115 As with the other certifications required in the
short-form application, an applicant’s failure to make this certification in its FCC Form 175 by the
February 11, 2026 short-form filing deadline will render its application unacceptable for filing, and its
application will be dismissed with prejudice.116
C.

Acknowledgement Statement for Auction 113 Applicants

81.
We adopt our proposal to require each applicant that selects on its short-form application
any market in which there is a license in the 1755–1780 MHz band available for bidding to submit as an
attachment to its short-form application a signed statement acknowledging that the applicant’s operations
in the 1755–1780 MHz band may be subject to interference from Federal systems, that the applicant must
accept interference from incumbent Federal operations, and that the applicant has considered these risks
before submitting any bids for applicable licenses in Auction 113.117 The specific text that must be
included in the required acknowledgement statement is contained in Attachment B to this Public
Notice.118 The acknowledgement statement must be signed by the same individual that signs the
application on behalf of the applicant.
D.

License Selection

82.
Auction 113 will offer 200 licenses in 199 markets.119 An applicant must select all of the
markets in which it may want to bid from the list of available markets on its FCC Form 175. An
applicant must carefully review and verify its selections before the FCC Form 175 filing deadline because
those selections cannot be changed after the auction application filing deadline.120 An applicant is not
required to place bids on any of the licenses in the markets it selects, but the bidding system will not
accept bids for any license(s) in a market that the applicant did not select in its FCC Form 175.
83.
When two or more short-form applications are submitted selecting the same market in
Auction 113, mutual exclusivity exists for auction purposes as to the license(s) in that market, and those
license(s) must be awarded by competitive bidding procedures.121 Once mutual exclusivity exists for
auction purposes, even if only one applicant is qualified to bid for a particular license, that applicant is
required to submit a bid in order to obtain the license.

115

See id. § 1.2105(a)(2)(v)-(xiii); Section III.A. (General Information Regarding Short-Form Applications), above.

116

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(1).

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1485, para. 13. We received no comment on this
proposal. As discussed in Section I.D. (Incumbency Issues), above, the Commission adopted rules to address
commercial operations in the 1695–1710 MHz and 1755–1780 MHz bands in light of the temporary and indefinite
the sharing of the bands by Federal incumbent users and commercial licensees, including a requirement that
commercial licensees operate on a co-equal, primary operations with Federal systems, and a requirement that
licensees in the 1755–1780 MHz band accept interference from Federal systems as long as such systems remain in
the band. See 47 CFR § 2.106, US note 88 and US note 91; 47 CFR § 27.1134(f).
117

118

Guidance on submitting the acknowledgement statement can be found in the FCC Form 175 Instructions, which
are available in the Education section on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.
119

One market, EA173, has two licenses available (one in frequency block H and one in frequency block I). An
applicant that wishes to bid on either license in that market must select the market (and will be therefore eligible to
bid on both licenses, assuming that it otherwise has sufficient bidding eligibility), even if it intends to bid on only
one license and not the other.
120

47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(2).

See Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2376, para. 165 (“If the Commission receives
only one application that is acceptable for filing for a particular license, mutual exclusivity would be lacking and the
Commission would be prohibited from using competitive bidding to award the license.”).
121

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Disclosure of Agreements and Bidding Arrangements

84.
An applicant must provide in its FCC Form 175 a brief description of, and identify each
party to, any partnerships, joint ventures, consortia or other agreements, arrangements, or understandings
of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned, including any agreements that address or
communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific prices), bidding strategies (including the
specific licenses on which to bid or not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which the
applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the applicant, is a party.122 In connection with the
agreement disclosure requirement, the applicant must certify under penalty of perjury in its FCC
Form 175 that it has described, and identified each party to any such agreements, arrangements, or
understandings to which it (or any party that controls it or that it controls) is a party.123 Moreover, since
each applicant must maintain the accuracy and completeness of the information in its pending auction
application,124 if it enters into any agreement relating to the licenses being auctioned after the FCC
Form 175 filing deadline, then that agreement is subject to these same disclosure requirements.
85.
For purposes of making the required agreement disclosures on the FCC Form 175, if
parties agree in principle on all material terms prior to the application filing deadline, then each party to
the agreement that is submitting an auction application must provide a brief description of, and identify
the other party or parties to, the agreement on its respective FCC Form 175,125 even if the agreement has
not been reduced to writing.126 Parties that have not agreed in principle by the FCC Form 175 filing
deadline should not describe, or include the names of parties to, the discussions on their applications.127
86.
The Commission’s rules generally prohibit joint bidding and other arrangements
involving auction applicants (including any party that controls or is controlled by such applicants).128 For
purposes of the prohibition, a joint bidding arrangement includes any arrangement relating to the licenses
being auctioned that addresses or communicates, directly or indirectly, bidding in the auction, bidding
strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the specific licenses on which to bid, and any such
arrangement relating to the post-auction market structure.129
87.
This prohibition applies to joint bidding arrangements involving two or more nationwide
providers,130 as well as joint bidding arrangements involving a nationwide provider and one or more non-

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii), (a)(4). As defined for purposes of this rule, a controlling interest includes all
individuals or entities with positive or negative de jure or de facto control of the applicant. Id. § 1.2105(a)(4)(i).
This definition is modeled on a similar term used in section 1.2110(c) (definitions for designated entities), though it
differs in some respects from that rule. Compare id. § 1.2105(a)(4)(i) with id. § 1.2110(c)(2).
122

Id. § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii). As discussed below, an applicant may continue negotiating, discussing, or
communicating with respect to a new agreement after the FCC Form 175 filing deadline, provided that the
communications involved do not relate both to the licenses being auctioned and to bids or bidding strategies or postauction market structure. See Section IV.B.3. (Scope of Prohibition on Certain Communications; Prohibition on
Joint Bidding Agreements), below.
123

124

47 CFR §§ 1.65, 1.2105(b)(4).

125

Id. § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii), (c)(1).

See Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Clarifies Spectrum Auction Anti-Collusion Rules, Public Notice, 11
FCC Rcd 9645, 9646 (WTB 1995) (clarifying standard for determining when a disclosable agreement exists,
discussed in connection with an earlier version of section 1.2105 of the Commission’s rules).
126

127

See id.

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7569–77, paras. 177–
99.
128

129

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7575, para. 195.

130

Id. at 7571, 7573, paras. 182, 186.

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nationwide providers,131 where at least one party to the arrangement is an applicant for the auction.132 In
the Updating Part 1 Report and Order, the Commission stated that entities that qualify as nationwide
providers generally would be identified in procedures public notices released before each auction.133 To
that end, in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, we proposed to identify AT&T, T-Mobile, and
Verizon as “nationwide providers” for the purpose of implementing the competitive bidding rules in
Auction 113, including section 1.2105(c), the rule prohibiting certain communications,134 which is
consistent with the Commission’s decisions in recent spectrum auctions and the 2024 Communications
Marketplace Report.135
88.
Verizon requests that we also identify EchoStar Corporation (EchoStar), or any bidders
“with whom EchoStar has agreements,” as a “nationwide provider” for purposes of Auction 113, citing
the public statements made by DISH Network (DISH) and EchoStar that have referred to DISH’s
“nationwide 5G network” and because EchoStar’s Boost Mobile Network touts 99% coverage.136 We
decline to adopt Verizon’s suggestion for Auction 113. The Commission has historically relied, in part,
on the Communications Marketplace Report among its justifications for a determination of which entities
are considered to be “nationwide providers” for competitive bidding purposes, and the Commission’s
most recent report, released in December 2024, did not identify EchoStar as a nationwide provider.137 In
addition, EchoStar’s geographic coverage as reflected on the Commission’s National Broadband Map, is
substantially less than that of AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon. Moreover, EchoStar’s Boost Mobile is
partially a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), and its purported “99%” coverage that Verizon
refers to is based in part on the nationwide networks of its wholesale providers (e.g., AT&T and TMobile). We therefore adopt our proposal to identify only AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon as “nationwide
providers” for purposes of implementing the competitive bidding rules in Auction 113.
A “non-nationwide provider” refers to any provider of communications services that is not a “nationwide
provider.” See id.
131

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7574–75, paras. 191–
93.
132

133

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7571, para. 182 n.596.

134

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1490, para. 23.

See, e.g., Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9287, para. 45; Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8413, para. 27. Communications Marketplace Report, GN Docket No. 24-119, 2024
Communications Marketplace Report, 39 FCC Rcd 14116, 14160–61, para. 56 (2024) (“As of December 31, 2023,
there were three facilities-based mobile wireless service providers in the United States that this Report refers to as
nationwide service providers: AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon”). Identifying “nationwide providers” in this manner
for the purpose of implementing the Commission’s competitive bidding rules is also consistent with the approach
used in Auctions 101, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, and 110, and the forward auction portion of the Broadcast Incentive
Auction (Auction 1002).
135

136

Verizon Comments at 3–5.

137

See, e.g., Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 2.5 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services;
Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 108, AU Docket No. 20-249, Public Notice, 36
FCC Rcd 645, 652, para. 17, n.44 (citing Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8413, 8418, paras.
27 & n.51, 43; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2150, 2155, paras. 28, 44; Auction 103
Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5542, 5547, paras. 27, 43). In identifying AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile
as “nationwide providers,” the 2024 Communications Marketplace Report explained that “[a]lthough none of these
three nationwide service providers has a network that is truly ubiquitous, these three service providers have
networks that they report cover a substantial majority of the country—each reports covering at least 95% of the U.S.
population and at least 68% of U.S. road miles with their 4G LTE networks, and at least 75% of the U.S. population
and at least 35% of road miles with their 5G-NR networks at speeds of at least 7/1 Mbps. Collectively, these three
nationwide service providers account for approximately 371 million U.S. postpaid and prepaid connections.” 2024
Communications Marketplace Report, 39 FCC Rcd at 14160–61, para. 56. Relying upon December 2023
Broadband Data Collection information, the Commission did not include EchoStar in this determination. Id.

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89.
Under certain circumstances, a non-nationwide provider may enter into an agreement to
form a consortium or a joint venture (as applicable) that results in a single party applying to participate in
an auction.138 Specifically, a designated entity can participate in one consortium or joint venture in an
auction,139 and non-nationwide providers that are not designated entities may participate in an auction
through only one joint venture.140 A non-nationwide provider may enter into only one agreement to form
a consortium or joint venture (as applicable), and such consortium or joint venture shall be the exclusive
bidding vehicle for its members in the auction.141 The general prohibition on joint bidding arrangements
excludes certain agreements, including those that are solely operational in nature,142 as defined in section
1.2105(a)(2)(ix)(A)–(C) of the Commission’s rules.143
90.
To implement the prohibition on joint bidding arrangements, the Commission’s rules
require each applicant to certify in its short-form application that it has disclosed any arrangements or
understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned to which it (or any party that controls
or is controlled by it) is a party.144 The applicant must also certify that it (or any party that controls or is
controlled by it) has not entered and will not enter into any arrangement or understanding of any kind
relating directly or indirectly to bidding at auction with, among others, any other applicant or a
nationwide provider.145

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7573, 7574, 7576, paras. 187, 190, 198. While two or
more non-nationwide providers may participate in an auction through a joint venture, a nationwide and a nonnationwide provider may not do so. See id. at 7575, para. 194; see 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix), (4)(ii).
138

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7576–77, para. 198. Pursuant to section 1.2105(a)(4)(ii),
a consortium is an entity formed to apply as a single applicant to bid at auction pursuant to an agreement by two or
more separate and distinct legal entities that individually are eligible to claim the same designated entity benefits
under section 1.2110, provided that no member of the consortium may be a nationwide provider. 47 CFR
§ 1.2105(a)(4)(ii).
139

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7576–77, para. 198. Under the Commission’s rules, a
“joint venture” is “a legally cognizable entity formed to apply as a single applicant to bid at auction pursuant to an
agreement by two or more separate and distinct legal entities, provided that no member of the joint venture may be a
nationwide provider.” 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(4)(iii); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at
7575, para. 194.
140

141

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7576–77, para. 198.

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix)(A). Under the Commission’s rules, agreements that are solely operational in
nature are those that address operational aspects of providing a mobile service, such as agreements for roaming,
device acquisition, and spectrum leasing and other spectrum use arrangements, provided that any such agreement
does not both relate to the licenses at auction and address or communicate, directly or indirectly, bidding at auction
(including specific prices to be bid) or bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which to bid or not to
bid) or post-auction market structure. Id. § 1.2105(a)(4)(iv); accord Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC
Rcd at 7576, para. 197.
142

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7575–76, paras. 195–
97.
143

144

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).

145

Section 1.2105(a)(2) requires the short-form application to contain, among other things:
(viii) Certification that the applicant has provided in its application a brief description of, and identified
each party to, any partnerships, joint ventures, consortia or other agreements, arrangements or
understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned, including any agreements that address
or communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific prices), bidding strategies (including the
specific licenses on which to bid or not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which the applicant,
or any party that controls as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this section or is controlled by the applicant, is
a party.
(continued….)

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91.
Although the Commission’s rules do not prohibit auction applicants from communicating
about matters that are within the scope of an excepted agreement that has been disclosed in an FCC
Form 175,146 we remind applicants that certain discussions or exchanges could nonetheless touch upon
impermissible subject matters,147 and that compliance with the Commission’s rules will not insulate a
party from enforcement of the antitrust laws.148
92.
Applicants should bear in mind that a winning bidder will be required to disclose in its
post-auction long-form application, the specific terms, conditions, and parties involved in any agreement
relating to the licenses being auctioned into which it had entered prior to the time bidding was
completed.149 This applies to any bidding consortium, joint venture, partnership, or other agreement,
arrangement, or understanding of any kind entered into relating to the competitive bidding process,
including any agreements relating to the licenses being auctioned that address or communicate directly or
indirectly bids (including specific prices), bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which to
bid or not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which the applicant, or any party that controls or
is controlled by the applicant, is a party.150
F.

Ownership Disclosure Requirements

93.
Each applicant must comply with the applicable part 1 ownership disclosure requirements
and provide information required by sections 1.2105 and 1.2112, and, when applicable, section 1.2110, of

(ix) Certification that the applicant (or any party that controls as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this section
or is controlled by the applicant) has not entered and will not enter into any partnerships, joint ventures,
consortia or other agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being
auctioned that address or communicate, directly or indirectly, bidding at auction (including specific prices
to be bid) or bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which to bid or not to bid), or post-auction
market structure with: any other applicant (or any party that controls or is controlled by another applicant);
with a nationwide provider that is not an applicant (or any party that controls or is controlled by such a
nationwide provider); or, if the applicant is a nationwide provider, with any non-nationwide provider that
is not an applicant (or with any party that controls or is controlled by such a non-nationwide provider),
other than:
(A) Agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind that are solely operational as defined
under paragraph (a)(4) of this section;
(B) Agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind to form consortia or joint ventures as
defined under paragraph (a)(4) of this section;
(C) Agreements, arrangements or understandings of any kind with respect to the transfer or
assignment of licenses, provided that such agreements, arrangements or understandings do not both
relate to the licenses at auction and address or communicate, directly or indirectly, bidding at auction
(including specific prices to be bid), or bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which
to bid or not to bid), or post-auction market structure.
47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii)–(ix); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7570–78, paras. 180–
201.
146

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii), (a)(2)(ix)(A)–(C), (c)(1).

See Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 467–68, para. 163; see generally Guidance Regarding the
Prohibition of Certain Communications During the Incentive Auction, Auction 1000, AU Docket No. 14-252 et al.,
30 FCC Rcd 10794 (WTB 2015) (Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice).
147

See 47 CFR § 1.2109(d); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7571, para. 181; Prohibited
Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10809, para. 43.
148

149

47 CFR § 1.2107(d); see also id. § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix)(A)–(C), (a)(2)(viii).

150

47 CFR § 1.2107(d); see also id. § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix)(A)–(C), (a)(2)(viii).

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the Commission’s rules.151 Specifically, in completing FCC Form 175, an applicant must fully disclose
information regarding the real party- or parties-in-interest in the applicant or application and the
ownership structure of the applicant, including both direct and indirect ownership interests of 10% or
more, as prescribed in sections 1.2105 and 1.2112 and, where applicable, section 1.2110 of the
Commission’s rules.152 Each applicant is responsible for ensuring that information submitted in its shortform application is complete and accurate.
94.
In certain circumstances, an applicant may have previously filed an FCC Form 602
ownership disclosure information report or filed an application to participate in a previous auction in
which ownership information was disclosed. If in that previous filing, the applicant used the same FRN
the applicant is using to create its FCC Form 175 for Auction 113, the applicant will have the option to
pre-fill the most current ownership information contained in any such filing into certain ownership
sections on the applicant’s FCC Form 175,153 if such information is in an electronic format compatible
with FCC Form 175. Applicants who want to take advantage of the pre-fill option are encouraged to
submit an FCC Form 602 ownership report or update any ownership information on file with the
Commission in an FCC Form 602 ownership report prior to starting a short-form application for
Auction 113 to ensure that their most recent ownership information is pre-filled into their short-form
application. Each applicant must carefully review any ownership information that has been pre-filled into
its FCC Form 175, including any ownership attachments, to confirm that all information supplied on FCC
Form 175 is complete and accurate as of the application filing deadline. Any information that needs to be
corrected or updated must be changed directly in FCC Form 175.
G.

Foreign Ownership Disclosure Requirements

95.
Section 310 of the Communications Act requires the Commission to review foreign
investment in radio station licenses and imposes specific restrictions on who may hold certain types of
radio licenses.154 Section 310 applies to applications for initial radio licenses, applications for
assignments and transfers of control of radio licenses, and spectrum leasing arrangements under the
Commission’s secondary market rules.155 In completing FCC Form 175, an applicant is required to
disclose information concerning foreign ownership of the applicant. If an applicant has foreign
ownership interests in excess of the applicable limit or benchmark set forth in section 310(b), then it may
seek to participate in Auction 113 as long as it has filed a petition for declaratory ruling with the
Commission prior to the FCC Form 175 filing deadline.156 An applicant must certify in its FCC Form 175
Section 1.2105 requires the disclosure on the FCC Form 175 of the applicant’s ownership information as set forth
in sections 1.2105 and 1.2112. See 47 CFR §§ 1.2105(a)(2)(ii)(B), 1.2112. In addition, each applicant should
ensure that its disclosures comply with the ownership disclosure requirements in the part 1 rules. See generally
Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7498–521, 7578–82, paras. 9–64, 202–10.
151

152

47 CFR §§ 1.2105(a)(2)(ii)(A), (B), 1.2110, 1.2112.

153

The FCC Form 175 Instructions provide additional details on how to choose this pre-fill option.

154

See 47 U.S.C. § 310(a), (b).

See Review of Foreign Ownership Policies for Common Carrier and Aeronautical Radio Licensees under Section
310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, IB Docket No. 11-133, Second Report and Order, 28
FCC Rcd 5741, 5747–48, para. 7 (2013). The Commission amended its foreign ownership rules in Review of
Foreign Ownership Policies for Broadcast, Common Carrier and Aeronautical Radio Licensees under Section
310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, GN Docket No. 15-236, Report and Order, 31 FCC Rcd
11272 (2016). The rules are now codified in 47 CFR §§ 1.5000–1.5004.
155

47 CFR §§ 1.2105(a)(2)(vi) (“The Commission will accept applications certifying that a request for waiver or
other relief from the requirements of section 310 is pending.”), 1.5000 (providing procedures for submitting
petitions for declaratory ruling seeking relief from section 310’s foreign ownership provisions). We note that there
are currently pending before the Commission proposals to codify and streamline certain policies and practices
concerning the Commission’s foreign ownership rules for common carrier, broadcast, and aeronautical licensees that
are subject to section 310(b) of the Communications Act, as amended. See generally Review of Foreign Ownership
(continued….)
156

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that, as of the deadline for filing its application to participate in the auction, the applicant either is in
compliance with the foreign ownership provisions of section 310 or has filed a petition for declaratory
ruling requesting Commission approval to exceed the applicable foreign ownership limit or benchmark in
section 310(b) that is pending before, or has been granted by, the Commission.157
H.

Additional Disclosures for Small Businesses and Rural Service Providers Seeking
Bidding Credits

96.
In Auction 113, designated entity bidding credits will be available to applicants that
demonstrate eligibility for a small business or a rural service provider bidding credit and are subsequently
winning bidders in the auction.158 A bidding credit represents an amount by which an eligible small
business or rural service provider bidder’s overall payment across the licenses won may be discounted,
subject to the caps discussed in section V, below.159 These bidding credits will not be cumulative—an
applicant is permitted to request either a small business bidding credit or a rural service provider bidding
credit, but not both.160
97.
The Commission’s rules regarding designated entity bidding credits provide for, among
other things: (1) a two-pronged standard for evaluating eligibility for small business benefits,161 (2)
updated gross revenue requirements for determining whether a small business is eligible for a 15% or
25% bidding credit,162 (3) a bidding credit for eligible rural service providers,163 and (4) an attribution rule
for certain disclosable interest holders of applicants claiming eligibility for bidding credits.164 As
discussed more fully below, an applicant seeking a designated entity bidding credit must disclose in its

Policies for Broadcast, Common Carrier and Aeronautical Radio Licensees under Section 310(b)(4) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, GN Docket No. 25-149, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 FCC Rcd
3516 (2025). Potential applicants for Auction 113 are on notice that any changes to the Commission’s existing
policies and practices concerning its foreign ownership rules that may be adopted and made effective prior to the
deadline for submitting an application to participate in Auction 113 could apply to Auction 113 applicants.
See id. § 1.2105(a)(2)(v), (vi). Additional information concerning foreign ownership disclosure requirements is
provided in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.
157

158

The Commission determined in the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order that a 15% rural service provider bidding
credit would be available to any eligible rural service provider, as defined in section 1.2110(f)(4)(i) of the
Commission’s rules, that is not also claiming a small business bidding credit. 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 15–
16, paras. 35–37. The total amount of designated entity benefits an eligible winning bidder may receive is subject to
a cap, to be established on an auction-by-auction basis. See 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2)(ii), (f)(4)(ii), The bidding credit
caps for Auction 113 are discussed in Section V.G.5 (Caps on Bidding Credits), below.
159

See Section V.G.5 (Caps on Bidding Credits).

160

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7538, para. 108; accord 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2)(i), (4)(i).

161

Id. § 1.2110(b)(3); see Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7507–10, paras. 29–34.

See 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 12–15, paras. 28–34; see also 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2); see Updating Part 1
Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7523–25, paras. 72–75.
162

See 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 15–16, paras. 35–37; see also 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4); see Updating Part 1
Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7530–38, paras. 88–108.
163

47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J); see Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7512–16, paras. 42–52. For
purposes of this rule, a disclosable interest holder of an applicant seeking designated entity benefits is defined as any
individual or entity holding a 10% or greater interest of any kind in the designated entity, including but not limited
to, a 10% or greater interest in any class of stock, warrants, options, or debt securities in the applicant or licensee.
47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J). The Commission also clarified its designated entity reporting requirements under 47
CFR § 1.2110(n). See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7562–63, paras. 162–67.
164

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short-form application additional information demonstrating its eligibility for that bidding credit,165 and
must also certify that it is eligible for the bidding credit it requests in its FCC Form 175.166
98.
In addition to the information provided below, each applicant should review carefully the
Commission’s decisions regarding eligibility for designated entity benefits as well as the part 1 rules.167
In particular, we remind applicants requesting bidding credits that they should take due account of the
requirements of the Commission’s rules and implementing orders regarding de jure and de facto control
of such applicants.168 Nearly all of the spectrum associated with licenses to be offered in Auction 113 is
in the Commission’s inventory in connection with two Auction 97 winning bidders having claimed small
business bidding credits for which the Commission later determined they were ineligible.169 Applicants
should be mindful that the Commission will closely examine qualifications of all applicant claims of
bidding credit eligibility and strictly enforce its designated entity eligibility requirements.
99.
Moreover, the Commission’s rules include a prohibition, which applies to all applicants
(whether they seek bidding credits or not), against changes in ownership of the applicant that would
constitute an assignment or transfer of control after the initial filing deadline for FCC Form 175.170
Applicants should not expect to receive any opportunities to revise their ownership structure after
the filing of their short- and long-form applications, including making revisions to their agreements
or other arrangements with interest holders, lenders, or others in order to address potential
concerns relating to compliance with the designated entity bidding credit requirements.171
100.
This policy will help to ensure compliance with the Commission’s rules applicable to the
award of bidding credits prior to the conduct of the auction, which will involve competing bids from
those that do and do not seek bidding credits, and thus preserves the integrity of the auction process. We

165

In addition to the small business and rural service provider bidding credits discussed below, the Commission
offers a Tribal Lands Bidding Credit to a winning bidder in Auction 113 that intends to use its license(s) to deploy
facilities and provide services to qualifying Tribal lands. However, unlike other bidding credits, which are requested
prior to an auction, a winning bidder seeking a Tribal lands bidding credit applies for this credit after the auction
ends, when it files its FCC Form 601 post-auction license application. See Section VI.E. (Tribal Lands Bidding
Credit), below.
166

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(iv).

See generally Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 7493; see also, e.g., Implementation of the
Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission’s Competitive Bidding Rules and
Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211, Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 891, 910–912, paras. 47–52 (2006)
(CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order); Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
21 FCC Rcd 4753 (2006); Order on Reconsideration of the Second Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 6703 (2006).
167

168

See, e.g., 47 CFR §§ 1.2110, 1.2111.

169

Northstar Wireless, LLC; SNR Wireless LicenseCo, LLC; Applications for New Licenses in the 1695–1710 MHz,
and 1755–1780 MHz and 2155–2180 MHz Bands, File Nos. 0006670613, 0008243409, 0006670667, and
0008243669, Report No. AUC-97AUC, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand, 35 FCC Rcd 13317 (2020).
170

47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(2). This may, in some circumstances, include changes of an applicant’s officers or directors.

171

Council Tree’s contention in its comments on the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice that this reminder
represents a “sea change” in the application of the Commission’s practice (see Council Tree Comments at 7–10) is
factually incorrect and lacks merit. The Commission has included this reminder in every auction comment public
notice since 2018 (beginning with Auctions 101 and 102, see Auctions of Upper Microwave Flexible Use Licenses
for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auctions 101 (28
GHz) and 102 (24 GHz), Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd 4103, 4115–16, para. 35), and it serves to address the exact
concern raised by the court in SNR Wireless LicenseCo, LLC v. FCC, which is the need to provide parties with “fair
notice of the circumstances in which a finding of de facto control will and will not be subject to an opportunity to
attempt to negotiate a cure.” See SNR Wireless LicenseCo, LLC v. FCC, 868 F.3d 1021, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

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also believe that this will meet the Commission’s statutory objectives in awarding licenses through the
competitive bidding process.172
1.

Small Business Bidding Credit

101.
For Auction 113, bidding credits will be available to eligible small businesses and
consortia thereof, subject to the bidding credit caps discussed below. Under the service rules applicable
to AWS-3 band licenses to be offered in Auction 113, the two-tiers of bidding credits available173 are
determined as follows174:
•

A bidder that qualifies as a “small business”—i.e., one with attributed average annual gross
revenues that do not exceed $55 million for the preceding five years175—is eligible to receive a
15% discount on its overall payment.176

•

A bidder that qualifies as a “very small business”—i.e., one with attributed average annual gross
revenues that do not exceed $20 million for the preceding five years177—is eligible to receive a
25% discount on its overall payment.178

102.
Small business bidding credits are not cumulative; an eligible applicant may receive
either the 15% or the 25% bidding credit on its overall payment, but not both.179 The Commission’s
unjust enrichment provisions also apply to a winning bidder that uses a bidding credit and subsequently
seeks to assign or transfer control of its license within a certain period to an entity not qualifying for at
least the same level of small business bidding credit.180

The Commission’s objectives when awarding licenses through competitive bidding include “the development and
rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public . . . without administrative
or judicial delays” and “promoting economic opportunity and competition and ensuring that new and innovative
technologies are readily accessible to the American people by avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and by
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including small businesses.” 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)–
(B).
172

173

In adopting this two-tiered approach in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, the Commission observed that this
approach would provide consistency and predictability for small businesses. 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29
FCC Rcd at 4680–81, para. 189. See also 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 13–15, paras. 30–34.
174

Although we did not make any proposals or seek comment in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice on
eligibility for bidding credits or the small business bidding credit levels for Auction 113, two parties offered
comments on this topic, seeking to roll back to the small business definitions and bidding credits and other
designated entity rules that had been used in Auction 97 held in 2014. See EchoStar Comments at 5–10; Council
Tree Comments at 1–6. We do not address the comments filed by these parties in this proceeding, however, because
the Commission has already addressed those contentions and determined bidding credit eligibility and the levels of
small business bidding credits available in Auction 113 in the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order. See 2025 AWS-3
Report and Order at 16–23, paras. 38–57.
175

47 CFR § 27.1219(a)(1); 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 12–14, paras. 28–29, 32, Appx. A.

176

47 CFR § 27.1219(b); 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 12–13, para. 29, Appx. A.

177

47 CFR § 27.1219(a)(2); 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 12–14, paras. 28-29, 32, Appx. A.

178

47 CFR § 27.1219(b); 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 12–13, para. 29, Appx. A.

179

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7538, para. 108; see also 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4)(i).

47 CFR § 1.2111. Thus, for example, the Commission’s unjust enrichment provisions would not apply to a
winning bidder that uses the 15% small business bidding credit and seeks to transfer control of its license to an
entity that qualifies for either the 15% small business bidding credit or the rural service provider bidding credit. See
Section III.H.2. (Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit), below. The provisions would apply, however, if that same
winning bidder uses the 25% small business bidding credit, unless the proposed transferee also qualifies for the 25%
small business bidding credit.
180

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103.
Each applicant seeking a small business bidding credit must disclose the gross revenues
for the preceding five years for each of the following: (1) the applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its
controlling interests, and (4) the affiliates of its controlling interests.181 The applicant must also submit an
attachment that lists all parties with which the applicant has entered into any spectrum use agreements or
arrangements for any licenses that may be won by the applicant in Auction 113.182 In addition, to the
extent that an applicant has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder for the use of more than
25% of the spectrum capacity of any license that may be won in Auction 113, the applicant must disclose
the identity and the attributable gross revenues of any such disclosable interest holder.183 This attribution
rule will be applied on a license-by-license basis.184 As a result, an applicant may be eligible for a
bidding credit on some, but not all, of the licenses for which it is bidding in Auction 113.185 If an
applicant is applying as a consortium of small businesses, then the disclosures described in this paragraph
must be provided for each consortium member.186
2.

Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit

104.
An eligible applicant may request a 15% discount on its overall payment using a rural
service provider bidding credit,187 subject to the cap discussed below. To be eligible for a rural service
provider bidding credit, an applicant must: (1) be a service provider that is in the business of providing
commercial communications services and, together with its controlling interests, affiliates, and the
affiliates of its controlling interests, has fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and
cable subscribers; and (2) serve predominantly rural areas.188 Rural areas are defined as counties with a
population density of 100 or fewer persons per square mile.189 An applicant seeking a rural service
provider bidding credit must provide the number of subscribers served as of the short-form application
deadline.190 An applicant may count any subscriber as a single subscriber even if that subscriber receives
more than one service.191
105.
Each applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit must disclose the number
of its subscribers, along with the number of subscribers of its affiliates, controlling interests, and the
affiliates of its controlling interests.192 The applicant must also submit an attachment that lists all parties
with which the applicant has entered into any spectrum use agreements or arrangements for any licenses
that may be won by the applicant in Auction 113.193 In addition, to the extent that an applicant has an
181

47 CFR §§ 1.2110(b)(1)(i), 1.2112(b)(1)(iv). See 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 12, para. 28, Appx. A.

182

See 47 CFR § 1.2112(b)(1)(iii).

183

See id. § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J).

184

Id.

185

See id.

186

See id. §§ 1.2110(b)(4)(i), 1.2110(c)(6), 1.2110(k), 1.2112(b)(1)(vi).

Id. § 27.1219(c). The Commission determines eligibility for bidding credits, including the rural service provider
bidding credit, on a service-by-service basis. See 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(1); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30
FCC Rcd at 7529, para. 85. The Commission determined in the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order that a rural service
provider bidding credit will be available to eligible rural service providers in Auction 113. 2025 AWS-3 Report and
Order at 15, para. 35, Appx. A.
187

188

47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4)(i)(A)–(B).

189

Id. § 1.2110(f)(4)(i)(B); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7536–37, para. 104.

190

47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4)(i)(A).

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7534, para. 98 & n.326. For instance, a subscriber receiving
both wireline telephone service and broadband service would be counted as a single subscriber. Id.
191

192

47 CFR § 1.2112(b)(1)(v); see also id. § 1.2110(f)(4)(i)(C).

193

See id. § 1.2112(b)(1)(iii).

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agreement with any disclosable interest holder for the use of more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of
any license that may be won in Auction 113, the identity and the attributable subscribers of any such
disclosable interest holder must be disclosed.194 Like applicants seeking eligibility for small business
bidding credits, eligible rural service providers may also form a consortium.195 If an applicant is applying
as a consortium of rural service providers, then the disclosures described in this paragraph, including the
certification, must be provided for each consortium member.196
3.

Attributable Interests

106.
Controlling Interests and Affiliates. Pursuant to section 1.2110 of the Commission’s
rules, an applicant’s eligibility for bidding credits is determined by attributing the gross revenues (for
those seeking small business benefits) or subscribers (for those seeking rural service provider benefits) of
the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests.197 This
information must therefore be disclosed in the short-form application of any auction participant seeking a
small business or rural service provider bidding credit. Controlling interests of an applicant include
individuals and entities with either de facto or de jure control of the applicant.198 Typically, ownership of
greater than 50% of an entity’s voting stock evidences de jure control.199 De facto control is determined
on a case-by-case basis based on the totality of the circumstances.200 The following are some common
indicia of de facto control:
•

the entity constitutes or appoints more than 50% of the board of directors or management
committee;

•

the entity has authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that control the
day-to-day activities of the licensee; and

•

the entity plays an integral role in management decisions.201

107.
Additionally, for attribution purposes, officers and directors of an applicant seeking a
bidding credit are considered to have a controlling interest in the applicant.202 Applicants should refer to
section 1.2110(c)(2) of the Commission’s rules and the FCC Form 175 Instructions to understand how
certain interests are calculated in determining control for purposes of attributing gross revenues.

194

See id. § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J).

195

See id. § 1.2110(b)(4)(i), (c)(6).

196

Id. § 1.2112(b)(1)(vi).

197

47 CFR § 1.2110(b)(1)(i), (f)(4)(i)(C)(1).

198

Id. § 1.2110(c)(2)(i).

199

Id.

See id.; see also, e.g., Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, PP
Docket No. 93-253, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 403, 447–49, 451, 455–56, paras. 80–82,
85–86, 95–96 (1994); Intermountain Microwave, Public Notice, 12 FCC 2d 559, 559–60 (1963) (Intermountain
Microwave); Application of Ellis Thompson Corp., CC Docket No. 94-136, Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Hearing Designation Order, 9 FCC Rcd 7138, 7138–39, paras. 9–11 (1994); Application of Baker Creek
Communications, L.P., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 18709, 18713–14, paras. 7–8 (WTB 1998);
Northstar Wireless, LLC, SNR Wireless LicenseCo, LLC, Applications for New Licenses in the 1695–1710 MHz,
1755–1780 MHz and 2155–2180 MHz Bands, File Nos. 0006670613 and 0006670667, Report No. AUC-97AUC,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 8887, 8889–91, paras. 4–9 (2015), aff’d on this issue and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. SNR Wireless LicenseCo, LLC v. FCC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 2674 (2018).
200

201

47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)(i)(A)–(C).

202

Id. § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(F).

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108.
Affiliates of an applicant or controlling interest include an individual or entity that:
(1) directly or indirectly controls or has the power to control the applicant, (2) is directly or indirectly
controlled by the applicant, (3) is directly or indirectly controlled by a third party that also controls or has
the power to control the applicant, or (4) has an “identity of interest” with the applicant.203 The
Commission’s definition of an affiliate of the applicant encompasses both controlling interests of the
applicant and affiliates of controlling interests of the applicant.204 For more information on how to
disclose information regarding controlling interests and affiliates, applicants should refer to sections
1.2110(c)(2) and (c)(5) respectively,205 as well as the FCC Form 175 Instructions.
109.
An applicant seeking a small business bidding credit must demonstrate, through its
disclosures, its eligibility for the bidding credit by: (1) meeting the applicable small business size
standard, based on the controlling interest and affiliation rules discussed above; and (2) retaining control,
on a license-by-license basis, over the spectrum associated with the licenses for which it seeks small
business benefits.206 For purposes of the first prong of the standard, applicants should note that control
and affiliation may arise through, among other things, ownership interests, voting interests, management
and other operating agreements, or the terms of any other types of agreements—including spectrum lease
agreements—that independently or together create a controlling, or potentially controlling, interest in the
applicant’s or licensee’s business as a whole.207 In addition, once an applicant demonstrates eligibility as
a small business under the first prong, it must also be eligible for benefits on a license-by-license basis
under the second prong.208 As part of making the FCC Form 175 certification that it is qualified as a
designated entity under section 1.2110, an applicant is certifying that it does not have any spectrum use or
other agreements that would confer either de jure or de facto control of any license it seeks to acquire
with bidding credits.209
110.
With respect to the retention of control over the spectrum associated with the licenses at
issue, applicants should note that, under this standard for evaluating eligibility for small business bidding
credits, if an applicant executes a spectrum use agreement that does not comply with the Commission’s
relevant standard of de facto control,210 then it will be subject to unjust enrichment obligations for the
203

Id. § 1.2110(c)(5).

204

Id.

205

Id. § 1.2110(c)(2), (c)(5).

206

See id. § 1.2110(b)(3); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7507–10, paras. 29–34.

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7507, para. 30; see also, e.g., 47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(5)(vii)–(x)
(explaining how affiliation can arise where one concern has the power to control or potentially control the other
concern). As discussed below, except under the limited provisions provided for spectrum manager lessors, the
Commission’s decision to discontinue its policy requiring designated entity licensees to operate as primarily
facilities-based providers of service directly to the public does not alter the rules that require the Commission to
consider whether any particular use agreement may confer control of or create affiliation with the applicant. See
Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7509, para. 33.
207

208

47 CFR § 1.2110(b)(3); see Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7507, 7509, paras. 29, 33.

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(iv); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7509–10, paras. 33–34; see
also 47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(A). For instance, if an applicant has a spectrum use agreement on a particular
license that calls into question whether, under the Commission’s affiliation rules, the user’s revenues should be
attributed to the applicant for that particular license, rather than for its overall business operations, the applicant
could be ineligible to acquire or retain benefits with respect to that particular license. By taking this license-bylicense approach, an applicant need not be eligible for small business benefits on each of the spectrum licenses it
holds in order to demonstrate its overall eligibility for such benefits. Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC
Rcd at 7509, para. 33.
209

See 47 CFR § 1.9010 (defining de facto control for spectrum leasing arrangements); see also Intermountain
Microwave, 12 FCC 2d at 559–60 (describing de facto control for non-leasing situations); 47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)
(continued….)
210

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benefits associated with that particular license.211 If that spectrum use agreement (either alone or in
combination with the designated entity controlling interest and attribution rules described above) goes so
far as to confer control of the applicant’s overall business, then the gross revenues of the additional
interest holders will be attributed to the applicant, which could render the applicant ineligible for all
current and future small business benefits on all licenses.212
111.
Limitation on Spectrum Use. Under section 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J) of the Commission’s
rules, the gross revenues (or the subscribers, in the case of a rural service provider) of an applicant’s
disclosable interest holder are attributable to the applicant, on a license-by-license basis, if the disclosable
interest holder has an agreement with the applicant to use, in any manner, more than 25% of the spectrum
capacity of any license won by the applicant and acquired with a bidding credit during the five-year
unjust enrichment period for the applicable license.213 For purposes of this requirement, a disclosable
interest holder of an applicant seeking designated entity benefits is defined as any individual or entity
holding a 10% or greater interest of any kind in the applicant, including but not limited to, a 10% or
greater interest in any class of stock, warrants, options, or debt securities in the applicant or licensee.214
Any applicant seeking a bidding credit for licenses won in Auction 113 will be subject to this attribution
rule and must make the requisite disclosures.215
112.
Certain disclosable interest holders may be excluded from this attribution rule.
Specifically, an applicant claiming the rural service provider bidding credit may have a spectrum license
use agreement with a disclosable interest holder, without having to attribute the disclosable interest
holder’s subscribers, so long as the disclosable interest holder is independently eligible for a rural service
provider credit and the disclosable interest holder’s spectrum use and any spectrum use agreement is
otherwise permissible under the Commission’s existing rules.216 If applicable, the applicant must attach
to its FCC Form 175 any additional information as may be required to indicate any license that may be
subject to this attribution rule or to demonstrate its eligibility for the exception from this attribution
rule.217 Consistent with the Commission’s limited information procedures, we intend to withhold from
public disclosure all information contained in any such attachments until after the close of Auction 113.

(defining de facto control for designated entities); Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 15324, para. 61
(incorporating the Intermountain Microwave principles of control into section 1.2110 of the Commission’s rules).
Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7509, para. 34. Although in this scenario the applicant may
not be eligible for a bidding credit and may be subject to the Commission’s unjust enrichment rules, the applicant
need not be eligible for small business benefits on each of the spectrum licenses it holds in order to demonstrate its
overall eligibility for such benefits.
211

Id. This rule does not alter the full dilution requirement in 47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(A). Except where the
leasing standard of de facto control applies under sections 1.9010 and 1.9020 of the secondary market rules, the
criteria of Intermountain Microwave and Ellis Thompson will continue to apply to every Commission licensee for
purposes of assessing whether it can demonstrate that it retains de facto control of its business venture and spectrum
license. 47 CFR §§ 1.9010, 1.9020; Application of Ellis Thompson Corporation, Summary Decision, 10 FCC Rcd
12554, 12555–56, para. 9 (ALJ 1995). In the Updating Part 1 Report and Order, the Commission also modified
section 1.9020 of its rules to apply the same de facto control standard to designated entity spectrum manager lessors
that it applies to non-designated entity spectrum manager lessors. Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd
at 7510–11, paras. 35–39; see 47 CFR § 1.9020.
212

213

47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7512–16, paras. 42–53.

214

47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J).

215

See Sections III.H.1. (Small Business Bidding Credit), III.H.2. (Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit), above.

216

47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7513, para. 46.

To the extent an Auction 113 applicant is required to submit any such additional information, the applicant must
not disclose details of its submission to others as it would reveal information regarding its license selection(s).
217

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113.
Exceptions from Attribution Rules for Small Businesses and Rural Service Providers.
Applicants claiming designated entity benefits may be eligible for certain exceptions from the
Commission’s attribution rules.218 For example, in calculating an applicant’s gross revenues under the
controlling interest standard, the Commission will not attribute to the applicant the personal net worth,
including personal income, of its officers and directors.219 However, to the extent that the officers and
directors of the applicant are controlling interest holders of other entities, the gross revenues of those
entities will be attributed to the applicant.220 Moreover, if an officer or director operates a separate
business, then the gross revenues derived from that business would be attributed to the applicant.221
114.
The Commission has also exempted from attribution to the applicant the gross revenues
of the affiliates of a rural telephone cooperative’s officers and directors, if certain conditions specified in
section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii) of the Commission’s rules are met.222 An applicant claiming this exemption
must provide, in an attachment, an affirmative statement that the applicant, affiliate, and/or controlling
interest is an eligible rural telephone cooperative within the meaning of section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii), and the
applicant must supply any additional information as may be required to demonstrate eligibility for the
exemption from the attribution rule.223
115.
An applicant claiming a rural service provider bidding credit may be eligible for an
exception from the Commission’s attribution rules as an existing rural partnership. To qualify for this
exception, an applicant must be a rural partnership providing service as of July 16, 2015, and each
member of the rural partnership must individually have fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline,
broadband, and cable subscribers.224 Because each member of the rural partnership must individually
qualify for the bidding credit, by definition, a partnership that includes a nationwide provider as a member
will not be eligible for the benefit.225
116.
Finally, a consortium of small businesses or rural service providers may seek an
exception from the Commission’s attribution rules. Under the Commission’s rules, a consortium of small
businesses or rural service providers is a conglomerate organization composed of two or more entities,
each of which individually satisfies the definition of small business or rural service provider.226 A
consortium must provide additional information for each member demonstrating each member’s
eligibility for the claimed bidding credit in order to show that the applicant satisfies the eligibility criteria

218

See, e.g., 47 CFR § 1.2110(b)(4).

See id. § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(F); Part 1 Third R&O Second Recon/Part 1 Fifth R&O Recon, 18 FCC Rcd at 10185–
86, paras. 8–9.
219

220

Part 1 Third R&O Second Recon/Part 1 Fifth R&O Recon, 18 FCC Rcd at 10186, para. 9.

221

See Part 1 Third R&O Second Recon/Part 1 Fifth R&O Recon, 18 FCC Rcd at 10186, para. 9.

See 47 CFR § 1.2110(b)(4)(iii); see also Part 1 Third R&O Second Recon/Part 1 Fifth R&O Recon, 18 FCC Rcd
at 10186–94, paras. 10–18; Part 1 Fifth R&O Second Recon, 20 FCC Rcd at 1945–50, paras. 9–18.
222

47 CFR § 1.2110(b)(4)(iii); see also Part 1 Third R&O Second Recon/Part 1 Fifth R&O Recon, 18 FCC Rcd at
10186–95, paras. 10–20; Part 1 Fifth R&O Second Recon, 20 FCC Rcd at 1945–50, paras. 9–18.
223

See 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4)(i)(C)(2); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7536, para. 102. Thus,
the Commission will essentially evaluate eligibility for an existing rural wireless partnership on the same basis as it
would for an applicant applying for a bidding credit as a consortium of rural service providers. See Updating Part 1
Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7536, para. 102 & n.336.
224

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7536, para. 103. We also note that members of such
partnerships that fall under this exception may also apply as individual applicants or members of a consortium (to
the extent that it is otherwise permissible to do so under the Commission’s rules) and seek eligibility for a rural
service provider bidding credit. Id. at 7536, 7582, paras. 103, 210.
225

226

47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(6).

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for the bidding credit.227 The gross revenue or subscriber information of each consortium member will
not be aggregated for purposes of determining the consortium’s eligibility for the claimed bidding credit.
This information must be provided, however, to ensure that each consortium member qualifies for the
bidding credit sought by the consortium.
I.

Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

117.
Pursuant to the rules governing competitive bidding, each applicant must make
certifications regarding whether it is a current or former defaulter or delinquent.228 A current defaulter
or delinquent is not eligible to participate in Auction 113,229 but a former defaulter or delinquent
may participate so long as it is otherwise qualified and makes an upfront payment that is 50% more
than would otherwise be necessary.230 Accordingly, each applicant must certify under penalty of
perjury on its FCC Form 175 that it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests are not in default on any payment for a Commission construction permit or license
(including down payments) and that they are not delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal
agency.231 Additionally, an applicant must certify under penalty of perjury whether it (along with its
controlling interests) has ever been in default on any payment for a Commission construction permit or
license (including down payments) or has ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal
agency, subject to the exclusions described below.232 For purposes of making these certifications, the
term “controlling interest” is defined in section 1.2105(a)(4)(i) of the Commission rules.233
227

See Sections III.H.1. (Small Business Bidding Credit), III.H.2. (Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit), above.

228

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(xi), (xii).

An applicant is considered a “current defaulter” or a “current delinquent” when it, any of its affiliates, any of its
controlling interests, or any of the affiliates of its controlling interests, is in default on any payment for any
Commission construction permit or license (including a down payment) or is delinquent on any non-tax debt owed
to any Federal agency as of the filing deadline for auction applications. See Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 15 FCC
Rcd at 15317, para. 42 & n.142; Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Reminds Prospective Broadband PCS
Spectrum Auction Applicants of Default and Delinquency Disclosure Requirements, Public Notice, 19 FCC Rcd
21920, 21920 (2004) (Auction Default Disclosure Public Notice). This public notice may be found at
www.fcc.gov/auction/58.
229

47 CFR §§ 1.2105(a)(2)(xii), (b)(1), 1.2106(a). For purposes of evaluating the certifications under sections
1.2105(a)(2)(xi) and (xii), we clarify that “non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency” includes, within the meaning
of the rule, all amounts owed under Federal programs, including contributions to the Universal Service Fund (USF),
Telecommunications Relay Services Fund, and the North American Numbering Plan Administration,
notwithstanding that the administrator of any such fund may not be considered a Federal “agency” under the Debt
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified in relevant parts at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3716 (administrative offset), 3717 (interest and penalty on claims)); see also 47 CFR §§ 1.1901, 1.1911,
1.1912, 1.1940. For example, an applicant with a past due USF contribution as of the auction application filing
deadline would be disqualified from participating in Auction 113 under the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR
§ 1.2105(a)(2)(xi), (b)(1). If, however, the applicant cures the overdue debt prior to the auction application filing
deadline (and such debt does not fall within one of the exclusions described in paragraph 118 of this Public Notice),
then it may be eligible to participate in Auction 113 as a former defaulter under the Commission’s rules. See id.
§§ 1.2105(a)(2)(xii), 1.2106(a). For additional information on upfront payments and related forms, see Section II.E.
(Upfront Payments), above.
230

231 47

CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(xi); see also Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 15317, para. 42 n.142 (“If any
one of an applicant’s controlling interests or their affiliates . . . is in default on any Commission licenses or is
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency at the time the applicant files it[s] FCC Form 175, the
applicant will not be able to make the certification required by Section 1.2105(a)(2)(x) . . . and will not be eligible to
participate in Commission auctions.”).
47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(xii). Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7568, para. 175 (interpreting the
former defaulter certification in section 1.2105(a)(2)(xii) as applying to applicants and controlling interests).
232

233

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(4)(i).

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118.
Under the Commission’s rule regarding applications by former defaulters, an applicant is
considered a “former defaulter” or a “former delinquent” when, as of the FCC Form 175 filing deadline,
the applicant or any of its controlling interests has defaulted on any Commission construction permit or
license or has been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, but has since remedied
all such defaults and cured all the outstanding non-tax delinquencies.234 For purposes of the certification
under section 1.2105(a)(2)(xii), the applicant may exclude from consideration any cured default on a
Commission construction permit or license or cured delinquency on a non-tax debt owed to a Federal
agency for which any of the following criteria are met: (1) the notice of the final payment deadline or
delinquency was received more than seven years before the FCC Form 175 filing deadline, (2) the default
or delinquency amounted to less than $100,000, (3) the default or delinquency was paid within two
quarters (i.e., six months) after receiving the notice of the final payment deadline or delinquency, or
(4) the default or delinquency was the subject of a legal or arbitration proceeding and was cured upon
resolution of the proceeding.235 With respect to the first exclusion, notice to a debtor may include notice
of a final payment deadline or notice of delinquency and may be express or implied depending on the
origin of any Federal non-tax debt giving rise to a default or delinquency.236 Additionally, for the third
exclusion, the date of receipt of the notice of a final default deadline or delinquency by the intended party
or debtor will be used for purposes of verifying receipt of notice.237
119.
In addition to this Public Notice, applicants are encouraged to review previous guidance
on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the context of the auction short-form application
process.238 Parties are also encouraged to consult with Auctions Division staff if they have any questions
about default and delinquency disclosure requirements.
120.
The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United States Government, in
any amount, to be a serious matter. The Commission has previously adopted rules, including a provision
referred to as the “red light rule,” that implement its obligations under the Debt Collection Improvement
Act of 1996, which governs the collection of debts owed to the United States.239 Under the red light rule,
47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(xii); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7568, para. 175. In 2015, the
Commission narrowed the scope of the individuals and entities to be considered for purposes of the former defaulter
rule. Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7568, para. 175; see 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(xii), (a)(4).
234

47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(xii), (a)(4); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7566–68, paras. 173–75.
Additionally, for purposes of the certification required on an FCC Form 175, a debt will not be deemed to be in
default or delinquent until after the expiration of a final payment deadline. See, e.g., Expedited Clarification of
Sections 1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) of the Commission's Rules, Letter Order, 19 FCC Rcd 22907, 22907–08 (WTB
2004). Thus, to the extent that the rules providing for payment of a specific federal debt permit payment after an
original payment deadline accompanied by late fee(s), such debts would not be in default or delinquent for purposes
of applying the former defaulter rules until after the late payment deadline. In addition, we provide the following
regarding defaults on Commission licenses: any winning bidder that fails to timely pay its post-auction down
payment or the balance of its final winning bid amount(s) or is disqualified for any reason after the close of an
auction will be in default and subject to a default payment. 47 CFR § 1.2109(c). Commission staff provide
individual notice of the amount of such a default payment as well as procedures and information required by the
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, including the payment due date and any charges, interest, and/or
penalties that accrue in the event of delinquency. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3716, 3717; 47 CFR §§ 1.1911, 1.1912,
1.1940. For purposes of the certifications required on an FCC Form 175, such notice provided by Commission staff
assessing a default payment arising out of a default on a winning bid constitutes notice of the final payment deadline
with respect to a default on a Commission license.
235

236

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7566, para. 173 & n.556.

237

Id. at 7567, para. 173 & n.559.

238

See Auction Default Disclosure Public Notice, 19 FCC Rcd at 21920.

Amendment of Parts 0 and 1 of the Commission’s Rules; Implementation of the Debt Collection Improvement Act
of 1996 and Adoption of Rules Governing Applications or Requests for Benefits by Delinquent Debtors, MD Docket
No. 02-339, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 6540 (2004) (Debt Collection Report and Order).
239

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applications and other requests for benefits filed by parties that have outstanding debts owed to the
Commission will not be processed.240 When adopting that rule, the Commission explicitly declared,
however, that its competitive bidding rules “are not affected” by the red light rule.241 As a consequence,
the Commission’s adoption of the red light rule does not alter the applicability of any of its competitive
bidding rules, including the provisions and certifications of sections 1.2105 and 1.2106, with regard to
current and former defaults or delinquencies.
121.
We remind each applicant, however, that any indication in the Commission’s Red Light
Display System, which provides information regarding debts currently owed to the Commission, may not
be determinative of an auction applicant’s ability to comply with the default and delinquency disclosure
requirements of section 1.2105.242 Thus, while the red light rule ultimately may prevent the processing of
long-form applications by auction winners, an auction applicant’s lack of current “red light” status is not
necessarily determinative of its eligibility to participate in an auction (or whether it may be subject to an
increased upfront payment obligation). Moreover, a prospective applicant in Auction 113 should note
that any long-form applications filed after the close of bidding will be reviewed for compliance with the
Commission’s red light rule,243 and such review may result in the dismissal of a winning bidder’s longform application.244 We encourage each applicant to carefully review all records and other available
Federal agency databases and information sources to determine whether the applicant, or any of its
affiliates, or any of its controlling interests, or any of the affiliates of its controlling interests, owes or was
ever delinquent in the payment of non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency.
J.

Modifications to FCC Form 175
1.

Duty to Maintain Accuracy and Completeness of FCC Form 175

122.
Pursuant to section 1.65 of the Commission’s rules, each applicant has a continuing
obligation to maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in a pending application,
including a pending application to participate in Auction 113.245 Consistent with the requirements for
prior spectrum auctions, an applicant for Auction 113 must furnish additional or corrected information to
the Commission within five business days after a significant occurrence, or amend its FCC Form 175 no
more than five business days after the applicant becomes aware of the need for the amendment.246 An
applicant is obligated to amend its pending application even if a reported change may result in the
dismissal of the application because it is subsequently determined to be a major modification.

240

Id.

Id. at 6541, para. 3 n.11 (specifically noting the current defaulter and former defaulter certifications of 47 CFR
§ 1.2105(a)(2)(x) and (xi) and stating that “[t]hese rules are not affected by the red light rule”).
241

Auction Default Disclosure Public Notice, 19 FCC Rcd at 21921–22 (addressing relationship between
Commission’s Red Light Display System and short-form application default and delinquency disclosure
requirements for auction applicants). To access the Commission’s Red Light Display System, go to
https://www.fcc.gov/redlight/.
242

243

See Debt Collection Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 6540–42, paras. 1, 3–5; see also 47 CFR § 1.1114.

Applicants that have their long-form applications dismissed will be deemed to have defaulted and will be subject
to default payments under 47 CFR §§ 1.2104(g) and 1.2109(c).
244

See id. §§ 1.65(a), 1.2105(b)(4). For purposes of sections 1.65 and 1.2105(b)(4), an applicant’s FCC Form 175
and associated attachments will remain pending until the release of a public notice announcing the close of the
auction. However, we remind Auction 113 applicants that they remain subject to the section 1.2105(c) prohibition
on certain communications until the post-auction deadline for making down payments on winning bids. See Section
IV.B.2. (Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline), below.
245

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(4). We remind each applicant of its duty to continuously maintain the accuracy of
information submitted in its auction application. See, e.g., Vermont Telephone Company, Inc., Notice of Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture, 26 FCC Rcd 14130, 14134, para. 11 (EB 2011).
246

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Modifying an FCC Form 175

123.
As noted above, a party seeking to participate in Auction 113 must file an FCC Form 175
electronically via the AAP in the AAS. During the initial filing window, an applicant will be able to
make any necessary modifications to its FCC Form 175 in the AAP. An applicant that has certified and
submitted its FCC Form 175 before the close of the initial filing window may continue to make
modifications as often as necessary until the close of that window; however, the applicant must re-certify
and re-submit its FCC Form 175 before the close of the initial filing window to confirm and effect its
latest application changes. After each submission, a confirmation page will be displayed stating the
submission time and submission date.
124.
An applicant will also be allowed to modify its FCC Form 175 in the AAP, except for
certain fields,247 during the resubmission filing window and after the release of the public notice
announcing the qualified bidders for an auction. During these times, if an applicant needs to make
permissible minor changes to its FCC Form 175 or must make changes in order to maintain the accuracy
and completeness of its application pursuant to sections 1.65 and 1.2105(b)(4), then it must make the
change(s) in the AAP and re-certify and re-submit its application to confirm and effect the change(s).248
125.
An applicant’s ability to modify its FCC Form 175 in the AAP will be limited between
the closing of the initial filing window and the opening of the application resubmission filing window,
and between the closing of the resubmission filing window and the release of the public notice
announcing the qualified bidders for an auction. During these periods, an applicant will be able to view
its submitted application, but will be permitted to modify only the applicant’s address, responsible party
address, and contact information (e.g., name, address, telephone number) in the AAP. An applicant will
not be able to modify any other pages of the FCC Form 175 in the AAP during these periods. If, during
these periods, an applicant needs to make other permissible minor changes to its FCC Form 175, or
changes to maintain the accuracy and completeness of its application pursuant to sections 1.65 and
1.2105(b)(4), then the applicant must submit a letter briefly summarizing the changes to its FCC
Form 175 via email to auction113@fcc.gov. The email summarizing the changes must include a subject
line referring to Auction 113 and the name of the applicant, for example, “Re: Changes to Auction 113
Auction Application of XYZ Corp.” Any attachments to the email must be formatted as Adobe®
Acrobat® (PDF) or Microsoft® Word documents. An applicant that submits its changes in this manner
must subsequently modify, certify, and submit its FCC Form 175 application(s) electronically in the AAP
once it is again open and available to applicants.
126.
Applicants should also note that even at times when the AAP is open and available to
applicants, the system will not allow an applicant to make certain other permissible changes itself (e.g.,
correcting a misstatement of the applicant’s legal classification).249 If an applicant needs to make a
permissible minor change of this nature, then it must submit a written request by email to the Auctions
Division Chief, via auction113@fcc.gov requesting that the Commission manually make the change on
the applicant’s behalf. Once Commission staff has informed the applicant that the change has been made
in the AAP, the applicant must then re-certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 in the AAP to confirm and
effect the change(s).
Specifically, an applicant will not be allowed to modify in the AAP the applicant’s legal classification, the
applicant’s name, or the certifying official.
247

248

After the initial FCC Form 175 filing deadline, an Auction 113 applicant will be permitted to make only minor
amendments to its application consistent with the Commission’s rules. See 47 CFR § 1.2105(b)(2); see supra para.
36. Minor amendments include any changes that are not major, such as: the deletion or addition of authorized
bidders (to a maximum of three); revision of addresses and telephone numbers of the applicant, its responsible party,
and its contact person; correcting typographical errors; and supplying or correcting information as requested to
support the certifications made in the application. Id.
This is the case because certain fields on the FCC Form 175 will no longer be changeable by the applicant after
the initial short-form application filing window closes.
249

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127.
As with filing the FCC Form 175, any amendment(s) to the application and related
statements of fact must be certified by an authorized representative of the applicant with authority to bind
the applicant. Applicants should note that submission of any such amendment or related statement of fact
constitutes a representation by the person certifying that he or she is an authorized representative with
such authority and that the contents of the amendment or statement of fact are true and correct.
128.
Applicants must not submit application-specific material through the Commission’s
Electronic Comment Filing System. Further, as discussed below, parties submitting information related
to their applications should use caution to ensure that their submissions do not contain confidential
information or communicate information that would violate section 1.2105(c) or the limited information
procedures adopted for Auction 113. An applicant seeking to submit, outside the AAP, information that
might reflect non-public information, such as an applicant’s license selection(s), upfront payment amount,
or bidding eligibility, should consider including in its email a request that the filing or portions of the
filing be withheld from public inspection until the end of the prohibition on certain communications
pursuant to section 1.2105(c).
129.
Questions about FCC Form 175 amendments should be directed to the Auctions Division
at auction113@fcc.gov or (202) 418-0660.
IV.

INFORMATION PROCEDURES AND PROHIBITED COMMUNICATIONS
A.

Information Procedures During the Auction Process

130.
Consistent with past practice in many prior spectrum license auctions,250 we adopt the
proposal to limit information available during Auction 113 in order to prevent the identification of bidders
placing particular bids until after the bidding has closed.251 Specifically, we will not make public until
after bidding has closed: (1) the licenses that an applicant selects for bidding in its short-form application,
(2) the amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant for Auction 113, (3) any
applicant’s bidding eligibility, and (4) any other bidding-related information that might reveal the identity
of the bidder placing a bid. Moreover, we will not make public until after the close of the auction whether
an applicant has submitted with its short-form application a signed acknowledgment statement regarding
the acceptance of interference from Federal incumbents for operations in the 1755–1780 MHz.
131.
We also adopt our proposal to make public after each bidding round, for each license, the
aggregate demand, the posted price of the last completed round,252 and the clock price for the next
round.253 The identities of bidders making specific bids will not be disclosed until after the close of
bidding in the auction. Bids placed according to a bidder’s proxy instructions will be made available, but
a bidder’s proxy instructions will not be disclosed because they may contain price information private to
the bidder. The limited comment we received on this proposal largely supports adopting it.254
132.
Each bidder will have access to additional information related to its own bidding and bid
eligibility.255 Specifically, after the bids of a round have been processed, the bidding system will inform
See, e.g., Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4391–92, paras. 53–58; Auction 110 Procedures
Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9286–87, paras. 37–42; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8417–
18, paras. 35–40; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2153–54, paras. 36–41; see also 47 CFR
§ 1.2104(h).
250

251

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1490–91, paras. 24–27.

252

The posted price for each license will serve as the start-of-round price for the next round.

253

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1495, para. 46.

254

See CCA Comments at 6–7; AT&T Comments at 3 (recommending adoption of the proposals outlined in the
Auction 113 Comment Public Notice “as is”); AT&T Reply at 1, 3; CTIA Reply at 1–2. Cf. Ravnitzky Comments at
7–8.
255

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1495, para. 47.

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each bidder of its processed demand for each license, its proxy instructions, and its eligibility for the next
round. The identities of bidders placing specific bids will not be disclosed until after the close of
bidding.256 After the close of bidding, bidders’ license selections, upfront payment amounts, bidding
eligibility, bids, and other bidding-related actions will be made publicly available.257
133.
The limited information procedures (sometimes also referred to as anonymous bidding)
we adopt here have been effective in past auctions to safeguard against potential anticompetitive behavior
such as retaliatory bidding and collusion.258 Commenters generally support adopting the limited
information procedures as proposed.259 However, Ravnitzky, who supports adopting limited information
procedures generally to promote fair competition and discourage anti-competitive conduct, suggests a
more restrictive approach—i.e., implementing phased disclosures of aggregate demand data because he
contends that in smaller markets with fewer licenses available, bidding patterns and price movements
revealed by the proposed limited information procedures can indirectly reveal biding strategies.260
Verizon, however, asks us to reject Ravnitzky’s suggested enhancements, arguing that such additional
procedures would complicate the development of Auction 113 bidding software and strategies and that
there is no reason for the Commission “to stray from the tried-and-true bidding framework that has made
its auctions a success.”261
134.
Because Ravnitzky provides no evidence that the limited information procedures used in
our past auctions have facilitated anticompetitive bidding behavior in any auction, we are not persuaded
that we should depart from our now-established practice of implementing these procedures in wireless
spectrum auctions, and we conclude that the competitive benefits associated with limiting information
disclosure support adoption of such procedures and outweigh any potential benefits of full disclosure.262
We also agree with Verizon that implementing Ravnitzky’s proposal for the phased disclosure of
aggregate demand data would unnecessarily complicate Auction 113 bidding procedures.263

256

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1491, para. 26.

Bids placed according to a bidder’s proxy instructions will be available, but a bidder’s proxy instructions will not
be disclosed. See Section V.F.6. (Proxy Bids), below.
257

258

See Auction of AWS-1 and Broadband PCS Licenses Rescheduled for August 13, 2008; Notice and Filing
Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 78, AU Docket No.
08-46, Public Notice, 23 FCC Rcd 7496, 7536, para. 157 (WTB 2008) (recognizing that limited information
procedures may have overall competitive benefits from reduced opportunities for bid signaling, retaliatory bidding,
or other anti-competitive strategic bidding) (Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice); Auction of 700 MHz Band
Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments,
and Other Procedures for Auction 92, AU Docket No. 10-248, Public Notice, 26 FCC Rcd 3342, 3372, para. 128 &
n.150 (WTB 2011) (finding that the competitive benefits associated with limited information disclosure procedures
support adoption of such procedures). We note that limited information procedures were also adopted for our most
recent broadcast auction (Auction 112). See Auction 112 Procedures Public Notice at 12–13, paras. 35–40.
259

See, e.g., CCA Comments at 6–7 (“confidential bidding procedures combat collusion and enhance competition
among providers . . .” and that it “can conceive of no compelling reason why any third parties should have real-time
information regarding bidders’ identity before the close of bidding.”). Other commenters also generally support
adopting the limited information procedures as proposed. See AT&T Comments at 3 (recommending adoption of
the proposals outlined in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice “as is”); AT&T Reply at 1, 3; CTIA Reply at 1–2.
Ravnitzky Comments at 7–8 (asserting that “in past FCC auctions, localized and less competitive markets made it
easier for bidders to infer competitor behavior despite the anonymity rules” and reduced disclosures “would further
strengthen the fairness and effectiveness of the auction process”). Ravnitzky suggests demand figures for specific
licenses could, for example, be released later in the auction or withheld until after the auction concludes. Id. at 8.
260

261

Verizon Reply at 6.

262

See Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice, 23 FCC Rcd at 7536, para. 157.

263

Verizon Reply at 6–7.

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135.
We warn applicants that direct or indirect communication to other applicants or the
public disclosure of non-public information (e.g., reductions in eligibility, identities of bidders) could
violate the Commission’s rule prohibiting certain communications.264 Therefore, to the extent an
applicant believes that such a disclosure is required by law or regulation, including regulations
issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), we strongly urge that the applicant
consult with Commission staff in the Auctions Division before making such disclosure.
B.

Prohibited Communications and Compliance with Antitrust Laws

136.
The rules prohibiting certain communications set forth in section 1.2105(c) apply to each
“applicant” in Auction 113.265 Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the Commission’s rules provides that, subject to
specified exceptions, “[a]fter the short-form application filing deadline, all applicants are prohibited from
cooperating or collaborating with respect to, communicating with or disclosing, to each other or any
nationwide provider [of communications services] that is not an applicant, or, if the applicant is a
nationwide provider, any non-nationwide provider that is not an applicant, in any manner the substance of
their own, or each other’s, or any other applicants’ bids or bidding strategies (including post-auction
market structure), or discussing or negotiating settlement agreements, until after the down payment
deadline[.]”266 Any applicant found to have violated these communication prohibitions may be subject to
sanctions.267
1.

Entities Subject to Section 1.2105(c)

137.
An “applicant” for purposes of this rule includes all “controlling interests” in the entity
submitting the FCC Form 175 auction application, as well as all holders of interests amounting to 10% or
more of the entity (including institutional investors and asset management companies), and all officers
and directors of that entity.268 Under section 1.2105(c), a party that submits an application becomes an
“applicant” under the rule, which goes into effect at the application deadline, and that status does not
change based on later developments.269
2.

Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline

138.
The prohibition in section 1.2105(c) on certain communications begins at an auction’s
short-form application filing deadline and ends at the auction’s down payment deadline after the auction
closes, which will be announced in a future public notice.270 To be clear, communications that occur even

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(c); see also Section IV.B. (Prohibited Communications and Compliance with Antitrust
Laws), below.
264

265

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(c)(5)(i).

47 CFR § 1.2105(c)(1). Section 1.2105(c)(5)(i) defines “applicant” as including all officers and directors of the
entity submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all controlling interests of that entity, as well
as all holders of partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest amounting to 10% or more of the
entity, or outstanding stock, or outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form application. Id.
§ 1.2105(c)(5)(1).
266

See, e.g., AT&T Services, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 39 FCC Rcd 3943 (EB 2024) (sanctioning AT&T for violating
the prohibited communications rule and for failing to timely report the violation). See also 47 CFR §§ 1.2105(c),
1.2109(d).
267

268

47 CFR § 1.2105(c)(5)(i).

See Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d 469, 473–74 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Thus, an auction applicant that does not
correct deficiencies in its application, fails to submit a timely and sufficient upfront payment, or does not otherwise
become qualified, remains an “applicant” for purposes of the rule and remains subject to the prohibition on certain
communications until the Auction 113 down payment deadline.
269

270

47 CFR § 1.2105(c)(1).

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after bidding has ended and the auction has closed, but before the down payment deadline, are still subject
to section 1.2105(c).271
3.

Scope of Prohibition on Certain Communications; Prohibition on Joint
Bidding Agreements

139.
Section 1.2105(c) of the Commission’s rules prohibits certain communications between
applicants for an auction, regardless of whether the applicants seek permits or licenses in the same
geographic area or market.272 The rule also applies to communications by applicants with non-applicant
nationwide providers of communications services and by nationwide applicants with non-applicant, nonnationwide providers.273 As explained above, for purposes of the prohibited communications rule for
Auction 113, we consider AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to be “nationwide providers.”274 The rule
further prohibits “joint bidding arrangements,” including arrangements relating to the permits or licenses
being auctioned that address or communicate, directly or indirectly, bidding at the auction, bidding
strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the specific permits or licenses on which to bid, and
any such arrangements relating to the post-auction market structure.275 The rule allows for limited
exceptions for communications within the scope of any arrangement consistent with the exclusion from
the Commission’s rule prohibiting joint bidding, provided such arrangement is disclosed on the
applicant’s auction application.276 Applicants may communicate pursuant to any pre-existing agreements,
arrangements, or understandings relating to the licenses being auctioned that are solely operational or that
provide for the transfer or assignment of licenses, provided that such agreements, arrangements, or
understandings are disclosed on their applications and do not address or communicate bids (including
amounts), bidding strategies, or the particular permits or licenses on which to bid or the post-auction
market structure.277
140.
In addition to express statements of bids and bidding strategies, the prohibition against
communicating “in any manner” includes public disclosures as well as private communications and

271

Indeed, the Commission has recently taken enforcement action against such communications by auction
participants in the context of the Commission’s analogous prohibited communications rule for universal service
auctions, section 1.21002(b). See LTD Broadband LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability, 37 FCC Rcd 5736 (EB 2022)
(post-Auction 904 communications to an applicant regarding LTD’s winning bids); AMG Technology Investment
Group, LLC, Forfeiture Order, 39 FCC Rcd 3953 (EB 2024) (post-Auction 903 communications regarding AMG’s
winning bids).
272

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7577, para. 199; 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix), (c)(1).

273

47 CFR § 1.2105(c)(1); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7577, para. 199.

See Section III.E. (Disclosure of Agreements and Bidding Arrangements), above; see also Updating Part 1
Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7571, para. 140 & n.596.
274

275

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7575, para. 195.

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii), (ix)(A)–(C); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7576–77, paras.
197–99.
276

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix)(A)–(C); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7576–77, paras. 197–
99; see generally Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd 10794 (providing further
guidance on complying with the rule).
277

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indirect or implicit communications.278 Consequently, an applicant must take care to determine whether
its auction-related communications may reach another applicant.279
141.
Parties subject to section 1.2105(c) should take special care in circumstances where their
officers, directors, and employees may receive information directly or indirectly relating to any
applicant’s bids or bidding strategies, even if the officers, directors, or employees are not involved in their
company’s participation in the auction or if the information received is wholly unsolicited.280 Such
information may be deemed to have been received by the applicant under certain circumstances. For
example, Commission staff have found that, where an individual serves as an officer and director for two
or more applicants, the bids and bidding strategies of one applicant are presumed to be conveyed to the
other applicant through the shared officer, which creates an apparent violation of the rule.281
142.
Subject to the limited exceptions for communications within the scope of any
arrangement consistent with the exclusion from the Commission’s rule prohibiting joint bidding, section
1.2105(c)(1) prohibits applicants from communicating with specified other parties only with respect to
“their own, or each other’s, or any other applicant’s bids or bidding strategies.”282 The Prohibited
Communications Guidance Public Notice released in advance of the Broadcast Incentive Auction
(Auction 1000) reviewed the scope of the prohibition generally, as well as in that specific auction’s
forward auction of spectrum licenses and reverse auction to relinquish broadcast licenses.283 As the
Commission explained therein, a communication conveying “bids or bidding strategies (including postauction market structure)” must also relate to the “licenses being auctioned” in order to be covered by the
prohibition.284 Thus, the prohibition is limited in scope and does not apply to all communications
between or among the specified parties. The Commission consistently has made clear that application of
the rule prohibiting communications has never required total suspension of essential ongoing business.285
Entities subject to the prohibition may negotiate agreements during the prohibition period, provided that
the communications involved do not relate to both: (1) the licenses being auctioned and (2) bids or
bidding strategies or post-auction market structure.286

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7577, para. 199; Cascade Access, LLC, Forfeiture Order,
28 FCC Rcd 141, 144, para. 7 (EB 2013) (rejecting argument that the communication was not prohibited because it
did not reveal the “substance” of Cascade’s bids or bidding strategies).
278

We remind applicants that they must determine whether their communications with other parties are permissible
under the rule once the prohibition begins at the deadline for submitting applications, even before the public notice
identifying applicants is released.
279

280

See generally AT&T Services, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 39 FCC Rcd 3943, 3947–48 & n.40, para. 9 (EB 2024)
(“[T]here is no provision in the rule that the communication must be received by an applicant’s authorized bidder(s)
or bidding team for a prohibited communication to occur.”).
See, e.g., Letter to Auction 109 Applicant Paul S. Alexander, Jr. Concerning Non-qualified Status, AU Docket
No. 21-39, Letter Order, 36 FCC Rcd 10262, 10265–66 (OEA/MB 2021) (finding a violation of the prohibited
communications rule where an individual applicant reported being the officer of another applicant).
281

282

47 CFR § 1.2105(c)(1).

283

See generally Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10794.

284

Id. at 10806, para. 33.

See, e.g., Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, GN
Docket No. 12-268, Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 6567, 6770–71, para. 492 (2014).
285

Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10806–07, paras. 33–34. Verizon suggests
that “the viability of a robust secondary market in other bands” would benefit from a statement “clarify[ing]” that
“discussions that do not involve the licenses at issue and that are unrelated to the AWS-1 and AWS-3 bands do not
implicate the ‘post-auction market structure’ for this auction.” Verizon Comments at 4. Existing guidance, which
Verizon cites, provides that “communication . . . prohibited by Section 1.2105(c) must relate to the licenses being
(continued….)
286

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143.
Accordingly, business discussions and negotiations that do not convey information about
the bids or bidding strategies, including the post-auction market structure, of an applicant are not
prohibited by the rule.287 Moreover, not all auction-related information is covered by the prohibition. For
example, communicating merely whether a party has or has not applied to participate in Auction 113 will
not violate the rule.288 In contrast, communicating, among other things, how a party will participate,
including specific geographic areas selected, specific bid amounts, and/or whether or not the party is
placing bids, would convey bids or bidding strategies and would be prohibited.289
144.
While section 1.2105(c) does not prohibit business discussions and negotiations among
auction applicants that are unrelated to the auction, each applicant must remain vigilant not to
communicate, directly or indirectly, information that affects, or could affect, bids or bidding strategies.
Certain discussions, even if they do not directly address the licenses offered in Auction 113 or the AWS-1
and AWS-3 bands still might touch upon subject areas that relate to bids and bidding strategies or to postauction market structure, which could convey price or geographic information related to bidding
strategies. Such subject areas include, but are not limited to, management, sales, local marketing
agreements, and other transactional agreements.
145.
We caution applicants that bids or bidding strategies may be communicated outside
situations that involve one party subject to the prohibition communicating privately and directly with
another such party. For example, the Commission has warned that prohibited “communications
concerning bids and bidding strategies may include communications regarding capital calls or requests for
additional funds in support of bids or bidding strategies to the extent such communications convey
information concerning the bids and bidding strategies directly or indirectly.”290 Moreover, the
Commission found a violation of the rule against prohibited communications when an applicant used the
Commission’s bidding system to disclose “its bidding strategy in a manner that explicitly invited other
auction participants to cooperate and collaborate . . . in specific markets,”291 and it has placed auction
participants on notice that the use of its bidding system “to disclose market information to competitors
will not be tolerated and will subject bidders to sanctions.”292
146.
Likewise, when completing a short-form application, each applicant should avoid any
statements or disclosures that may violate section 1.2105(c), particularly in light of the limited
information procedures in effect for Auction 113. Specifically, an applicant should avoid including any
information in its short-form application that might convey information regarding its license selections,
such as referring to markets or other geographic areas in describing agreements, including any
information in application attachments that will be publicly available that may otherwise disclose the
applicant’s license selections, or using applicant names or attachment file names in the application that
refer to licenses being offered.

auctioned.” Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10806, para. 33. As a result, we
see no benefit from the requested further clarification. The critical question is what a discussion conveys to relevant
parties. “As with any communication, all of the surrounding facts and circumstances must be considered when
determining whether a particular communication violates the rule.” Id. at 10808, para. 40.
287

Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10806, para. 32.

288

See id. at 10796, paras. 6–7 (interpreting similar rule language in 47 CFR § 1.2205).

289

See id. at 10796–97, paras. 8–9.

Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 7684, 7689, para. 12 (1994) (Competitive Bidding Memorandum
Opinion and Order).
290

291

Mercury PCS II, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 12 FCC Rcd 17970, 17976, para. 17 (1997).

292

Mercury PCS II, LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 23755, 23760, para. 11 (1998).

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147.
Applicants also should be mindful that communicating non-public application or bidding
information publicly or privately to another applicant may violate section 1.2105(c) even though that
information subsequently may be made public during later periods of the application or bidding
processes.
4.

Communicating with Third Parties

148.
Section 1.2105(c) does not prohibit an applicant from communicating bids or bidding
strategies to a third party, such as a consultant or consulting firm, counsel, or lender. An applicant should
take appropriate steps, however, to ensure that any third party it employs for advice pertaining to its bids
or bidding strategies does not become a conduit for prohibited communications to other specified parties,
as that would violate the rule.293 For example, an applicant might require a third party, such as a lender,
to sign a non-disclosure agreement before the applicant communicates any information regarding bids or
bidding strategy to the third party.294 Within third-party firms, separate individual employees, such as
attorneys or auction consultants, may advise individual applicants on bids or bidding strategies, as long as
such firms implement firewalls and other compliance procedures that prevent such individuals from
communicating the bids or bidding strategies of one applicant to other individuals representing separate
applicants.295 Although firewalls and/or other procedures should be used, their existence is not an
absolute defense to liability if a violation of the rule has occurred.296
149.
As the Commission has noted in other spectrum auctions, in the case of an individual, the
objective precautionary measure of a firewall is not available.297 As a result, an individual that is privy to
bids or bidding information of more than one applicant presents a greater risk of becoming a conduit for a
prohibited communication.298 We will take the same approach to interpreting the prohibited
communications rule in Auction 113. We emphasize that whether a prohibited communication has taken
place in a given case will depend on all the facts pertaining to the case, including who possessed what
information, what information was conveyed to whom, and the course of bidding in the auction.299
150.
We remind potential applicants that they may discuss the short-form application or bids
for specific licenses with the counsel, consultant, or expert of their choice before the short-form
application deadline. Furthermore, the same third-party individual could continue to give advice after the
short-form deadline regarding the application, provided that no information pertaining to bids or bidding
strategies, including licenses selected on the short-form application, is conveyed to that individual.
151.
Applicants also should use caution in their dealings with other parties, such as members
of the press, financial analysts, or others who might become conduits for the communication of prohibited
bidding information. For example, even though communicating that it has applied to participate in the
auction will not violate the rule, an applicant’s statement to the press or a statement on social media that it

See, e.g., Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10798, para. 13 (interpreting
similar rule language in 47 CFR § 1.2205).
293

294

Id.

Id.; see also Application of Nevada Wireless for a License to Provide 800 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio Service
in the Farmington, NM-CO Economic Area (EA 155) Frequency Band A, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC
Rcd 11973, 11978, para. 12 (WTB 1998) (Nevada Wireless Order) (strongly encouraging applicants to implement
any firewall procedures necessary and to provide information in their auction applications regarding the procedures).
295

See Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10799, para. 14; Nevada Wireless
Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 11978, para. 13.
296

See, e.g., Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4396, para. 73 & n.169 (citing Prohibited
Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10800, para. 15).
297

298

Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10800, para. 15.

299

See id.

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intends to stop bidding in an auction could give rise to a finding of a section 1.2105 violation.300
Similarly, an applicant’s public statement of intent not to place bids during bidding in Auction 113 could
also violate the rule.
5.

Section 1.2105(c) Certifications

152.
By electronically submitting its FCC Form 175, each applicant for Auction 113 certifies
its compliance with section 1.2105(c) of the rules.301 The mere filing of a certifying statement as part of
an application, however, will not outweigh specific evidence that a prohibited communication has
occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when warranted.302
6.

Duty to Report Prohibited Communications

153.
Section 1.2105(c)(4) requires that any applicant that makes or receives a communication
that appears to violate section 1.2105(c) must report such communication in writing to the Commission
immediately, and in no case later than five business days after the communication occurs.303 Each
applicant’s obligation to report any such communication continues beyond the five-day period after the
communication is made, even if the report is not made within the five-day period.304
7.

Procedures for Reporting Prohibited Communications

154.
A party reporting any information or communication pursuant to sections 1.65(a),
1.2105(a)(2), or 1.2105(c)(4) must take care to ensure that any report of a prohibited communication does
not itself give rise to a violation of section 1.2105(c). For example, a party’s report of a prohibited
communication could violate the rule by communicating prohibited information to other parties specified
under the rule through the use of Commission filing procedures that allow such materials to be made
available for public inspection.
155.
An applicant must file only a single report concerning a prohibited communication and
must file that report with the Commission personnel expressly charged with administering the
Commission’s auctions.305 This rule is designed to minimize the risk of inadvertent dissemination of
Cf. Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Responds to Questions About the Local Multipoint Distribution Service
Auction, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 341, 347–48 (WTB 1998) (“Public statements can give rise to collusion
concerns. This has occurred in the antitrust context, where certain public statements can support other evidence
which tends to indicate the existence of a conspiracy.”).
300

See 47 CFR § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix). In accordance with the Updating Part 1 Report and Order, if an applicant has a
non-controlling interest with respect to more than one application, then the applicant must certify that it has
established internal control procedures to preclude any person acting on behalf of the applicant from possessing
information about the bids or bidding strategies of more than one applicant or communicating such information with
respect to either applicant to another person acting on behalf of and possessing such information regarding another
applicant. Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7577, para. 199.
301

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7577, para. 199; Nevada Wireless Order, 13 FCC Rcd at
11978, para. 13; see also Competitive Bidding Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 7689, para. 12.
302

303

Id. § 1.2105(c)(4); Part 1 Seventh Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17553–55, paras. 13–17.

See Service Rules for the 698–746, 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands et al., WT Docket No. 06-150 et al.,
Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15289, 15395, paras. 285–86 (2007); see also 47 CFR § 1.65(a); Part 1
Seventh Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17550–51, para. 9; Procedural Amendments to Commission Part 1
Competitive Bidding Rules, WT Docket No. 10-18, Order, 25 FCC Rcd 521, 523, para. 8 (2010) (Part 1 Procedural
Amendments Order).
304

Part 1 Procedural Amendments Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 522, para. 4. This process differs from filing procedures
used in connection with other Commission rules and processes, which may call for submission of filings to the
Commission’s Office of the Secretary or ECFS. Filing through the Office of Secretary or ECFS could allow the
report to become publicly available and might result in the communication of prohibited information to other
auction applicants.
305

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information in such reports.306 Any reports required by section 1.2105(c) must be filed consistent with
the instructions set forth in this Public Notice.307 For Auction 113, such reports must be filed with the
Chief of the Auctions Division, Office of Economics and Analytics, by the most expeditious means
available. Any such report should be submitted by email to the Auctions Division Chief and sent to
auction113@fcc.gov. If you choose instead to submit a report in hard copy, contact Auctions Division
staff at auction113@fcc.gov or (202) 418-0660 for guidance.
156.
Given the potential competitive sensitivity of public disclosure of information in such a
report, a party seeking to report such a prohibited communication should consider submitting its report
with a request that the report or portions of the submission be withheld from public inspection by
following the procedures specified in section 0.459 of the Commission’s rules.308 We encourage such
parties to coordinate with the Auctions Division staff about the procedures for submitting such reports.309
8.

Additional Information Concerning Prohibition on Certain
Communications in Commission Auctions

157.
A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and OEA/WTB addressing
the application of section 1.2105(c) is available on the Commission’s auction web page at
www.fcc.gov/summary-listing-documents-addressing-application-rule-prohibiting-certaincommunications.
9.

Antitrust Laws

158.
Regardless of compliance with the Commission’s rules, applicants remain subject to the
antitrust laws, which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the marketplace.310 Compliance
with the disclosure requirements of section 1.2105(c)(4) will not insulate a party from enforcement of the
antitrust laws.311 For instance, a violation of the antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking place well
before any party submits a short-form application.312 The Commission has cited a number of examples of
potentially anticompetitive actions that would be prohibited under antitrust laws: for example, actual or
potential competitors may not agree to divide territories in order to minimize competition, regardless of

306

Id.

307

See id.

See 47 CFR § 0.459. Filers requesting confidential treatment of documents must be sure that the cover page of
the filing prominently displays that the documents seek confidential treatment. For example, a filing might include a
cover page stamped with “Request for Confidential Treatment Attached” or “Not for Public Inspection.” Any such
request must cover all the material to which the request applies. Id. § 0.459(a)(1). On July 7, 2020, the Commission
announced that the hand-delivery filing location at FCC Headquarters was permanently closed, effective
immediately. FCC Announces Closure of Filing Window at FCC Headquarters and Permanent Change in the
Location and Hours for Receiving Hand-Carried Filings, Public Notice (OMD July 7, 2020). Because handdelivery of confidential materials is no longer possible, the public is directed to submit such materials in accordance
with the procedures described in that public notice and in Amendment of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Order, 35 FCC Rcd 5450 (OMD 2020). Id. at 1.
308

309

See Section VII. (Procedural Matters), below.

See, e.g., Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules—Competitive Bidding Procedures, WT Docket No.
97-82, Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 21558, 21560–61, para. 4 & n.17 (1999).
310

See Competitive Bidding Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 7689, para. 12; see also Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Sues Three Firms Over FCC Auction Practices (Nov. 10, 1998),
www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1998/2068.htm.
311

See, e.g., Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93253, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 6858, 6869, para. 59 & n.125 (1994).
312

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whether they split a market in which they both do business, or whether they merely reserve one market
for one and another market for the other.313
159.
To the extent we become aware of specific allegations that suggest that violations of the
federal antitrust laws may have occurred, we may refer such allegations to the United States Department
of Justice for investigation.314 If an applicant is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the
Commission’s rules in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding process, then it may be
subject to a forfeiture and may be prohibited from participating further in Auction 113 and in future
auctions, among other sanctions.315
V.

BIDDING PROCEDURES

160.
We adopt our proposal to conduct Auction 113 using an ascending clock-1 auction
format. The clock-1 auction format was used in Auction 108 and is similar to the clock phase of past
Commission ascending clock auctions, but rather than offering multiple generic spectrum blocks in a
category in a geographic area, each frequency-specific license in an EA or CMA will constitute its own
category with a supply of 1.316 Therefore, in the clock-1 auction format adopted for Auction 113, bidders
will bid on frequency-specific licenses in a clock phase. This proposal has ample support in the record.317
161.
While we set forth the key bidding procedures for the clock-1 auction below, OEA, in
conjunction with WTB, will release, concurrently with this Public Notice, an updated technical guide
(Auction 113 Technical Guide) that provides further technical details about the adopted bidding
procedures. The information in the Auction 113 Technical Guide, which is available in the Education
section on the Auction 113 website (www.fcc.gov/auction/113), supplements our decisions in this Public
Notice.
A.

Clock-1 Auction Structure

162.
Under the clock-1 format that we adopt, each bidder will be able to bid for specific
licenses in the clock bidding rounds, in license-by-license bidding. The auction will proceed in a series of
rounds, with bidding conducted simultaneously for all licenses available in the auction. Consistent with
prior Commission clock auctions, for each bidding round, the bidding system will announce a clock price
for each license, and a bidder will indicate its demand for licenses at the prices associated with the current
round. Under the clock-1 auction format, a bidder’s demand for a license can be zero or one.
163.
The clock price for a license will increase from round to round if more than one bidder
indicates demand for the license. The bidding rounds will continue until the number of bidders
demanding each license does not exceed one. Once bidding rounds stop, the bidder with demand for a
license will become the winning bidder.

313

Id.

314

Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2388, para. 226.

315

See id.; 47 CFR § 1.2109(d).

316

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1493, para. 35.

317

The only three parties that commented on our proposal to use the clock-1 format for Auction 113 support doing
so. See T-Mobile Comments at 7 (the clock-1 format is comparatively simple and the multi-round format should
lead to rapid and efficient price discovery); Verizon Comments at 1–3 (the clock-1 structure is appropriate for
Auction 113, will encourage robust participation, and is preferable to the simultaneous multi-round (SMR) format used
in Auction 97 because clock auctions are faster and more efficient than SMR auctions, and the clock-1 format removes
unnecessary complexity found in the traditional SMR approach, including withdrawals, waivers, and variable bidding
increments); CTIA Reply at 1 (noting that the record demonstrates broad support for the clock-1 auction format).

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Individual Licenses in Two Geographic Area Types

164.
Auction 113 will offer 200 geographic area-based licenses in 199 markets in the 1695–
1710 MHz, 1755–1780 MHz, and the 2155–2180 MHz bands.318 The Auction 113 inventory consists of
licenses in EAs and CMAs.319 The 48 EA licenses include frequency blocks designated A1, B1, H, I,
and/or J; the 152 CMA licenses are all for frequency block G. In Auction 113, only one geographic area
(EA173) has more than one frequency block available, and it includes both the H and the I blocks.320
C.

Bidding Rounds

165.
Auction 113 will consist of sequential bidding rounds, each followed by the release of
round results. We will conduct bidding simultaneously for all licenses available in the auction. In the
first bidding round of Auction 113, a bidder will indicate whether it demands the licenses at the minimum
opening bid price. Before each subsequent bidding round, the bidding system will announce a start-ofround price and a clock price for each license, and during the round, qualified bidders will indicate the
licenses for which they wish to bid at the prices associated with the current round.321 Bidding rounds will
be open for predetermined periods of time. Bidders will be subject to activity and eligibility rules that
govern the pace at which they participate in the auction.
166.
For each license, the clock price will increase from round to round if more than one
bidder indicates demand for that license. The bidding rounds will continue until, for every license,
demand does not exceed one. At that point, the bidder still indicating demand for a license will be the
winning bidder.
167.
The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to be released at least
one week before the start of bidding. Details on viewing round results, including the location and format
of downloadable results files for each round, will be released concurrent with or prior to that public
notice.
168.
A bidder will be able to submit bids via the Internet through the bidding system user
interface, the bidding system’s upload function, or using the auction bidder line.322 The bidding system’s
upload function accepts bid files in a comma-separated values (CSV) text format. The bidding system
will allow a bidder to submit bids only for licenses the bidder selected on its FCC Form 175 and for
which the bidder has sufficient bidding eligibility.
169.
During each open bidding round, a bidder will be able to modify its bids in the current
bidding round. Bids can be modified either through the user interface, the bidding system’s upload
function, or through the auction bidder line. If a bidder modifies its bids by uploading a new file, then
that file, including all of the file’s bids and modifications, will replace all of the bidder’s bids previously
submitted in the round. The system will take the last bid file submission as that bidder’s bids for the
round. We urge bidders to verify their bids in each round. Information on how to do so will be made
available in educational materials that OEA will provide, including a bidding system user guide and an
online bidding procedures tutorial.
170.
OEA will retain the discretion to change the bidding schedule in order to foster an
auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders’ need to study round results and adjust their
bidding strategies.323 Such adjustments may include changes to the amount of time for bidding rounds,
318

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1494, para. 39.

319

Id.

320

Id.

321

The prices associated with the round are prices between the start-of-round price and the clock price, inclusive.

322

See the Auction 113 Bidding System User Guide for more information on how to submit bids.

323

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1494, para. 41.

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the amount of time between rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding activity
and other factors.
D.

Stopping Rule

171.
We adopt our proposal to employ a simultaneous stopping rule for Auction 113, which
means all licenses simultaneously remain open for bidding until the first round in which, after bid
processing, no license has excess demand,324 at which point the auction will close.325
E.

Activity Rule

172.
For the reasons set forth in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, we adopt our
proposal to employ an activity rule that requires bidders to bid actively throughout the auction, rather than
wait until late in the auction before participating.326 For this clock auction, a bidder’s activity in a round
for purposes of the activity rule will be the sum of the bidding units associated with the bidder’s demands
as applied by the bidding system during bid processing. Bidders are required to be active on a specific
percentage (the activity requirement percentage) of their current bidding eligibility during each round of
the auction. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder’s
eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder’s ability to place bids in subsequent rounds of the
auction.
173.
We adopt our proposal to require that bidders maintain a fixed, high level of activity in
each round of Auction 113 in order to maintain bidding eligibility.327 In order for posted prices and
aggregate demand in the clock auction to reflect bidders’ true demands reliably, the bidding system
requires a high activity requirement percentage to incentivize bidders to start bidding early in the auction
for the licenses that they want to acquire. Consistent with past practice, we will require that bidders be
active on between 90% and 100% of their bidding eligibility in all clock rounds, with the specific
percentage for each round to be set by OEA.328 OEA will set the activity requirement percentage initially
at 95%.
174.
If the activity requirement is met, then the bidder’s eligibility will not change for the next
round. If the activity requirement is not met in a round, the bidder’s eligibility will be reduced to an
amount that brings the bidder into compliance with the requirement.329 Bidding activity will be based on
the bids that are applied by the bidding system. That is, if a bidder submits a bid to reduce its demand for
a license, but the bidding system cannot apply the request because demand for that license will fall below

324

In Auction 113, a license has no excess demand when aggregate demand for the license is 1 or 0.

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1495, para. 45. We received no comment on this proposal.
The Commission has discretion to establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to
complete the auction within a reasonable time. 47 CFR § 1.2104(e).
325

326

Id. at 1495–96, paras. 48–49.

327

Id. at 1495–96, para. 49.

See, e.g., Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9328, para. 192 (adopting an activity rule with
an activity requirement percentage range of 90% to 100%). An activity requirement percentage range below that
which we adopt here would create uncertainty regarding the exact level of bidder demand, interfere with the basic
clock-price setting and winner determinations, provide less helpful information to bidders, and prolong the auction
unduly. Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2193, para. 178.
328

With a 95% activity requirement, for example, a bidder not meeting the requirement would have its eligibility
reduced to the number of bidding units that equals its activity divided by 0.95.
329

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one, then the bidder’s activity will reflect its unreduced demand (i.e., the license will still count toward
the bidder’s activity).330
175.
OEA retains the discretion to change the activity requirement percentage during the
auction.331 The bidding system will announce any such changes in advance of the round in which they
would take effect, giving bidders adequate notice to adjust their bidding strategies.
176.
Most commenters did not object to our proposal to set the initial activity requirement
percentage at 95%, which the Commission has successfully used in every clock auction since the format
was introduced for the Broadcast Incentive Auction. Ravnitzky proposes to reduce the activity
requirement to 90% or to use a more complicated tiered eligibility system to reduce the activity
requirement below 95%, arguing that “strict” activity requirements create challenges for bidders,
especially smaller entities, who are “navigating complex auction rules.” 332 He claims that “unforeseen
technical or financial constraints have limited bidder activity, leading to a loss of eligibility,” but provides
no examples of such instances.333 We are not persuaded by his unsupported arguments, and see no
convincing evidence of a need to deviate from the proposed 95% initial activity requirement. Moreover,
we agree with Verizon that we should not depart from the “tried-and-true bidding framework” that has
made our auctions successful, including changing features that are in place to protect the integrity of the
auction or introducing features that would unnecessarily complicate bidding system development or
bidding strategies.334 The 95% initial activity requirement has consistently demonstrated that it balances
providing bidders with the flexibility to substitute across markets in response to learned price information
with providing bidders incentives to bid in each round of the auction for the markets that they are
sincerely interested in. Lowering the initial activity requirement could extend the duration of the auction
if bidders delay placing their bids until the activity requirement is increased. We therefore decline to
reduce the initial activity requirement below 95% because doing so could create more uncertainty
regarding the exact level of bidder demand, provide less helpful information to bidders about aggregate
demand, and likely prolong the auction as bidders could delay their bidding until later in the auction.
177.
In the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, we sought comment on procedures for a
contingent bidding limit that would allow a bidder’s submitted bids to have bidding activity that is greater
than the bidder’s eligibility. In particular, we sought comment on whether the contingent bidding limit
would be useful with the limited inventory in Auction 113 or whether it would add unnecessary
complexity.335 The only two commenters that addressed this both object to allowing contingent bidding in
Auction 113.336 T-Mobile argues that the contingent bidding limit would introduce complexity and
uncertainty into the bidding without adding any appreciable benefits to the bidders or the Commission.337
T-Mobile and Verizon analyze bidding data from the Commission’s four most recent clock auctions, to
argue that the contingent bidding limit was scarcely utilized by bidders.338 We agree that including a
contingent bidding limit in Auction 113 would introduce added complexity. Given that Auction 113 has a
Under the clock-1 format, the bidding system would not apply a bid to reduce demand for an individual license if
the reduction would cause the aggregate demand for that license to drop to zero (i.e., below the available supply of
one). See Section V.G.1. (No Excess Supply Rule for Bids to Reduce Demand), below.
330

331

47 CFR §§ 0.271, 0.21(m).

332

Ravnitzky Comments at 6.

333

Id.

334

Verizon Reply at 6.

335

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1496, para. 51.

336

T-Mobile Comments at 2, 7–10; Verizon Comments at 5–6.

337

T-Mobile Comments at 7–10.

338

T-Mobile Comments at 8; Verizon Comments at 6.

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more limited inventory than recent auctions, we expect fewer bidders to attempt to switch between
licenses, lowering the likelihood that bidders see submitted bids go unapplied during bid processing. As
such, we find a contingent bidding limit to be unnecessary, and we will not include it in Auction 113.
178.
For Auction 113, we will not provide for activity rule waivers to preserve a bidder’s
eligibility. This approach has been followed in every ascending clock auction since the Commission
introduced the format.339 The clock auction relies on precisely identifying the point at which demand
decreases to equal supply to determine winning bidders and final prices. Allowing waivers would create
uncertainty with respect to the exact level of bidder demand, would reduce the incentives to bid sincerely,
and would interfere with the basic clock price-setting and winner determination mechanism. Moreover,
uncertainty about the level of demand would affect the way bidders’ requests to reduce demand are
processed by the bidding system, as addressed below.340 Submitting proxy instructions can address some
of the circumstances under which a bidder inadvertently risks losing bidding eligibility.341
F.

Acceptable Bids
1.

Reserve Prices

179.
In the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, we proposed not to establish reserve prices
other than minimum opening bid amounts for the licenses being offered in Auction 113, reasoning that,
unlike Auction 97, the public interest did not provide any specific basis for doing so in Auction 113.342
However, we invited commenters that consider a reserve price to be in the public interest to describe what
specific factors lead them to that conclusion.343
180.
EchoStar, CCA, and Council Tree argue that adopting an aggregate reserve price is
necessary to achieve Congress’ goal of fully funding the Commission’s Supply Chain Reimbursement
Program in a single auction, to ensure that AWS-3 spectrum is not sold for less than it is worth, and to
avoid subjecting Auction 97 defaulting bidders to disproportionately large liabilities—with EchoStar

See Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled to Begin on March 29, 2016; Procedures for Competitive Bidding in
Auction 1000, Including Initial Clearing Target Determination, Qualifying to Bid, and Bidding in Auctions 1001
(Reverse) and 1002 (Forward), AU Docket No. 14-252, WT Docket No. 12-269, GN Docket No. 12-268, MB
Docket No. 15-146, Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd 8975, 9077, para. 213 (2015); Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures
Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7650, para. 245; Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5591, para.
195; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2196, para. 188; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice,
35 FCC Rcd at 8456–57, para. 178; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9329–30, para. 199.
339

See Sections V.G.1. (No Excess Supply Rule for Bids to Reduce Demand) and V.G.3. (Processed Demand),
below.
340

341

See Section V.F.6. (Proxy Bidding), below.

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1496–97, para. 54. In the Auction 113 Comment Public
Notice, we noted that the Commission adopted reserve prices for the auction of AWS-3 licenses in Auction 97
pursuant to section 1.2104(c) and the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act (CSEA) because the CSEA requires
the Commission to prescribe methods by which the total cash proceeds from any auction of licenses authorizing the
use of eligible frequencies would equal at least 110% of the total estimated relocation costs of eligible federal
entities. Id.; see Auction of Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-3) Licenses Scheduled for November 13, 2014;
Notice and Filing Requirements, Reserve Prices, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures
for Auction 97, AU Docket No. 14-78, Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 8386, 8437–40, paras. 184–92 (WTB 2014)
(Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice). We further explained in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice that at the
conclusion of Auction 97, the reserve prices were exceeded by the applicable net winning bids, thereby satisfying
that statutory requirement, and given that the results of Auction 97 fulfilled the purpose of the reserve prices in that
auction, that CSEA provision is not a basis to adopt a reserve for Auction 113. Auction 113 Comment Public Notice,
40 FCC Rcd at 1496–97, para. 54.
342

343

Id.

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specifically advocating for the adoption of a $3.3 billion aggregate reserve.344 AT&T and Verizon,
however, ask us to reject calls for an aggregate reserve price in Auction 113, arguing that it is not
necessary where the Commission is already proposing robust minimum opening bids that will prevent
licenses from being assigned at nominal amounts. They further observe that an aggregate reserve price
that is set too high could ultimately cause the auction to fail, which would in turn deprive the Treasury of
all revenue and result in valuable spectrum remaining unlicensed and unused.345 We agree.
181.
We adopt our proposal not to establish reserve prices for Auction 113 licenses, other than
minimum opening bid amounts. As the Commission has previously explained, while the primary purpose
of a minimum opening bid is to speed up the course of an auction, a minimum opening bid also can serve
a revenue-enhancing function like a reserve price, because if bids are not accepted below a certain level,
they will also not be sold below that level.346 That is, a minimum opening bid effectively functions as a
reserve price.347 We therefore conclude that adopting an aggregate reserve price is not necessary for an
auction in which we are adopting minimum opening bids that are sufficiently high so as to prevent
licenses from being assigned at nominal amounts and we have no statutory obligation to do so.348
182.
Contrary to EchoStar’s arguments, the Commission is not required to adopt a reserve
price to ensure that the maximum funding earmarked by Congress for the Commission’s Supply Chain
Reimbursement Program is fully funded from a single auction.349 We agree with Verizon that Congress’s
directive that proceeds raised in Auction 113 be used to support the Commission’s Supply Chain
Reimbursement Program does not require that the Commission risk a failed auction by setting a
$3.3 billion reserve price.350 As Verizon correctly notes, if a reserve was established but not met, the
auction would provide no funds at all.351 It is unreasonable to believe that Congress intended such a
result. Moreover, in the Part 1 Third Report and Order, the Commission concluded that section
309(j)(4)(F) of the Communications Act does not require it to use reserve prices or minimum opening
bids to maximize the revenue earned in all future spectrum auctions because the other auction goals in
section 309(j)(3)—such as ensuring the deployment and rapid deployment of new technologies and
services and promoting economic opportunity and competition—have not been eliminated, and the
Commission must continue to balance and pursue all of its objectives.352
183.
We find unavailing EchoStar, CCA, and Council Tree’s arguments that the lack of a
reserve price would be detrimental to defaulting bidders from Auction 97 and that setting a reserve price
would help these defaulting bidders avoid facing disproportionately large liabilities in Auction 113. The
Commission is not obligated to establish an aggregate reserve price equal to the sum of all bids on which
bidders defaulted in Auction 97—i.e., $3.3 billion—in order to shield past defaulting bidders from the
consequences of their own actions and to protect them from any risk that they would be required to pay a
deficiency payment following Auction 113.353 Indeed, bidders in a Commission auction are on notice that
344

See EchoStar Comments at 3–5; CCA Comments at 7–10; Council Tree Reply at 3–4.

345

AT&T Reply at 2–3; Verizon Reply at 3–4.

346

See Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 455, para. 140.

347

Id.

348

See Section V.F.2. (Minimum Opening Bids), below. See Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 455,
para. 140; 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(F); 47 CFR § 1.2104(c), (d).
349

EchoStar Comments at 3–5.

350

See Verizon Reply at 5.

351

Verizon Reply at 5.

352

See Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 455, para. 140.

353

See AT&T Reply at 2; Verizon Reply at 4.

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they bear any risk that may be associated with their winning bids, because the Commission’s default
payment rules make clear that “[a] bidder assumes a binding obligation to pay its full bid amount upon
acceptance of the winning bid at the close of an auction.”354 Those rules also make clear that if a bidder
defaults on its winning bid, it will be subject to a default payment consisting of a deficiency payment
equal to the difference between the amount of the defaulted bid amount and the amount of the winning
bid in a subsequent auction, plus an additional default payment percentage amount.355 Setting a reserve
price that would render the deficiency payment provision of the default payment meaningless would
distort auction incentives and likely encourage more defaults in the future.
184.
The Commission has previously explained that the reserve price and minimum opening
bid provision in section 309(j)(4)(F) is intended to prevent licenses from being assigned via auction at
nominal amounts, which could result, for example, from insufficient competition in the auction that might
in turn be due to the inability of potential bidders to assess the market adequately or develop business
plans.356 Moreover, the Commission has discretion regarding whether to employ a minimum opening bid
and/or reserve price in an auction, after considering, among other factors, the amount of spectrum being
auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the size of the
geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors
that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of the spectrum being auctioned.357 Given the
circumstances in Auction 113—i.e., that it is an auction of licenses in spectrum bands that are already in
use for 5G services, that this is the first auction the Commission will be conducting in almost four years,
and that the licenses being offered in Auction 113 have been lying fallow for ten years during the
pendency of litigation—we conclude these factors should be sufficient to ensure that there will be
sufficient competition in the auction and that these licenses will not be assigned at nominal amounts.
This will in turn benefit the public more than establishing a reserve price in the absence of a statutory
directive to do so.
2.

Minimum Opening Bids

185.
As is typical for spectrum license auctions, we sought comment on the use of a minimum
opening bid and/or reserve price, as mandated by section 309(j) of the Communications Act.358 We will
establish minimum opening bids for every license in Auction 113. The bidding system will not accept
bids at prices less than the minimum opening bid specified for each license. Based on our experience in
past auctions, setting appropriate minimum opening bids is an effective tool to prevent an excessive
number of bidding rounds at very low prices.359
186.
We adopt our proposed minimum opening bid amounts. We calculate minimum opening
bids on a license-by-license basis based on $0.01 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a
population of less than 300,000, $0.02 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of
at least 300,000 and less than 1,000,000, $0.05 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a

354

47 CFR § 1.2104(g)(2).

355

47 CFR §§ 1.2104(g)(2)(i)–(ii).

356

Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band; Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, Order, 12 FCC Rcd
16354, 16358, para. 11 (1997) (800 MHz Order). The Commission may therefore withhold those licenses so that
they may be offered again in the future to be acquired by licensees under circumstances that will more effectively
benefit the public. Id.
357

See Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 455–56, para. 141.

358

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1497–98, 1511, paras. 55–58 & Attach. A; see also 47
U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(F).
359

See, e.g., Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd at 8440, para. 193.

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population of at least 1,000,000, and $0.01 per MHz-pop for the unpaired licenses. For all licenses,
minimum opening bids will be subject to a minimum of $1,000 per license.360
187.
Council Tree and EchoStar argue that our proposed minimum opening bids are too low
and propose that the minimum opening bids for the licenses in Auction 113 not be lower than the
minimum opening bids of the corresponding licenses in Auction 97.361 They both argue that lower
minimum opening bids in Auction 113 on some licenses, relative to the corresponding minimum opening
bids in Auction 97, may result in lower winning bids on those licenses and lower auction revenue.362
188.
We are unconvinced by these arguments. As we have recognized in past auctions,
minimum opening bids are not intended to be a reflection of final license prices, but instead a starting
point for bidding.363 The minimum opening bid on a license has less bearing on the final price of the
license than it does on the number of rounds required to reach the final price.364 We also disagree that
lower minimum opening bids on some licenses in Auction 113 (relative to Auction 97) will reduce
auction revenue, even though other minimum opening bids in Auction 113 are higher (relative to
Auction 97).365 In past auctions, we have recognized that a critical factor in setting minimum opening
bids is to not set them above the market clearing price, which is unknown prior to the auction and, if set
too high, could result in lower participation and unsold licenses.366 Verizon supports this principle,
agreeing that the minimum opening bids we adopt will facilitate robust price discovery and
participation.367 We find that the amounts we adopt for Auction 113 balance the competing objectives for
minimum opening bids because (1) they are sufficiently low so as not to deter participation or interfere
with the price-setting and winner determination mechanisms of the auction, and (2) they are sufficiently
high so as not to result in an excessive number of rounds at prices very distant from the final prices and to
not permit the licenses to be sold for nominal amounts.
189.
The minimum opening bids that we adopt for the midband AWS-3 spectrum licenses
available in Auction 113 are in line with the minimum opening bids that we have set for every recent
auction of mid-band spectrum. In Auction 110 for licenses in the 3.45–3.55 GHz band, the minimum
opening bids were calculated based on $0.02 or $0.06 per MHz-pop, according to the population tiers of
the geographic area.368 In Auction 108 for licenses in the 2.5 GHz band, the minimum opening bids were

361

See Council Tree Comments at 6; EchoStar Comments at 2, 10–11 (“Finally, the Commission should set the
minimum opening bid for each of the 200 AWS-3 licenses at an amount higher than, or at a minimum equal to, the
minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 97.”).
362

See Council Tree Comments at 6 (“Lower minimum opening bids clearly hold the potential to reduce the
ultimate financial yield of Auction 113, to the obvious potential detriment of Northstar/SNR in the form of higher
Deficiency Payments.”).
363

Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4437, para. 206.

364

Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd at 5230, para. 44 (A minimum opening bid “is generally used to
accelerate the competitive bidding process”).
365

See Council Tree Comments at 6; EchoStar Comments at 2 (“Finally, the Commission should set the minimum
opening bid for each of the 200 AWS-3 licenses at an amount higher than, or at a minimum equal to, the minimum
opening bid amounts for Auction 97; lower minimum opening bids would simply facilitate undesirable low-balling
and would fail to reflect the increase in value that the licenses have gained since their original auction.”).
366

Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4437, para. 206.

367

Verizon Reply at 5–6.

368

Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9330, para. 201.

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calculated based on $0.006 per MHz-pop for all licenses.369 In Auction 107 for licenses in the 3.7–3.98
GHz band, the minimum opening bids were calculated based on $0.003, $0.006 or $0.03 per MHz-pop,
according to the population tiers of the geographic area.370 In Auction 105 for licenses in the 3.55–3.65
GHz band, the minimum opening bids were calculated based on $0.02 per MHz-pop for all licenses.371
Commenters have not presented any evidence that there have been changes to the market conditions for
5G-suitable spectrum that could justify increasing the minimum opening bids for Auction 113 above the
range of minimum opening bids found in these four auctions of midband spectrum. We find that this
range of minimum opening bids better reflects current market conditions than the minimum opening bids
that were used in Auction 97.
190.
Ravnitzky suggests implementing the use of “adaptive pricing mechanisms” that would
decrease minimum opening bids during the auction for licenses that do not receive any bids at the current
minimum opening bids.372 We do not believe that this approach would be helpful to bidders in
Auction 113. Neither Ravnitzky nor any other commenter submitted evidence demonstrating that the
specific minimum opening bids we proposed for Auction 113 are too high. The minimum opening bids
we adopt in Auction 113 use a lower dollar-per-MHz-pop basis in areas with lower populations than in
areas with higher populations, reducing the risk of licenses in rural areas going unsold.373 The number of
licenses unsold in recent auctions has been relatively small, suggesting that our minimum opening bids
have not been set inappropriately high. In Auction 110, 0.5% of licenses were not sold; in Auction 108,
1.8% of licenses were not sold; in Auction 107, there were no unsold licenses; and in Auction 105, 8.9%
of licenses were not sold. Furthermore, we have concerns that introducing a feature into the bidding
system to reduce certain minimum opening bids “for licenses that receive no bids after a defined number
of rounds”374 could introduce additional complexity into bidding strategies and could run counter to the
objective of not permitting licenses to be sold for nominal amounts. Therefore, we decline to implement
Ravnitzky’s suggestion.
191.
The minimum opening bids for all licenses offered in Auction 113 are set forth in the
Attachment A file on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.
3.

Clock Price Increments

192.
We adopt the procedures regarding clock price increments as described in the
Auction 113 Comment Public Notice.375 Therefore, after bidding in the first round and before each
subsequent round, for each license, the bidding system will announce the start-of-round price376 and the
clock price for the upcoming round—that is, the lowest price and the highest price at which bidders can
submit bids during the round. As long as aggregate demand for the license at the clock price exceeds one,
the start-of-round price for the upcoming round will be equal to the clock price from the prior round. If
aggregate demand equaled one at a price in the previous round, then the start-of-round price for the next
round will be equal to the price at which demand equaled one. If aggregate demand was zero in the
previous round, then the start-of-round price for the next round will remain the same.
369

Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4436, para. 204.

370

Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8457, para. 180.

371

Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice 35 FCC Rcd 2197, para. 190.

372

Ravnitzky Comments at 7.

373

This tiered approach to setting minimum opening bid prices is similar to the approach taken in Auctions 107 and
110; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8457, para. 180; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice,
36 FCC Rcd at 9330, para. 201.
374

See Ravnitzky Comments at 7.

375

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1498, para. 60.

376

The start-of-round price equals the posted price of the previous round.

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193.
We will set the clock price for a license for a round by adding a percentage increment to
the start-of-round price.377 We will set the initial increment percentage at 10%, and OEA may adjust this
increment percentage within a range of 5% to 30%, inclusive, in later rounds.378 To ensure that an
increase in the percentage increment does not result in an unduly large increase for a license, the total
dollar amount of the increment (the difference between the clock price and the start-of-round price) will
be capped at a certain amount. We will set this cap on the increment initially at $50 million, and OEA
may adjust the cap in later rounds. The 5% to 30% increment range and cap will allow us to manage the
auction pace and take into account bidders’ needs to reevaluate their bidding strategies while also moving
the auction along quickly.
4.

Bid Types

194.
Under the clock-1 auction format adopted for Auction 113, a bidder will indicate in each
round the licenses it demands at the prices associated with the round. A “simple” bid indicates a desired
quantity (in this auction, one or zero) at a price. In the first round, a bidder indicates the licenses it
demands at the minimum opening bids by indicating a quantity of one for each of those licenses. After
the first round, a bidder that wants to maintain the same processed demand for a license at the new clock
price would submit a bid for the license at the clock price, indicating that it is willing to pay up to that
price, if need be, for the license. A bid to maintain the same processed demand cannot be at a price less
than the clock price.
195.
We will not permit a “switch” bid to reduce demand for one license in a market and
increase demand for another license in the same market in Auction 113. We did not receive any
comments on this issue. The inventory of licenses for Auction 113 contains only one market in which
there are multiple licenses that may be considered similar, thus the additional bidding and system
complexity necessary to permit switch bidding in this market is not worthwhile. A bidder that wants to
bid on both licenses within the market that has two licenses could bid on these two licenses separately.
5.

Intra-Round Bids

196.
After the first round, bids to change demand can be made at prices between the start-ofround price and the clock price. These are known as intra-round bids. A bidder will be permitted to make
intra-round bids by indicating the quantity it demands for the license (in this auction, one or zero) and a
price between the start-of-round price and the clock price at which it wants to change its demand.379 For
example, if a bidder has processed demand for a license at the start-of-round price of $200, but no longer
wants the license if the price increases by more than $10, the bidder would indicate a bid quantity of zero
at a price of $210. Similarly, if the bidder wishes to reduce its demand to zero if the price increases at all
above $200, the bidder would indicate a bid quantity of zero at the start-of-round price of $200.
197.
Permitting intra-round bids allows the bidding system to use relatively large clock price
increments, because bidders can submit bids at prices lower than the clock prices. This may reduce the
number of rounds in the auction without increasing the risk that a large clock price increment will prevent
the auction from accurately determining the market clearing price, at which only one bidder demands the
license.
For example, if the start-of-round price for a license is $10,000, and the percentage increment is 20%, then the
clock price for the round will be $12,000. The result of the clock price calculation will be rounded up to the nearest
$1,000 for results above $10,000; rounded up to the nearest $100 for results below $10,000 but above $1,000; and
rounded up to the nearest $10 for results below $1,000.
377

378

An initial bid increment percentage of 10% has proved successful in past clock auctions. See, e.g., Auction 110
Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9331, para. 207.
See the Auction 113 Technical Guide pages 2–3 for further details. For a reduction in demand the price indicated
signifies the price at which the bidder wants to reduce demand if the price for the license would increase beyond that
price. For an increase in demand the price indicated signifies that the bidder is willing to buy the license at all prices
between the start-of-round price and the clock price.
379

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198.
Intra-round bid amounts will be limited to multiples of $10 for prices below $10,000; to
multiples of $100 for prices between $10,000 and $100,000, inclusive; and to multiples of $1,000 for
prices above $100,000. We limit intra-round bids to these multiples to deter anti-competitive strategic
bidding.380
6.

Proxy Bids

199.
We adopt our proposal, which is supported by the record, to make proxy bidding an
option available to bidders in Auction 113.381 In the first round, a bidder may submit a proxy instruction
to the bidding system for any license for which it submits a bid in the first round. After the first round, a
bidder may submit a proxy instruction to the bidding system for any license for which it has processed
demand. A proxy instruction for a license must indicate a reduction in demand for the license to zero at a
price higher than the current round’s clock price.382 Proxy instructions to increase a bidder’s demand for
a license at a given price will not be permitted.
200.
Under the procedures we adopt here, if a proxy instruction has been submitted, the
bidding system will automatically submit a proxy bid to maintain the bidder’s demand for the license in
every subsequent round as long as the clock price for the round is less than the proxy instruction price. In
the first round in which the clock price is greater than or equal to the proxy instruction price, the bidding
system will submit a proxy bid on behalf of the bidder to reduce the bidder’s demand for that license to
zero at the proxy instruction price. For example, if a bidder has processed demand for a license with a
clock price of $1,000, and the bidder is willing to purchase the license for a price up to $1,800, the bidder
could submit a proxy instruction to reduce its demand for the license to 0 at $1,800. In that case, the
bidding system will submit proxy bids to maintain the bidder’s demand for the license in each subsequent
round as long as the clock price is less than $1,800. In a round in which the clock price is above $1,800,
the bidding system will submit a proxy bid to reduce the bidder’s demand for the license to zero at the
price of $1,800.
201.
In the case that a bid to reduce demand, whether placed according to proxy instructions or
submitted by the bidder in the round, is not applied during bid processing, the bidding system will
automatically generate a proxy instruction at the bid price and, in the following rounds, submit proxy bids
on behalf of the bidder according to that proxy instruction. For example, suppose that the start-of-round
price for a license is $10,000, the clock price is $12,000, and a bidder with processed demand for the
license submits a bid to reduce its demand to 0 at price $11,500. If the bid is not applied during bid
processing (e.g., because there were no other bids for the license in the round), in the following round the
bidding system will submit a proxy bid on behalf of the bidder to reduce demand for the license to 0 at
price $11,500. The proxy instruction preserves in the bidding system the bidder’s interest in retaining
demand for the license only if the price is no higher than $11,500, which may help avoid having the
license sold later in the auction to another bidder at a price less than what the initial bidder would be
willing to pay.383

Specifically, these rounding rules deter the use of trailing digits for bid signaling. See Application of Mercury
PSC II, LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 23755, 23760, para. 11 (1998) (using trailing digits for
bid signaling is a violation of the prohibited communications rule).
380

381

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1498–99, paras. 64–68. See CCA Comments at 10;
Ravnitzky Comments at 10; T-Mobile Comments at 5–7; Verizon Comments at 3.
A bidder would submit its proxy instructions along with its bids, using the bidding system’s user interface or
upload function described in Section V.C. (Bidding Rounds), above.
382

For instance, suppose that there were no other bids for the license in the round and thus the start-of-round price
for the following round is, once again, $10,000. If another bidder bids for the license in the following round, a
proxy bid placed for the initial bidder at $11,500 would, with only these two bids, prevent the posted price of the
license from being less than the $11,500 that the initial bidder would have been willing to pay.
383

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202.
In any round, a bidder can remove or modify any existing proxy instructions or proxy
bids for the round by submitting new bids through the user interface or file upload. The system will take
the last bid submission as that bidder’s bids and proxy instructions. Bidders are reminded that any bids
submitted through an upload will replace all bids and proxy instructions previously submitted.
203.
As is the case for intra-round bid amounts, proxy instruction prices will be limited to
multiples of $10 for prices below $10,000; to multiples of $100 for prices between $10,000 and $100,000,
inclusive; and to multiples of $1,000 for prices above $100,000. Proxy instructions will not be publicly
released either during or after the auction.
204.
Commenters agree that proxy bidding as proposed in the Auction 113 Comment Public
Notice alleviates the burden and resources required to monitor a multiple-round auction.384 T-Mobile
states that proxy bidding will also promote more efficient auction outcomes by reducing the risk of
erroneous bids and allowing for more efficient use of bidder resources. While Ravnitzky supports
allowing proxy bidding, he suggests that we consider introducing conditional proxy bid increases in
demand to allow a bidder to instruct the bidding system to bid on an additional license if its price falls
below a certain level. He claims this approach would help bidders navigate the complexities of managing
multiple licenses.385 Specifically, Ravnitzky suggests that, similar to auction sniping tools like those that
may be available for use on commercial retail auction sites, conditional proxy increases would “allow
auction participants to place contingent bids, adjusting their strategies dynamically without
overcommitting resources.”386 Verizon argues against introducing features into the bidding system that
would complicate the development of the Auction 113 bidding system or increase the complexity of
bidding strategies.387
205.
We conclude that adopting Ravnitzky’s proposal is unnecessary in an ascending clock
auction because the posted prices and start-of-round prices never decrease from one round to the next. In
the ascending clock auction managing substitutions between multiple licenses is already possible, for
instance, by placing a bid to decrease demand on one license, and, if the bid to reduce demand is
processed,388 placing a bid to increase demand for another license that has the same or fewer bidding units
as the former license. This type of substitution does not require a proxy bid to increase demand. Proxy
bids are not intended to relieve bidders of their responsibility to manage their bidding eligibility or to
actively follow round-to-round changes in prices and aggregate demand. Furthermore, in the ascending
clock auction, once a bidder has processed demand for a license, the bidder cannot ensure or guarantee
that it will not win the license when the auction closes.389 Similarly, a bidder cannot ensure or guarantee
that the price of a license will not continue to rise in future rounds, or that the relative price of a license
compared to another license will not change in future rounds.390
7.

Missing Bids

206.
Under the clock-1 auction format, if a bidder does not submit bids in the current round
for all of the licenses for which it had processed demand in the previous round and does not have proxy
384

CCA Comments at 10; T-Mobile Comments at 5–7; Verizon at 3.

385

Ravnitzky Comments at 10 (“For example, a bidder might instruct the system to acquire an additional license if
its price falls below a specified level.”).
386

Ravnitzky Comments at 10–11.

387

Verizon Reply at 7.

388

Once aggregate demand exceeds supply (the supply is one in Auction 113) the bidding system will not process a
bid to reduce demand if that reduction would result in excess supply. See Section V.G. (Bid Processing).
389

Id.

390

Bidding is open on all licenses until the first round in which, after bid processing, no license has excess demand.
See Section V.G.6. (Winning Bids).

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instructions in place, the system will consider those licenses to have missing bids. Missing bids are
treated by the bidding system as requests to reduce demand to zero at the start-of-round prices for the
licenses with missing bids. If these requests are applied, then a bidder’s bidding activity, and its bidding
eligibility for the next round, may be reduced.391 A bidder can avoid having missing bids by either
indicating its demand in every round or by entering appropriate proxy instructions.
G.

Bid Processing

207.
We adopt bid processing procedures that the bidding system will use after each round of
bidding to process bids to change demand, to determine the processed demand of each bidder for each
license, and to determine the posted price for each license that will serve as the start-of-round price for
the next round. Bids to maintain demand will always be applied by the auction bidding system during bid
processing.
1.

No Excess Supply Rule for Bids to Reduce Demand

208.
Under the clock-1 auction format, the bidding system will not allow a bidder to reduce its
demand for a license if the reduction would cause aggregate demand to fall below one (the “no excess
supply” rule). Therefore, if a bidder submits a bid to reduce its demand from one to zero for a license if
the price should increase above the price in its bid, the bidding system will treat the bid as a request to
reduce demand that will be applied only if the no excess supply rule would be satisfied.
209.
We adopt the no excess supply rule for Auction 113. The no excess supply rule has been
integral to the success of the clock auction since the clock auction was introduced at the Commission in
the Broadcast Incentive Auction. Ravnitzky proposes to introduce exceptions to the no excess supply rule
because he claims, it has created barriers for bidders in past auctions.392 Ravnitzky provides no examples
to support this claim, which is counterintuitive on its face. The purpose of not allowing the use of
withdrawals and proactive waivers in a clock auction is to reduce complexity and uncertainty about
bidder demand for spectrum.393 The clock auction relies on identifying the point at which demand
decreases to equal supply to determine prices.394 Allowing withdrawals, proactive waivers, or exceptions
to the no excess supply rule would create uncertainty with respect to the exact level of bidder demand and
would interfere with the basic clock price-setting and winner determination mechanism.395 The no excess
supply rule ensures that once there is demand for a license that the license will not then go unsold.396 The
no excess supply rule makes it risky or costly for a bidder to engage in gamesmanship by increasing its
demand for a license in one round, potentially causing the price of the license to increase for another
bidder, and then reducing its demand for the license in a subsequent round. We agree with Verizon that
we should not introduce exceptions that are contrary to the underlying purpose of the rules, which is to
protect the integrity of the auction.397
2.

Eligibility Rule for Bids to Increase Demand

210.
The bidding system will not allow a bidder to increase its demand for a license if the total
number of bidding units associated with all of the bidder’s license demands exceeds the bidder’s
391

See Auction 113 Technical Guide for further details.

392

Ravnitzky Comments at 8.

393

Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Broadcast Incentive Auction 1000, Including Auctions
1001 and 1002, AU Docket No. 14-252, GN Docket No. 12-268, Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 15750, 15805, para.
169 (2014) (Auction 1000 Comment Public Notice).
394

Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4435, para. 202.

395

Id.

396

Auction 1000 Comment Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd at 15879, Appendix G.

397

Verizon Reply at 6–7.

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eligibility for the round. Therefore, if a bidder submits a bid to add a license for which it did not have
processed demand in the previous round, the bidding system will treat the bid as a request to increase
demand that will be applied only if it would not cause the bidder’s processed activity to exceed its
eligibility.
3.

Processed Demand

211.
We adopt the procedures described in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice to
determine the order in which the bidding system will process bids after a round ends.398 After a round
ends, the bidding system will first consider and apply all bids to maintain demand at the clock price, and
then it will process bids to change demand in order of price point, where the price point represents the
percentage of the distance between the bid price and the start-of-round price, relative to the distance
between the clock price and the start-of-round price.399 The bidding system will process bids to change
demand in ascending order of price point across all licenses and all bidders, first by considering intraround bids in order of price point and then, finally, bids at the clock price (i.e., bids with a price point
equal to 100%).400 As it considers each submitted bid during bid processing, the bidding system will
determine whether there is excess demand for a license at that point in the processing in order to
determine whether a bidder’s request to reduce demand for that license can be applied. Likewise, the
bidding system will evaluate the activity associated with the bidder’s most recently determined demands
at that point in the processing to determine whether a request to increase demand can be applied.
212.
If a bid can be applied, the licenses that the bidder holds at that point in the processing
would be adjusted, and aggregate demand for the license would be recalculated accordingly. If the bid
cannot be applied, the unfulfilled bid will be held in a queue, to be considered later during the current
round’s bid processing. The bidding system will then consider the bid submitted at the next lowest price
point, and given the most recently determined demands of bidders, see if the bid can be applied. Note that
the price point at which a bid is considered by the bidding system can affect whether the bid is applied,
because at any given price point some bidders may request to increase demand for licenses while others
may request reductions.
213.
Every time a bid is applied, the unfulfilled bids held in the queue will be reconsidered, in
the order of their price points.401 Bids that were not applied because demand would fall below one or
because the bidder’s processed activity would exceed its eligibility will be considered, again in price point
order, if there should be excess demand or if the bidder’s processed activity is reduced sufficiently later in
the processing after other bids are processed.
214.
This step of bid processing will conclude when all bids from the round have been
processed and no unfulfilled bids held in the queue can be applied. The bidding system will then
automatically generate a proxy instruction for each bid to reduce demand that was not applied.402
However, the bidding system will not carry over to the next round unfulfilled bid requests to increase
demand. The bidding system will advise bidders about whether their bids were applied when round
results are released.

398

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1501, paras. 77–80.

399

For example, if the start-of-round price is $1,200 and the clock price is $1,300, a bid at $1,230 is at the 30% price
point, as 100% × ($1230-$1200) / ($1300-$1200) = 30%.
If there are multiple bids at a single price point, the system would process bids in order of a bid-specific
pseudorandom number.
400

401

Unfulfilled bids held in the queue with tied price points will be reconsidered in order of their bid-specific pseudorandom number.
402

See Section V.F.6. (Proxy Bids), above.

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Price Determination

215.
As described in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, the bidding system further will
determine, based on aggregate demand, the posted price for each license for the round, with a license’s
posted price serving as its start-of-round price for the next round.403 The price for a license will increase
from round to round as long as there is excess demand for the license, but will not increase if either no
bidder demands the license or if only a single bidder demands the license.
216.
If, at the end of a round, aggregate demand for a license exceeds the supply of one, the
posted price will equal the clock price for the round. If a reduction in demand was applied during the
round and caused demand for a license to fall to one, the posted price will be the highest price at which a
reduction was applied for that license. If aggregate demand is zero, or if aggregate demand is one and no
bid to reduce demand was applied for the license, then the posted price will equal the start-of-round price
for the round. The range of acceptable bid amounts for the next round will be set by adding the
percentage increment to the posted price.
217.
Under the clock-1 auction format, if a bid to reduce demand is not applied, it is because
there is no excess demand for the license and, therefore, the posted price will not increase. Hence, the
posted price for a license will not be higher than the bid price of a bidder that makes a bid to reduce
demand that cannot be applied.
218.
After the bids of the round have been processed, if the stopping rule has not been met, the
bidding system will announce clock prices to indicate a range of acceptable bids for the next round. Each
bidder will be informed of the licenses for which it has processed demand and of the aggregate demand
for each license.
5.

Caps on Bidding Credits

219.
Eligible applicants claiming either a small business or rural service provider bidding
credit will be subject to specified caps on the total bidding credit discount that they may receive.404 For
Auction 113, we adopt the bidding credit caps at the amounts proposed for the reasons discussed in the
Auction 113 Comment Public Notice.405 Specifically, we adopt a $25 million cap on the total bidding
credit discount that may be awarded to an eligible small business,406 and a $10 million cap on the total
bidding credit discount that may be awarded to an eligible rural service provider in Auction 113.407
Additionally, to create parity among eligible small businesses and rural service providers competing
against each other in smaller markets, no winning designated entity bidder may receive more than $10

403

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1501–02, paras. 81–84.

EchoStar and Council Tree argue against adopting bidding credit caps in Auction 113. EchoStar Comments at 6,
10; Council Tree Comments at 10–13. The Commission’s part 1 rules, however, require a cap on a winning bid
discount that will be offered to small businesses and rural service providers. 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2)(ii), (4)(ii);
Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7541, para. 114. Amendments to those rules require a
rulemaking proceeding and cannot be done in the context of establishing the procedures for Auction 113 because
such action is outside the scope of OEA’s and WTB’s delegated authority. See 47 CFR §§ 0.271, 0.131.
404

405

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1487–88, paras. 16–18.

Bidding credit discounts of 15% are available to entities whose average gross revenues for the preceding five
years does not exceed $55 million, and discounts of 25% are available to entities whose average gross revenues for
the preceding five years does not exceed $20 million. See 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 12–13, paras. 28–29,
Appx. A.
406

407

Id. at 15, para. 35, Appx. A.

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million in bidding credit discounts in total for licenses won in markets with a population of 500,000 or
fewer.408
220.
The record supports adopting the small business bidding credit cap and rural service
bidding credit cap for Auction 113 at the amounts proposed,409 and we find this consistent with the
Commission’s decisions in recent spectrum auctions.410 In the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report and Order,
the Commission adopted small business and rural service provider bidding credit caps and established the
parameters for implementing such bidding credit caps in a given auction based on an evaluation of the
expected capital requirements presented by the specific service and the inventory of licenses to be
auctioned.411 The Commission’s rules provide for a small business bidding credit cap of not less than $25
million and a rural service provider bidding credit of not less than $10 million, to be determined on an
auction-by-auction basis.412
221.
Under the parameters established in the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report Order, we find that
a $25 million small business bidding credit cap for Auction 113 is appropriate because this is an auction
of a limited number of AWS-3 licenses and the expected capital requirements associated with these
AWS-3 licenses are not likely to be any higher than those for bands where we adopted the same $25
million cap, given that many providers have already cleared, standardized, deployed, and offer service
using other licenses in the same bands.
222.
Some commenters disagree with our approach.413 CCA, for example, proposes that the
Commission increase the bidding credit caps to account for inflation, noting that a decade has passed
since Auction 97 and, “according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, $25 million in November 2014 dollars
would be worth more than $33 million today.”414 However, recent auction data demonstrate that a
$25 million cap on small business bidding credits has allowed a substantial majority of eligible small
businesses to take advantage of the bidding credit program and be unaffected by the cap.415 Whatever the
See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1489, para. 19. If an applicant seeking a small business
bidding credit does not claim the full $10 million in bidding credits in those smaller markets, then it may apply the
remaining balance to its winning bids on licenses in larger markets, up to the aggregate $25 million cap.
408

409

Several commenters generally support adopting the proposed procedures “as is.” See AT&T Comments at 3;
CTIA Reply at 1; Verizon Comments at 1; Verizon Reply at 7.
See Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7609–10, para. 93; Auction 103 Procedures
Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5558–59, para. 79; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2165, para.
77; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8428–29, para. 76; Auction 110 Procedures Public
Notice; 36 FCC Rcd at 9297, para. 78; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4402, para. 94. Cf.
Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7544–45, paras. 122–23 (adopting a $150 million cap for small
businesses in the forward portion of the Broadcast Incentive Auction (Auction 1002) because “a significant upwards
adjustment from the $25 million baseline for small businesses was warranted in light of the significant value of the
600 MHz spectrum to be auctioned and associated capital requirements”).
410

411

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7541, 7544, paras. 114, 119.

412

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7541, para. 114; see also 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2)(ii),
(4)(ii).
413

See EchoStar Comments at 10; Council Tree Comments at 10–13; CCA Comments at 4–6; Ravnitzky Comments
at 2–3; WISPA Reply at 1–3.
414

CCA Comments at 5, citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator (last accessed
Nov. 6, 2025), https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
415

No bidder seeking a small business bidding credit exceeded the $25 million cap in Auctions 101, 102, 103, 105,
and 108; only one bidder exceeded the $25 million cap in Auction 107, and only three bidders in Auction 110. See
generally Winning Bidders Announced for Auction of 28 GHz Upper Microwave Flexible Use Service Licenses
(Auction 101), AU Docket No. 18-85, Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd 4279, 4283–85, Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2019)
(continued….)

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impact of inflation generally, we see no persuasive evidence that a $25 million cap would impair the
meaningful opportunity that the bidding credit provides for small businesses to participate in Auction
113.416
223.
Council Tree argues that, in proposing to apply a $25 million small business bidding
credit cap, the “lens through which [we view] small business participation in Auction 113” is “out of
focus” and we should instead draw on the results of Auction 97 to assess the capital requirements for
Auction 113.417 Council Tree reasons that the Auction 97 results demonstrate that a $25 million small
business bidding credit cap is “untenable,” because Northstar and SNR placed $3.4 billion in winning
bids for 197 of the licenses available in Auction 113, with the expectation that they would be eligible for
$859 million in bidding credits.418 We find this argument meritless inasmuch as the Commission’s very
purpose in requiring the implementation of a minimum small business bidding credit cap in all auctions
that offer such a credit is to safeguard against the use of bidding credits by entities that are not bona fide
small businesses, such as the applicants that were denied bidding credits in Auction 97.419 The fact that a
bidder claiming eligibility for bidding credits in Auction 97 could have bid with an expectation of
receiving close to $1 billion in bidding discounts, as Northstar and SNR did, illustrates why the
Commission established a cap on bidding credits that is reasonably proportional to the capital
expenditures for spectrum licenses likely needed by bona fide small businesses, as well as the
appropriateness of the caps set in our most recent auctions.420 Moreover, applying a reasonable bidding
credit cap in Auction 97 such as the one we adopt here would have substantially lessened the financial
impact of SNR’s and Northstar’s being found ineligible for the bidding credits that they claimed, and
perhaps they would not have had the incentive to bid, in aggregate, so much more than they were

(Auction 101 Closing Public Notice); Auction of 24 GHz Upper Microwave Flexible Use Service Licenses Closes;
Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 102, AU Docket No. 18-85, Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd 4294, 4306–08,
Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2019) (Auction 102 Closing Public Notice); Incentive Auction of Upper Microwave Flexible
Use Service Licenses in the Upper 37 GHz, 39 GHz, and 47 GHz Bands for Next-Generation Wireless Services
Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 103, AU Docket No. 19-59, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2015,
2032–34, Attach. B (OEA/WTB 2020) (Auction 103 Closing Public Notice); Auction of Priority Access Licenses in
the 3550–3650 MHz Band Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 105, AU Docket No. 19-244, Public
Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 9287, Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2020) (Auction 105 Closing Public Notice); Auction of FlexibleUse Service Licenses in the 3.45–3.55 GHz Band Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 110, AU Docket
No. 21-62, Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd 308, Attach. A (OEA/WTB Jan. 14, 2022) (Auction 110 Closing Public
Notice); Auction of Flexible-Use Licenses in the 2.5 GHz Band Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction
108, AU Docket No. 20-429, Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd 10117, Attach. A (OEA/WTB Sept. 1, 2022) (Auction 108
Closing Public Notice). See generally Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.7–3.98 GHz Band; Winning
Bidders Announced for Auction 107, AU Docket No. 20-25, Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd 4318, Attach. A
(OEA/WTB Feb. 24, 2021) (Auction 107 Closing Public Notice).
416

This data also belies EchoStar’s assertion that a $25 million cap “would suppress bidding values by curtailing the
bidding effect.” EchoStar Comments at 10.
417

Council Tree Comments at 11.

418

Id.

419

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7541, paras. 112–14.

420

Id. at para. 115. In establishing bidding credit caps for future auctions, the Commission explained that “as the
cost of spectrum continues to grow, the incentives for structuring transactions to obtain bidding discounts increases
significantly.” Although the Commission remained committed to strict enforcement of its DE rules, it concluded
that “by imposing a bright-line cap on the overall amount of bidding credits we will award to a bona fide small
business or eligible rural service provider, we will provide an important additional safeguard—or backstop—that
will prevent misconduct in a manner that is simple and straightforward to implement, and as noted below if set
appropriately will not impose an artificial restriction on the amount DEs are likely to bid.” Id.

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ultimately willing to pay.421 As the Commission concluded in 2015, a $25 million bidding credit cap
provides a significant benefit to the vast majority of bona fide small businesses that may participate in
Auction 113, particularly since applying the cap would allow a bidder eligible for a 25% discount to
receive that discount on gross bids of up to $100 million.422
224.
Nor are we persuaded by Ravnitzky’s proposal to introduce more complex bidding credit
caps such as regional bidding credit caps that are a function of regional spectrum values, population
density, median income, or broadband access disparities.423 Because, as we just explained, the $25
million bidding credit cap in recent auctions allowed the substantial majority of small business to realize
the full value of their bidding credit based on their gross winning bid amounts, we find it unnecessary to
introduce other bidding credit caps in some regions that would increase complexity, make it more likely
that a small business would be limited by some regional cap, and could create issues for bidders and the
bidding system as a result of regional borders.
225.
Based on our experience in our spectrum auctions, we also find a $10 million rural
service provider bidding credit cap is appropriate because, as the Commission explained in the 2015
Updating Part 1 Report and Order, a rural service provider’s approach to bidding is generally more
targeted and usually focuses on competing for a few select license areas that align with its existing service
territory or adjacent areas.424
226.
Lastly, we find that a $10 million cap on the overall bidding credit amount that any
winning small business bidder may apply to licenses won in small markets is appropriate based on the
Commission’s conclusions in the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report and Order.425 This is consistent with the
approach adopted in all of our spectrum actions beginning with the Broadcast Incentive Auction and
strikes a measured and reasonable balance to protect against abuse of the designated entity program while
also allowing large designated entities a higher cap in large service areas.426 CCA proposes that rather
than capping the bidding credits used by a designated entity for particular small markets based on
421

We are equally unpersuaded by Council Tree’s claim that historical data “prove only that setting a cap at $25
million becomes a type of self-fulfilling prophecy.” Council Tree Comments at 13. Council Tree provides no
evidence beyond the bidding behavior of Northstar and SNR—neither of whom were deemed eligible for a small
business bidding credit—to demonstrate that the bidding behavior of other small businesses would be negatively
impacted by applying a bidding credit cap.
422

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7541, para. 115.

423

Ravnitzky Comments at 2,3.

424

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7544, para. 121. Notably, no rural service provider exceeded
the $10 million cap in the Broadcast Incentive Auction (Auction 1002), Auction 101, Auction 102, Auction 103,
Auction 105, Auction 108, or Auction 110, and it is unlikely that adopting a $10 million rural service provider
bidding credit cap for Auction 113 will constrain the ability of any rural service provider to participate fully and
fairly in the auction. See generally Incentive Auction Closing and Channel Reassignment Public Notice; the
Broadcast Television Incentive Auction Closes; Reverse Auction and Forward Auction Results Announced; Final
Television Band Channel Assignments Announced; Post-Auction Deadlines Announced, AU Docket No. 14-252 et
al., Public Notice, 32 FCC Rcd at 2786, Attach. B (WTB/MB 2017); Auction 101 Closing Public Notice, 34 FCC
Rcd at 4283–85, Attach. A; Auction 102 Closing Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 4306–08, Attach. A; Auction 103
Closing Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2032–34, Attach. B; Auction 105 Closing Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at
9287, Attach. A; Auction 107 Closing Public Notice, Attach. A; Auction 110 Closing Public Notice, Attach. A;
Auction 108 Closing Public Notice, Attach. A.
425

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7546–47, paras. 127–28.

426

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7546–47, paras. 127–28; Auction 101 and 102
Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd 7609–10, para. 93; Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at
5558–59, para. 79; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2165, para. 77; Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8428–29, para. 76; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9297–98,
para. 78; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4402, para. 94.

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population, we cap the bidding credits for rural service providers at the same level as that for small
businesses.427 After considering the purpose and benefits of a rural service provider bidding credit, the
Commission concluded in the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report and Order that rural service providers did not
warrant as high a bidding credit as other designated entities.428 Given the different nature of their
business plans and financial resources, it concluded that different bidding credit caps, and the
methodology for implementing them in the Broadcast Incentive Auction, were warranted for small
businesses and rural service providers.429 These different caps have been maintained for auctions
subsequent to the Broadcast Incentive Auction. CCA provides no evidence to support a finding that a
different conclusion would be appropriate with respect to the AWS-3 licenses remaining in our spectrum
inventory.
227.
We conclude that the adoption of these caps on the overall amount of bidding credits
offered in Auction 113 serves the Commission’s statutory goals by awarding meaningful opportunities to
bona fide small businesses and eligible rural service providers,430 while preventing unjust enrichment and
ensuring efficient and intensive use of spectrum.431 Notably, by adopting these caps for Auction 113, we
will provide an important additional safeguard, as the Commission intended, to prevent ineligible entities
from undercutting the Commission’s rules in a manner similar to circumstances of Auction 97. Our
approach is simple and straightforward to implement and will not impose an artificial restriction on the
amount eligible small businesses and rural service providers are likely to bid.432
6.

Winning Bids

228.
Under the clock-1 auction format, a bidder with processed demand for a license at the
time the stopping rule is met will become the winning bidder for the license. The final price for a license
will be the posted price for the final round.433
VI.

POST-AUCTION PROCEDURES

229.
The public notice announcing the close of the bidding and auction results will be released
within several days after bidding has ended in Auction 113. This public notice will also establish the
deadlines for submitting down payments, final payments, and long-form applications (FCC Form 601) for
the auction.
A.

Down Payments

230.
The Commission’s rules provide that, unless otherwise specified by public notice, within
10 business days after the release of the auction closing public notice for Auction 113, each winning
bidder must submit sufficient funds (in addition to its upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money
on deposit with the Commission to 20% of the net amount of its winning bids (less any bidding credits, if
applicable).434

427

CCA Comments at 6.

428

See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7541–43, paras. 116–17

429

Id. at 7542–43, para. 117.

430

See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D); see also id. § 309(j)(3)(A)–(B).

431

See id. § 309(j)(3)(C)–(D).

432

A $25 million small business bidding cap will not foreclose the ability for small businesses to participate in
auctions if their auction bids exceed the cap—rather, such entities will still receive a bidding credit discount of up to
the cap adopted and then pay the excess only above that amount.
433

See Auction 113 Technical Guide for further details.

434

See 47 CFR § 1.2107(b).

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Final Payments

231.
The Commission’s rules provide that each winning bidder must submit the balance of the
net amount for each of its winning bids within 10 business days after the deadline for submitting down
payments.435
C.

Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

232.
The Commission’s rules provide that, within 10 business days after release of the auction
closing public notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly completed post-auction longform application (FCC Form 601), including the applicable filing fee,436 for the license(s) they won
through the auction.437
233.
A winning bidder claiming eligibility for a small business bidding credit or a rural service
provider bidding credit must demonstrate its eligibility for the bidding credit sought in its FCC Form
601.438 Further instructions on these and other filing requirements will be provided to winning bidders in
the auction closing public notice for Auction 113.
234.
A winning bidder will also be required to provide as part of its long-form application any
agreement or arrangement it has entered into and a summary of the specific terms, conditions, and parties
involved in any agreement it has entered into.439 This applies to any bidding consortia, joint venture,
partnership, or agreement, understanding, or other arrangement entered into relating to the competitive
bidding process, including any agreement relating to the post-auction market structure.440 Failure to
comply with the Commission’s rules can result in enforcement action.441
235.
A winning bidder organized as bidding consortium must comply with the long-form
application procedures set forth in section 1.2107(g) of the Commission’s rules.442 Specifically, license(s)
won by a consortium must be applied for as follows: (a) an individual member of the consortium or a
new legal entity comprising two or more individual consortium members must file for licenses covered by
the winning bids; (b) each member or group of members of a winning consortium seeking separate
licenses will be required to file a separate FCC Form 601 for its/their respective license(s) in their legal
business name; (c) in the case of a license to be partitioned or disaggregated, the member or group filing
the applicable FCC Form 601 shall include the parties’ partitioning or disaggregation agreement with the
FCC Form 601; and (d) if a designated entity credit is sought (either small business or rural service
See id. § 1.2109(a) (requiring auction winners to pay the balance of their winning bids “within ten (10) business
days following the release of a public notice establishing the payment deadline,” “[u]nless otherwise specified by
public notice” (emphasis added)); see also CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd at 907–09, paras. 43–46.
435

A winning bidder is required to submit an application filing fee with each long-form application. 47 CFR
§ 1.1102(d), tbl. 3 to para. (d). The Commission adopted a long-form application filing fee that includes an amount
to recover costs for processing the short-form application. Amendment of the Schedule of Application Fees Set
Forth in Sections 1.1102 through 1.1109 of the Commission’s Rules, MD Docket No. 20-270, Report and Order, 35
FCC Rcd 15089, 15104–06, paras. 45–51 (2020) (adopting a filing fee for geographic-based wireless license longform applications). Currently, the fee for filing FCC Form 601 is $3,730 per application. 47 CFR § 1.1102(d), tbl. 3
to para. (d).
436

437

47 CFR § 1.2107(c).

438

Id. § 1.2112(b).

47 CFR § 1.2107(d). Such agreements must have been entered into prior to the filing of short-form applications
pursuant to section 1.2105. 47 CFR § 1.2107(d); see id. § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii), (c).
439

440

47 CFR § 1.2107(d).

See, e.g., id. § 1.2109(d). See also 47 CFR § 1.2105(c)(1) and Section IV.B. (Prohibited Communications and
Compliance with Antitrust Laws), above.
441

Id. § 1.2107(g); see also CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd at 911–12, paras. 51–52; Updating Part 1
Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7535, para. 101.
442

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provider), the applicant must meet the applicable eligibility requirements in the Commission’s rules for
the credit.443
D.

Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)

236.
Within 10 business days after the release of the auction closing public notice for
Auction 113, each winning bidder must also comply with the ownership reporting requirements in
sections 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112 of the Commission’s rules by submitting an ownership disclosure
information report for wireless telecommunications services (FCC Form 602) with its FCC Form 601.444
237.
If a winning bidder already has a complete and accurate FCC Form 602 on file in the
FCC’s Universal Licensing System (ULS), then it is not necessary to file a new report, but the winning
bidder must certify in its FCC Form 601 that the information on file with the Commission is complete and
accurate. If the winning bidder does not have an FCC Form 602 on file, or if the form on file is not
complete and accurate, then the winning bidder must submit a new one.
238.
When a winning bidder submits an FCC Form 175, ULS automatically creates an
ownership record. This record is not an FCC Form 602, but it may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form 602
with the ownership information submitted on the winning bidder’s FCC Form 175 application. A
winning bidder must review the pre-filled information and confirm that it is complete and accurate as of
the filing date of the FCC Form 601 before certifying and submitting the FCC Form 602. Further
instructions will be provided to winning bidders in the auction closing public notice.
E.

Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

239.
A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy facilities and provide services
to qualifying Tribal lands that have a wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85% may be eligible to
receive a Tribal lands bidding credit as set forth in sections 1.2107 and 1.2110(f) of the Commission’s
rules.445 A Tribal lands bidding credit is in addition to, and separate from, any other bidding credit for
which a winning bidder may qualify.
240.
Unlike other bidding credits that are requested prior to an auction, a winning bidder
applies for a Tribal lands bidding credit after the auction when it files its FCC Form 601.446 When
initially filing its FCC Form 601, the winning bidder will be required to advise the Commission whether
it intends to seek a Tribal lands bidding credit, for each license won in a particular auction, by checking
the designated box(es).447 After stating its intent to seek a Tribal lands bidding credit, the winning bidder
will have 180 days from the close of the applicable long-form application filing deadline within which to
amend its application to select the specific qualifying Tribal lands to be served and provide the required
Tribal government certifications.448 A licensee receiving a Tribal lands bidding credit is subject to
performance criteria as set forth in section 1.2110(f)(3)(vii).449 For additional information on the Tribal
lands bidding credit, including how the amount of the credit is calculated, applicants should review the
Commission’s rulemaking proceeding regarding Tribal lands bidding credits and related public notices.

47 CFR § 1.2107(g); see also id. § 1.2110(b)(4)(i), (c)(6); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at
7535–36, 7574, 7583–86, paras. 101–03, 190, 214–26.
443

444

47 CFR §§ 1.913(a)(2), 1.919, 1.2107(f), 1.2112.

445

Id. §§ 1.2107, 1.2110(f). See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4674, para. 175.

446

47 CFR § 1.2107(e).

Instructions for applicants seeking a Tribal lands bidding credit will be provided, after the close of bidding, in
Filing Instructions for FCC Form 601 and FCC Form 602.
447

448

47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(3)(ii).

449

Id. § 1.2110(f)(3)(vii).

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Default and Disqualification

241.
Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the close of an auction (i.e., fails
to remit the required down payment by the specified deadline, fails to submit a timely long-form
application, fails to make a full and timely final payment, or is otherwise disqualified) is liable for default
payments as described in section 1.2104(g)(2).450 A default payment consists of a deficiency payment,
equal to the difference between the amount of the bidder’s winning bid and the amount of the winning bid
the next time a license covering the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal
to a percentage of the defaulter’s bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever is less.451
242.
The Commission’s rules provide that, in advance of each auction, it will establish a
percentage between 3% and 20% of the applicable winning bid to be assessed as an additional default
payment.452 As the Commission has indicated, the level of this additional payment in each auction will be
based on the nature of the service and the licenses being offered.453 In the Auction 113 Comment Public
Notice, we proposed to set the additional default payment for Auction 113 at 15% of the applicable bid
for winning bids.454 Verizon, however, opposes the proposed 15% additional default payment percentage,
arguing instead that we should implement the maximum default payment percentage of 20% to ensure
that defaults that occurred in Auction 97 are not repeated.455 Council Tree opposes Verizon’s request,
claiming that it is designed to discourage competitor participation in Auction 113.456
243.
As the Commission has previously emphasized, defaults weaken the integrity of the
auction process and may impede the deployment of service to the public.457 Due to prior defaults, the
AWS-3 spectrum being offered in Auction 113 has been in the Commission’s inventory for a full decade
after it was first offered in Auction 97. We therefore agree with Verizon that it is important to take steps
to minimize the chance of defaults on winning bids in this auction. We disagree with Council Tree’s
assertion that a 20% additional default payment would serve only to discourage participation in the
auction.458 Council Tree does not explain how adopting a higher additional default payment to discourage
insincere bidding and defaults by bidders who are unable to pay their full bid amount would discourage
bidding by sincere bidders who have adequate financing to pay their full bids. And in any case, whatever
deterrent effect the higher default payment amount may or may not have would be outweighed by the
public interest in encouraging only sincere bidding. We conclude that a higher additional default payment
will be more effective in deterring defaults in Auction 113 and therefore adopt the maximum additional
default payment percentage of 20% for this auction.459
450

Id. § 1.2104(g)(2).

451

Id.

452

Id. § 1.2104(g)(2)(ii).

453

See CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd at 903–04, para. 31.

454

See Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1493, para. 34.

455

Verizon Comments at 5.

456

Council Tree Reply at 7.

457

CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd at 902–03, para. 29.

458

Council Tree Reply at 7.

Ravnitzky generally opposes applying a flat default payment percentage across all license categories because he
claims it could disproportionately affect smaller bidders or those targeting rural and less competitive markets, and
suggests that a tiered payment structure with lower penalties for defaults on rural or low-demand licenses, paired
with higher penalties for defaults in high-demand urban areas could address these disparities by adjusting penalties
based on license market conditions. Ravnitzky Comments at 9. Ravnitzky also suggests that limited exceptions or
reduced penalties could be provided for small entities that demonstrate good faith efforts to meet their obligations in
order to mitigate the financial impact on participants. Id. We decline to implement Ravnitzky’s suggested tiered
(continued….)
459

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244.
Finally, in the event of a default, the Commission has the discretion to re-auction the
license or offer it to the next highest bidder (in descending order) at its final bid amount.460 In addition, if
a default or disqualification involves gross misconduct, misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant,
then the Commission may declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in future auctions and
may take any other action that it deems necessary, including institution of proceedings to revoke any
existing authorizations held by the applicant.461
G.

Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance

245.
If a bidder is due a refund, the bidder must request a refund in writing with the
information listed below. All refunds of upfront payment balances will be returned to the payer of record
as identified on the FCC Form 159, or on the wire transfer, unless the payer submits written authorization
instructing otherwise. Bidders are encouraged to use the Refund icon found in the Review or Modify
Existing Applications table on the FRN Selection screen or the Refund Form link available on the
Auction Application Submit Confirmation page in the AAP to access the form. After the required
information is completed on the blank form, the form should be printed, signed, and submitted to the
Commission by fax or email as instructed below.
246.
If you have elected not to access the Refund Form, the Commission is requesting that all
information listed below be supplied in writing:
Name, address, contact and phone number of Bank
ABA Number (capable to accept ACH payments)
Account Number to Credit
Name of Account Holder
FCC Registration Number (FRN)
All refund requests must be submitted to the Revenue & Receivables Operations Group/Auctions either
by fax at (202) 418-2843, or by email to RROGWireFaxes@fcc.gov.
NOTE: Refund processing generally takes up to two weeks to complete. Bidders with questions about
refunds should contact Scott Radcliffe at (202) 418-7518 or Theresa Meeks at (202) 418-2945.
VII.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A.

Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

247.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collections
in the Application to Participate in an FCC Auction, FCC Form 175.462 This Public Notice does not
contain new or substantively modified information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. Therefore, it does not contain any new or modified
information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees pursuant to the
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198.463 The Commission will be
submitting a non-substantive change request to OMB concerning OMB 3060-0600 related to the
certification requirement and the acknowledgment statement for Auction 113 applicants adopted herein,
and the Commission will not require Auction 113 applicants to make this certification or submit the
default payment structure—which Ravnitzky acknowledges “would add a layer of complexity to the auction
process” (see Ravnitzky Comments at 9)—because we conclude it is both unnecessary and overly complicated,
particularly for an auction in which only a limited number of licenses are available.
460

47 CFR § 1.2109(b)–(c).

461

Id. § 1.2109(d); Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2382, para. 198.

462

OMB Control No. 3060-0600.

463

See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(4).

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acknowledgement statement in FCC Form 175 until OMB has approved the non-substantive change
request.
B.

Congressional Review Act

248.
The Commission has determined, and Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, concurs, that this rule is “non-major” under the
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of this Auction 113
Procedures Public Notice to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
801(a)(1)(A).
C.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

249.
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA),464 OEA and
WTB incorporated a Supplemental Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental IRFA) in the
Auction 113 Comment Public Notice released in March 2025.465 OEA and WTB sought written public
comment on the proposals in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, including comments on the
Supplemental IRFA. The comments received on the Supplemental IRFA466 are addressed below. The
Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice establishes the procedures to be used for Auction 113. This Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) reflects actions taken in the Auction 113 Procedures Public
Notice, and supplements the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses completed by the Commission in the
2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order, and other Commission orders
pursuant to which Auction 113 will be conducted.467 This FRFA conforms to the RFA, and it (or
summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.468
250.
Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules. The Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice
resolves all open issues, and addresses comments filed in response to the Auction 113 Comment Public
Notice. The licenses in Auction 113 are being offered pursuant to the Spectrum and Secure Technology
and Innovations Act, which directs the Commission to initiate a system of competitive bidding to grant
licenses for spectrum in its inventory in the AWS-3 spectrum bands.469 The Auction 113 Procedures
Public Notice implements auction procedures for those entities that seek to bid in Auction 113 to acquire
geographic-based licenses in the 1695–1710 MHz, 1755–1780 MHz, and 2155–2180 MHz bands
(collectively, the AWS-3 bands). The Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice adopts procedural rules and
terms and conditions governing Auction 113, and the post-auction application and payment processes, as
well as sets the minimum opening bid amounts for licenses in the AWS-3 bands that will be offered in
Auction 113.
251.
To promote the efficient and fair administration of the competitive bidding process for all
Auction 113 participants, including small entities, we adopt the following procedures for Auction 113:
•

A requirement that any applicant seeking to participate in Auction 113 certify in its short-form
application, under penalty of perjury, that it has read the public notice adopting procedures for

5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA),
Pub. L. No. 104–121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
464

465

Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1502–08, paras. 87–105.

466

Ravnitzky Comments at 4–5.

467

See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4728–34, Appx. B; 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at Appx.

B.
468

See 5 U.S.C. § 604

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Auction 113 and that it has familiarized itself with those procedures and the requirements for a
license and operating facilities in the AWS-3 bands;
•

A requirement that any applicant seeking to bid in the 1755–1780 MHz submit a signed statement
with its short-form application acknowledging that the applicant’s operations in the 1755–1780 MHz
band may be subject to interference from Federal systems in certain geographic zones, that the
applicant must accept interference from such Federal systems in those zones, and that the applicant
has considered these risks before submitting any bids for applicable licenses in Auction 113;

•

Identification of AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon as nationwide providers for the purpose of
implementing the competitive bidding rules in Auction 113, including section 1.2105(c), the rule
prohibiting certain communications;

•

Use of anonymous bidding/limited information procedures, under which we will not make the
following information public until after bidding has closed: (1) the licenses that an applicant selects
for bidding in its short-form application (FCC Form 175); (2) the amount of any upfront payment
made by or on behalf of an applicant for Auction 113; (3) any applicant’s bidding eligibility; and (4)
any other bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid;

•

Establishment of bidding credit caps for eligible small businesses in Auction 113;

•

Establishment of bidding credit caps for eligible rural service providers in Auction 113;

•

Use of a clock auction format (clock-1) with a supply of one for Auction 113 under which each
qualified bidder will indicate in successive clock bidding rounds its demand for licenses at the prices
associated with the current round;

•

Use of a simultaneous stopping rule for Auction 113, under which all licenses remain available for
bidding until no license has excess demand;

•

Establishment of a specific minimum opening bid for each license available in Auction 113 based on
$0.01 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of less than 300,000, $0.02 per
MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of at least 300,000 and less than
1,000,000, $0.05 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of at least 1,000,000,
and $0.01 per MHz-pop for the unpaired licenses, with a minimum opening bid of $1,000 per license;

•

A specific upfront payment amount for each license available in Auction 113;

•

Establishment of a bidder’s initial bidding eligibility in bidding units based on that bidder’s upfront
payment through assignment of a specific number of bidding units for each license;

•

Provision of delegated authority to OEA, in conjunction with WTB, to exercise its discretion to delay,
suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 113 for any reason that affects the ability of the competitive
bidding process to be conducted fairly and efficiently;

•

Retention by OEA of discretion to adjust the bidding schedule in order to manage the pace of Auction
113;

•

Use of information procedures which would make public after each round of Auction 113, for each
license, the aggregate demand, the posted price of the last completed round, and the clock price for
the next round;

•

Use of an activity rule that would require bidders to be active on between 90% and 100% of their
bidding eligibility in all clock rounds, with the initial activity requirement percentage set at 95%, and
with OEA retaining discretion to change the activity requirement percentage during the auction;

•

Establishment of acceptable bid amounts, including clock price increments and intra-round bids,
along with a proposed methodology for calculating such amounts;
79

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•

An option to permit a bidder to submit a proxy instruction to reduce its demand for a license to zero at
a price higher than the current round’s clock price and a requirement that bidders indicate their
demand in every round or submit appropriate proxy instructions;

•

Establishment of a methodology for processing bids and requests to reduce and increase demand
subject to the no excess supply rule for bids to reduce demand and the eligibility rule for bids to
increase demand; and

•

Establishment of an additional default payment of 20% under section 1.2104(g)(2) of the rules in the
event that a winning bidder defaults or is disqualified after the auction.

252.
The procedures for the conduct of Auction 113 constitute the more specific
implementation of the competitive bidding rules contemplated by parts 1 and 27 of the Commission’s
rules, and the underlying rulemaking orders, including the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, the 2025 AWS3 Report and Order, and relevant competitive bidding orders, and are fully consistent therewith.470
253.
Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the RFA,471 the
Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration (SBA) and provide a detailed statement of any changes made to the
proposed procedures as a result of those comments.472 The Chief Counsel did not file any comments in
response to the procedures that were proposed in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice.
254.
Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response to the IRFA.
Only one party—Ravnitzky—filed comments directly in response to the Supplemental IRFA.473
Ravnitzky contends that the Commission’s definition of “small entities” used in the Supplemental IRFA “may
unintentionally exclude businesses in high-cost urban markets” because “while these businesses fall outside the
thresholds for ‘small entities,’ they often face challenges similar to those in rural areas, such as high operational
costs and limited resources.”474 He suggests that the Commission “reevaluate its small entity criteria by
considering factors like regional cost variations and market-specific metrics (e.g., population density,
median income, broadband access) . . . [to] better align with section 309(j)(3)(B)’s goal of promoting
diverse participation and equitable access to spectrum.”475 In addition, he notes that the Supplemental
IRFA highlights the compliance burdens that Auction 113 could impose476 and suggests that a more
detailed analysis of these costs—broken down by market type or industry—would help uncover the unique
challenges small businesses in underserved markets face.477 He submits that providing tools such as
reporting templates, compliance checklists, and cost estimation guides would further support small entities,
reduce administrative burdens, and enable broader participation in Auction 113.478 We address Ravnitzky’s
comments in response to the Supplemental IRFA below.

See generally Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order; 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order; 2025 AWS-3
Report and Order.
470

471

Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–240, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010).

472

5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3).

473

Ravnitzky Comments at 5.

474

Id. at 4–5.

475

Id.

476

Id. at 5 (referencing paragraph 102 of the Supplemental IRFA, see Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 2025
FCC LEXIS 627, at *91–92, para. 102).
477

Ravnitzky Comments at 5.

478

Id.

Federal Communications Commission

DA 25-1075

255.
Other parties filed comments relating to small entities in response to the proposals in the
Auction 113 Comment Public Notice. Two parties—WISPA and CCA—filed comments advocating that
licenses for AWS-3 spectrum should be offered in smaller licensing areas in Auction 113.479 Specifically,
WISPA advocates that small businesses would benefit from changing the geographic area of Block G to
offering licenses at a county level rather than the CMA level.480 Several parties opposed WISPA’s
request to change the geographic area size of Block G from CMAs to counties.481 Some commenters
oppose any amendments to small business bidding credits in effect for Auction 97 for Auction 113.482 In
these comments, there were two prevailing themes of discussion: (1) the application of the part 1 small
business bidding rules in effect for Auction 97, and (2) the proposal for a $25 million bidding credit cap
for Auction 113. Regarding the application of part 1 small business bidding rules, two parties—EchoStar
and Council Tree—specifically advocate for applying the part 1 designated entity rules in effect for
Auction 97 in Auction 113 because they contend that any rule changes will be to the detriment of small
businesses, amongst other concerns unrelated to small businesses.483 Regarding the proposal to apply a
$25 million small business bidding credit cap in Auction 113, all parties commenting on the proposal
oppose the proposal.484 Four parties—EchoStar, Council Tree, Ravnitzky, and WISPA—oppose any
bidding credit cap.485 CCA also opposes adopting any bidding credit cap but advocates for an increase of
the bidding credit cap to $33 million in order to adjust the bidding credit cap to account for inflation if
bidding credit caps are adopted for Auction 113.486 Additionally, Ravnitzky notes his opposition to the
proposed 95% activity level to retain full eligibility, because although it encourages active participation, it
may unintentionally exclude less experienced bidders and small entities that lack the resources to engage
dynamically in every round.487 We address these comments below.
256.
Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Rules Will Apply.
The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of
small entities that may be affected by the adopted procedures.488 The RFA generally defines the term
“small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small organization,” and
“small governmental jurisdiction.”489 In addition, the term “small business” has the same meaning as the
term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act (SBA).490 A “small business concern” is one
which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
479

WISPA Comments at 2–5; CCA Reply at 6–7.

480

WISPA Comments at 2–5.

481

CTIA Reply at 3–4; Verizon Reply at 7; AT&T Reply at 3–4.

482

EchoStar Comments at 1–2, 5–10; Council Tree Comments at 2–6, 7–10, 10–13; Council Tree Reply at 7–9.

483

EchoStar Comments at 1–2, 5–10; Council Tree Comments at 2–6, 5–10; Council Tree Reply at 7–9.

484

EchoStar Comments at 1–2, 10; Council Tree Comments at 10–13; Council Tree Reply at 7–9; Ravnitzky
Comments at 2–3; CCA Reply at 2–4; WISPA Reply at 2–3.
485

EchoStar Comments at 1–2, 10; Council Tree Comments at 10–13; Ravnitzky Comments at 2–3; WISPA Reply
at 2–3.
486

CCA Comments at 4–6; CCA Reply at 2–4.

487

Ravnitzky Comments at 6.

488

5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(3).

489

Id. § 601(6).

490

Id. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small-business concern” in the Small Business Act, 15
U.S.C. § 632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an agency,
after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity for public
comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the agency and
publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”

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DA 25-1075

(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.491 The SBA establishes small business size
standards that agencies are required to use when promulgating regulations relating to small businesses;
agencies may establish alternative size standards for use in such programs, but must consult and obtain
approval from SBA before doing so.492
257.
Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present.
We therefore describe three broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected by our actions.493
In general, a small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees.494 These types
of small businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 34.75
million businesses.495 Next, “small organizations” are not-for-profit enterprises that are independently
owned and operated and not dominant in their field.496 While we do not have data regarding the number
of non-profits that meet that criteria, over 99 percent of nonprofits have fewer than 500 employees.497
Finally, “small governmental jurisdictions” are defined as cities, counties, towns, townships, villages,
school districts, or special districts with populations of less than fifty thousand.498 Based on the 2022 U.S.
Census of Governments data, we estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835 local government
jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000.499
258.
The procedures adopted in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice will apply to small
entities in the industries identified in the chart below by their six-digit North American Industry
Classification System500 codes and corresponding SBA size standard.501 Based on currently available
U.S. Census data regarding the estimated number of small firms in each identified industry, we conclude
that the adopted procedures will impact a substantial number of small entities. Where available, we also
provide additional information regarding the number of potentially affected entities in the industries
identified below.
Table 1. 2022 U.S. Census Bureau Data by NAICS Code

491

15 U.S.C. § 632.

492

13 CFR § 121.903.

493

5 U.S.C. § 601(3)-(6).

494

See SBA, Office of Advocacy, Frequently Asked Questions About Small Business (July 23, 2024),
https://advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Frequently-Asked-Questions-About-Small-Business_2024508.pdf.
495

Id.

496

5 U.S.C. § 601(4).

497

See SBA, Office of Advocacy, Small Business Facts, Spotlight on Nonprofits (July 2019),
https://advocacy.sba.gov/2019/07/25/small-business-facts-spotlight-on-nonprofits/.
498

5 U.S.C. § 601(5).

499

See U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Census of Governments –Organization,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2022/econ/gus/2022-governments.html, tables 1-11.
500

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies
in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related
to the U.S. business economy. See www.census.gov/NAICS for further details regarding the NAICS codes
identified in this chart.
501

The size standards in this chart are set forth in 13 CFR § 121.201, by six digit NAICS code.

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SBA Size Standard

DA 25-1075

Regulated Industry (NAICS
Classification)

NAICS
Code

Total
Firms502

Small
Firms503

% Small
Firms in
Industry

Satellite Telecommunications504

517410

$47 million

275

242

88.00

Wireless Telecommunications
Carriers (except Satellite)505

517112

1,500 employees

2,893

2,837

98.06

502

See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Economic Census of the United States, Employment Size of Firms for the U.S.:
2017, Table ID: EC1700SIZEEMPFIRM, and 2017 Economic Census of the United States, Selected Sectors: Sales,
Value of Shipments, or Revenue Size of Firms for the U.S.: 2017, Table ID: EC1700SIZEREVFIRM.
503

Id.

504

Affected Entities in this industry include Fixed Satellite Small Transmit/Receive Earth Stations, Fixed Satellite
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Systems, Mobile Satellite Earth Stations.
505

Affected Entities in this industry include license holders in the Advanced Wireless Services - AWS Services,
Wireless Broadband Internet Access Service Providers, Wireless Carriers and Service Providers, Wireless
Communications Services, and Wireless Telephony.

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DA 25-1075

Table 2. Telecommunications Service Provider Data
2024 Universal Service Monitoring
Report Telecommunications Service
Provider Data506

SBA Size Standard
(1500 Employees)

(Data as of December 2023)
Affected Entity

Total # FCC
Form 499A Filers

Wireless Telecommunications
Carriers (except Satellite)507

585

Small
Firms
498

% Small
Entities
85.13

259.
Description of Economic Impact and Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact
of proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record.508 The
Commission designed the auction application process to minimize reporting and compliance requirements
for small entities and other applicants, and the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice reflects its efforts to
remain consistent with this approach. In the first part of the Commission’s two-phased auction
application process, parties desiring to participate in an auction file streamlined, short-form applications
in which they certify under penalty of perjury as to their qualifications, and to having reviewed the
Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice.509 Eligibility to participate in bidding is based on an applicant’s
short-form application and certifications, as well as remittance of a timely and sufficient upfront payment.
In the second phase of the process, winning bidders file a more comprehensive long-form application.
Thus, an applicant that fails to become a winning bidder does not need to file a long-form application or
provide the additional showings and more detailed demonstrations required of a winning bidder, thereby
saving small entities and other applicants the time and expense associated with unnecessary filings.
260.
Applicants that wish to participate in Auction 113 are required to certify that they have
read the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice and the procedures adopted herein, and are also familiar
with the procedures and requirements for obtaining a license and operating facilities in the AWS-3 bands.
The certification requirement allows applicants to educate themselves about the procedures for
participation in Auction 113, as well as their obligation to stay abreast of relevant information before
bidding in Auction 113 begins, and throughout the entire Auction 113 process. Adoption of this
requirement may help small entities and other applicants avoid, among other things, rule violations or
technical errors that could prevent them from becoming a qualified bidder or obtaining a license after
placing a winning bid. Moreover, as discussed below, the Commission makes available to potential and
actual participants, at no cost, a variety of information, resources, and guidance, including interactive,
online tutorials and technical guides. The requirement that applicants certify that they have read the
Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice and are familiar with the procedures and requirements for the
auction will help ensure that small entity applicants are aware that these detailed educational materials,
which are designed to enhance their understanding of the pre-bidding and bidding processes, are available
for their use.
506

Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Universal Service Monitoring Report at 26, Table 1.12 (2024),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-408848A1.pdf.
507

Affected Entities in this industry include all reporting wireless carriers and service providers.

508

5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(5).

509

See Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2376–77, paras. 163–66.

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DA 25-1075

261.
We do not expect that the processes and procedures adopted in the Auction 113
Procedures Public Notice will require small entities to hire attorneys, engineers, consultants, or other
professionals to participate in Auction 113 and comply with the procedures we adopt. Moreover, we do
not believe that the cost of compliance will unduly burden small entities that choose to participate in the
auction. We note that the processes and procedures are consistent with existing Commission policies and
procedures used in prior auctions. Thus, some small entities may already be familiar with such
procedures and have the processes and procedures in place to facilitate compliance and minimize their
costs to comply. Even for those small entities that may be new to the Commission’s auction process, the
various resources that will be made available, including, but not limited to, the mock auction, remote
electronic bidding, and access to hotlines for both technical and auction assistance, should help facilitate
participation without the need to hire professionals. These resources are in addition to the resources
discussed above that small entities and other applicants will be able to access. By providing these
resources as well as the resources discussed below, we expect small entities that use the available
resources to experience lower participation and compliance costs.
262.
Discussion of Steps Taken to Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered. The RFA requires an agency to provide “a description
of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities . . .
including a statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the
final rule and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency
which affect the impact on small entities was rejected.”510
263.
In the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, OEA and WTB have taken steps to
minimize any economic impact of the Commission’s auction procedures on small businesses through,
among other things, the many resources provided to potential auction participants. As mentioned above,
consistent with the past practices in prior auctions, small entities that are potential participants will have
access to detailed educational information and Commission personnel to help guide their participation in
Auction 113, which should alleviate any need to hire professionals. Only one party—Ravnitzky—filed
comments in response to the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice regarding the Commission’s provision
of these materials.511 In reaching our conclusions in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, we
considered the alternatives Ravnitzky presented in his comments. For example, Ravnitzky advocates for
additional educational support in the form of personalized and interactive tools because he claims that the
available educational materials are often too generalized for bidders, particularly small entities, to apply
to their particular circumstances.512 Similarly, Ravnitzky also suggests that the Commission should
provide a more detailed analysis, including additional educational resources, of the costs of compliance
with the Supplemental IRFA to further support small businesses in underserved markets. By Ravnitzky’s
own acknowledgement, however, the Commission’s educational resources are “valuable components” to
a “demonstra[ble] commitment to equipping participants with the tools they need for Auction 113.”513
264.
To assist small entities with the AAS and the bidding system in Auction 113, the
Commission currently offers a wide variety of free educational materials, demonstrations, educational
opportunities, and other information and resources. For example, small entities and other would-be
participants will also be provided with various materials on the pre-bidding process in advance of the
short-form application filing window, which includes step-by-step instructions on how to complete FCC
Form 175. The Commission has taken steps to ensure that the AAS is simple to use, and that FCC Form
175 is easy to complete. For example, if an applicant for Auction 113 previously filed an FCC Form 602
ownership disclosure information report or filed an application to participate in a previous auction in
510

5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(6).

511

Ravnitzky Comments at 5–6.

512

Id.

513

Id.

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DA 25-1075

which ownership information was disclosed and the applicant uses the same FRN used to make that filing
to create its FCC Form 175 for Auction 113, the AAS will give the applicant the option to pre-fill the
most current ownership information contained in any such filing into certain ownership sections on the
applicant’s FCC Form 175. Accordingly, in light of all the educational resources the Commission already
provides to bidders in an auction, we conclude that the added benefit, if any, of developing alternative
personalized and interactive educational tools in time for Auction 113 is outweighed by the time and
expense that the Commission would incur to customize such resources.
265.
In addition, small entities will have access to the web-based, interactive online tutorials
produced by Commission staff to familiarize themselves with auction procedures, filing requirements,
bidding procedures, and other matters related to an auction.
266.
Prior to the start of bidding, eligible bidders will be given an opportunity to become
familiar with auction procedures and the bidding system by participating in a mock auction. Eligible
bidders will have access to a user guide for the bidding system, bidding file formats, and an online
bidding procedures tutorial in advance of the mock auction. Further, we will conduct Auction 113
electronically over the Internet using a web-based bidding system that eliminates the need for small
entities and other bidders to be physically present in a specific location. These mechanisms are made
available to facilitate participation in Auction 113 by all eligible bidders and may result in significant cost
savings for small entities that use them. Moreover, the adoption of bidding procedures in advance of the
auction, consistent with statutory directive, is designed to ensure that the auction will be administered
predictably and fairly for all participants, including small businesses. These steps provide measures to
prepare and support the ability of a small business to comprehend our bidding rules, including our rules
relating to the proposal for a 95% activity level to retain full eligibility in auction rounds. Given these
steps we have taken, we decline to adopt Ravnitzky’s alternative proposal to lower the activity rule
threshold.
267.
Small entities and other auction participants may seek clarification of, or guidance on,
complying with competitive bidding rules and procedures, reporting requirements, and using the bidding
system at any stage of the auction process. Additionally, the FCC Auctions Hotline will provide small
entities one-on-one access to Commission staff for information about the auction process and procedures.
Further, the FCC Auctions Technical Support Hotline is another resource that provides technical
assistance to applicants, including small entities, on issues such as access to or navigation within the
electronic FCC Form 175 and use of the bidding system.
268.
The Commission also makes various databases and other sources of information,
including the Auctions program websites and copies of Commission decisions, available to the public
without charge, providing a low-cost mechanism for small entities to conduct research prior to and
throughout the auction. Prior to the start of bidding, and at the close of Auction 113, we will post public
notices on the Commission’s Auctions website that articulate the procedures and deadlines for the
auction. The Commission makes this information easily accessible and without charge to benefit small
entities and other Auction 113 applicants, including small entities, thereby lowering their administrative
costs to comply with the Commission’s competitive bidding rules.
269.
After the initial application stage, auction participants whose applications have been
deemed incomplete have the opportunity to correct certain errors. An applicant whose application is
deemed incomplete will receive a letter from the Commission identifying the specific errors in their
application and providing the contact information for a specific Commission staff member who has been
assigned to provide assistance. Additionally, after the application process is complete and the
Commission has identified the applicants who will be qualified to bid in Auction 113, all qualified
bidders for Auction 113 will automatically be registered for the auction, and registration materials will be
distributed prior to the auction by overnight delivery. Applicants are not required to take any further steps
until bidding commences.
270.
Another step taken to minimize the economic impact for small entities participating in
Auction 113 is the Commission’s adoption of bidding credits for small businesses and rural service
86

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DA 25-1075

providers. As discussed above, we received comments discussing the adoption of bidding credits for
small businesses and rural service providers and the application of part 1 bidding credit rules as in effect
for Auction 97 in Auction 113. These discussions of eligibility for small business bidding credits were
resolved in the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order.514 In accordance with the service rules applicable to the
AWS-3 band licenses to be offered in Auction 113, bidding credit discounts will be available to eligible
small businesses and small business consortia on the following basis: (1) a bidder with attributed average
annual gross revenues that do not exceed $55 million for the preceding five years is eligible to receive a
15% discount on its overall payment; or (2) a bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do
not exceed $20 million for the preceding five years is eligible to receive a 25% discount on its overall
payment. Eligible applicants can receive only one of the available small business bidding credits—not
both.
271.
An eligible rural service provider may request a 15% discount on its overall payment
using a rural service provider bidding credit. To be eligible for a rural service provider bidding credit, an
applicant must: (1) be a service provider that is in the business of providing commercial communications
services and, together with its controlling interests, affiliates, and the affiliates of its controlling interests,
has fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable subscribers; and (2) serve
predominantly rural areas. Rural areas are defined as counties with a population density of 100 or fewer
persons per square mile. Eligible applicants can request either a small business bidding credit or a rural
service provider bidding credit, but not both.
272.
The total bidding credit discount that may be awarded to an eligible small business is
capped at $25 million and there is a $10 million cap that may be awarded to a rural service provider. In
addition, to create parity among eligible small businesses and rural service providers competing against
each other in smaller markets, we adopt a $10 million cap on the overall amount of bidding credits that
any winning designated entity bidder may apply to winning licenses in markets with a population of
500,000 or less. Based on the technical characteristics of AWS-3 licenses and our analysis of past auction
data, we anticipate that our caps will allow the majority of small businesses to take full advantage of the
bidding credit program, thereby lowering the relative costs of participation for small businesses. While
eligible entities will have the opportunity to compete at auction without being unduly constrained, the
caps are reasonable enough to ensure that ineligible entities are not encouraged to undercut our rules,
thereby achieving our dual statutory goals of benefiting designated entities and at the same time
preventing unjust enrichment. In Auction 113, bidding credit caps were adopted not only because we are
required to do so by Part 1,515 but also because bidding credit caps provide safeguards for both the
Commission and small entities and other Auction 113 bidders. Therefore, we rejected the alternatives
received in comments opposing the bidding credit cap as proposed, including those opposing any form of
a bidding credit cap as well as those opposing proposals for an increase. Likewise, we are unable to
consider any changes to the geographic size of licenses offered in Auction 113, as proposed by WISPA
and supported by CCA516 because the Commission adopted the use of CMAs for AWS-3 spectrum
licenses in the context of a rulemaking and amending that decision is outside the scope of our delegated
authority to establish auction procedures.
273.
A Tribal lands bidding credit will also be available to winning bidders that intend to
deploy facilities and provide services to qualifying Tribal lands that have a wireline penetration rate equal
or below 85%.517 The Tribal lands bidding credit is in addition to, and separate from, any other bidding
credit winning bidders may qualify to claim. Therefore, small entities that are eligible for the small or
514

2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at 12–15, paras. 28–34 (small business bidding credits); 15–16, paras. 35–37
(rural service provider bidding credit).
515

47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2)(ii), (f)(4)((ii).

516

WISPA Comments at 2–4; CCA Reply at 6–7.

517

47 CFR §§ 1.2107, 1.2110(f).

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rural bidding credit can also claim the Tribal lands bidding credit, provided they meet the requirements of
sections 1.2107 and 1.2110(f) of the Commission’s rules.
274.
These procedures for the conduct of Auction 113 constitute the more specific
implementation of the competitive bidding rules contemplated by parts 1 and 27 of the Commission’s
rules and the underlying rulemaking orders, including the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, the 2025 AWS3 Report and Order, and relevant competitive bidding orders, and are fully consistent therewith.518
275.
Report to Congress. The Commission will send a copy of the Auction 113 Procedures
Public Notice, including this FRFA, in a report to Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.519
In addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, including this
FRFA to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA and will publish a copy of the Auction 113
Procedures Public Notice and this FRFA (or summaries thereof) in the Federal Register.520
D.

Contact Information

276.

For further information concerning this proceeding, contact the offices listed below:

General Auction 113 Information
General Auction Questions
Auction Process and Procedures

FCC Auctions Hotline
(888) 225-5322, option two; or
(717) 338-2868
Hours of service: 8:00 a.m. – 5:30 p.m. ET,
Monday through Friday

Auction 113 Legal Information
Auction Rules, Policies, Regulations, including
Reports of Section 1.2105(c) Violations and
Application Major Modifications

Auctions Division, OEA
(202) 418-0660
Valerie Barrish
Yasiman Montgomery

AWS-3 Bands Licensing Information
Service Rules, Policies, Regulations
Licensing Issues, Engineering Issues
Due Diligence, Incumbency Issues

Broadband Division, WTB
Madelaine Maior (Attorney) (202) 418-1466
Jeffrey Tignor (Attorney) (202) 418-0774

Technical Support
Electronic Filing
FCC Auction Bidding System
(Hardware/Software Issues)

FCC Auctions Technical Support Hotline
(877) 480-3201, option nine; or (202) 418-1250
ASL Video Call: (844) 432-2275
Hours of service: 8:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m. ET,
Monday through Friday

Payment Information
Wire Transfers
Refunds

FCC Revenue & Receivables Operations
Group/Auctions
Scott Radcliffe at (202) 418-7518,
or Theresa Meeks at (202) 418-2945, or
(fax) (202) 418-2843, or email to
RROGWireFaxes@fcc.gov

Auction Bidder Line

Will be furnished only to qualified bidders

See generally Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2360–75, paras. 68–159; 2014
AWS-3 Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 4728–34, Appx. B; 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order at Appx. B.
518

519

See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).

520

Id. § 604(b).

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Press Information

Office of Media Relations
Will Wiquist (202) 418-0500

FCC Forms

(800) 418-3676 (outside Washington, DC)
(202) 418-3676 (in the Washington area)
www.fcc.gov/forms

Accessible Formats
Braille, large print, electronic files, or
audio format for people with disabilities

Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau
(202) 418-0530 or (844)-432-2275 (ASL Video
Call)
fcc504@fcc.gov

Small Businesses
Additional information for small and
disadvantaged businesses

Office of Communications Business
Opportunities
(202) 418-0716
OCBOinfo@fcc.gov
www.fcc.gov/ocbo

FCC Internet Sites

www.fcc.gov
www.fcc.gov/auction/113

- FCC -

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ATTACHMENT A
Auction 113 Licenses
Bidding Units, Upfront Payments, and Minimum Opening Bid Amounts
This page was intentionally inserted as a placeholder for Attachment A, which is available as a separate
file. This Attachment will also be made available at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.

Federal Communications Commission

DA 25-1075

ATTACHMENT B
Acknowledgement Statement for Auction 113 Applicants
Applicant acknowledges that under 47 CFR § 27.1134(f) it must accept any interference from
incumbent federal operations in 1755–1780 MHz identified in an approved Transition Plan until such
time as these operations vacate the 1755–1780 MHz band in accordance with 47 CFR part 301, and that
under 47 U.S.C. § 2.106, US note 91 it must accept harmful interference from certain incumbent federal
systems, including federal earth stations at 25 sites. Applicant accepts the risk that this may pose to any
base station or associated equipment that it may deploy; any services it may offer; and any of its other
business arrangements. Applicant acknowledges that it understands these risks could potentially affect
the value of any licenses in 1755–1780 MHz band and that it has considered these risks before submitting
any bids for applicable licenses in Auction 113. This acknowledgement does not supersede the licensee’s
rights and obligations specified by law, rule, or other Commission action with respect to these
frequencies.

By:

Printed Name:

Title:

Applicant Name:

File Type

application/pdf